The role of stimulus-response bindings in priming: multiple routes and multiple stages by Horner, Aidan J
 
 
 
 
The role of stimulus-response bindings in priming: 
multiple routes and multiple stages 
 
Aidan James Horner 
Clare College 
Cambridge 
 
 
Medical Research Council 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
December 2009 
 ii
Declaration 
 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. 
 
Experiments 1, 2, 4-8 in Chapters 1-3 were reported in the paper by Horner, A.J. & 
Henson, R.N. (2009). Bindings between stimuli and multiple response codes dominate 
long-lag repetition priming in speeded classification tasks. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 35(3), 757-779. 
 
I hereby state that this dissertation does not exceed the work limit set by the Degree 
Committee for the Faculty of Biology (300 single-sided pages of double spaced text, 
not including the bibliography and appendices). 
 iii
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Rik Henson.  His breadth and 
depth of knowledge and eye for experimental detail have been invaluable; as has his 
unfailing support and willingness to point out when I am being stupid. 
 
Thanks are also due to the Medical Research Council for their financial support. 
 
For their friendship, support and tolerance whilst sharing an office I want to thank 
Becky Lawson and Caroline Whiting.  Their readiness to talk about all things 
psychological was of great help, as was their ability to make me realise there is more 
to life than carrying out yet another experiment.  Thanks also to all those at the MRC-
CBU who consider me a friend.  The chance to talk about issues other than science 
over tea and coffee were welcome.   
 
To my mother and father, thanks for instilling in me the importance of education, 
even if it took a while for the message to sink in.  Thanks also to my father for proof-
reading and expressing genuine enthusiasm and interest in my work. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank Sarah.  For her unfailing love and support throughout 
the last three and a bit years; for tolerating my scientific indulgences; for proof-
reading; for finally persuading me to move to London and giving me somewhere to 
call home whilst I finished this thesis.  For all that and more, I am truly grateful. 
 iv
Abstract 
 
Humans are remarkably adept at recognising, categorising and interacting with 
objects in their environment, an ability that is strongly modulated by prior experience. 
Behaviourally, such experience-dependent facilitation can manifest as an increase in 
response accuracy and/or a decrease in response time on a given task for repeated 
compared to experimentally novel stimuli. This behavioural priming effect is often 
accompanied by decreases in neural activity, as measured by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and/or electroencephalography/magnetoencephalography 
(EEG/MEG), within distinct cortical regions – a phenomenon known as repetition 
suppression. Priming and repetition suppression (RS) are often thought to reflect the 
facilitation of psychological (component) processes engaged during initial and 
subsequent presentations of a stimulus. These phenomena however can also reflect the 
formation of direct, stimulus-response (S-R) bindings, retrieval of which can bypass 
many of the processes engaged during the initial presentation.   
This thesis presents evidence that S-R learning contributions dominate in long-
lag repetition priming of semantic classification of visual stimuli (Chapters 2-3). 
Furthermore, S-R bindings can form at multiple levels of both stimulus and response 
representation, suggesting S-R learning is a highly flexible process (Chapter 4). 
Whereas RS, as measured by fMRI, is shown to be sensitive to the retrieval of S-R 
bindings in inferior prefrontal regions, it is shown to be insensitive to such retrieval in 
posterior ventral visual regions (Chapter 5). Using sensor-level analyses of EEG, 
repetition effects that are sensitive to the retrieval of S-R bindings are shown to be 
time-locked to response-onset whereas repetition effects that are unaffected by such 
retrieval are time-locked to stimulus-onset (Chapter 6). As such, both fMRI and EEG 
point to a dissociation between possible S-R learning and component process 
contributions to priming and RS. Finally, the formation of S-R bindings is shown to 
be dependent upon attention, with no significant S-R learning effects present for 
stimuli either unattended at initial or subsequent presentation (Chapter 7). Given 
dominant theories of repetition priming are incapable of incorporating many of these 
results, a multiple-route multiple-stage (MR-MS) framework is proposed (Chapter 8). 
This framework attempts to incorporate known component process contributions to 
priming and RS with the S-R learning contributions presented in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Repetition priming 
 
Humans are remarkably adept at recognising, categorising and ultimately interacting 
with objects in their environment, seemingly oblivious to the computational 
complexities involved.  Importantly, such abilities are modulated by experience – in 
general, we become more efficient with increased exposure to a particular stimulus.  
Experimentally, such increased efficiency can manifest as an increase in response 
accuracy and/or a decrease in response time (RT) on a given task for subsequent 
compared to initial presentation of a stimulus, a phenomenon known as repetition 
priming.  Repetition priming is a robust phenomenon, and has been shown across a 
range of visual (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1993), auditory (e.g., Schacter & 
Church, 1992), haptic (e.g., Easton, Greene & Srinivas, 1997) and olfactory (e.g., 
Schab & Crowder, 1995) stimuli, as well as across short (i.e., msecs; e.g., Ratcliff, 
Hockley & McKoon, 1985) and long (i.e., months to years; e.g., Cave, 1997) time-
lags between stimulus presentations. 
Interest in priming began in earnest following the revelation that amnesic 
patients, who demonstrate profound impairments in standard tests of long-term 
declarative memory, show intact priming (Scoville & Milner, 2000; Warrington & 
Weiskrantz, 1974).  In contrast, lesions to occipital (Keane, Gabrieli, Mapstone, 
Johnson & Corkin, 1995) and temporal (Bondi & Kaszniak, 1991) regions have been 
shown to result in the disruption of priming, but not declarative recognition memory 
(though see Kinder & Shanks, 2003; Kroll et al., 2003).  These results drew a clear 
distinction between assessing memory using direct memory tasks (i.e., those that 
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make explicit reference to, or require explicit knowledge of, stimulus repetition) and 
indirect memory tasks (i.e., those that do not refer or relate to stimulus repetition).   
In the realm of indirect memory tasks, a distinction can be made between 
identification tasks (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a; Roediger, Srinivas & Weldon, 1989a) and 
classification tasks (e.g., Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Schnyer et al., 2007; Schnyer, 
Dobbins, Nicholls, Schacter & Verfaellie, 2006).  Whereas identification tasks simply 
require the participant to identify/recognise a particular stimulus, classification tasks 
require a further, often binary, classification.  For example, following the presentation 
of a picture of a common object, participants might be required to name the object or 
classify it as being “man-made” or “natural”.  Whereas the former naming task 
requires only identification of the stimulus (and subsequent naming), the latter man-
made/natural task requires a further binary classification.  The present thesis 
concentrates primarily on these latter indirect classification tasks, though I will return 
to identification tasks in the final chapter. 
A further reason for the interest in priming is that it has been used for many 
years as a tool to investigate the nature of mental and neural representations. By 
testing the degree to which priming generalises over some change in the stimulus 
(e.g., when presenting pictures of the same object but from different viewpoints), one 
can infer the degree of abstraction of the mental representations assumed to underlie 
the priming.  In this way priming has been used to investigate the view-dependence of 
object representations (Biederman & Gerhardstein, 1993) and the separate existence 
of morphological representations of words (Marslen-Wilson, Tyler, Waksler & Older, 
1994). The same logic has more recently been combined with functional 
neuroimaging, examining where priming effects are observed in the brain when 
repeating stimuli at various levels of abstraction, and hence inferring the nature of 
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neural representations in certain brain regions (Henson, 2003). The alternative 
explanation of behavioural and neural priming effects explored in this thesis, 
however, questions such a use of priming. 
 
1.2 Theories of repetition priming  
1.2.1 Modification accounts 
1.2.1.1 Abstractionist accounts 
  
Early studies of priming typically interpreted priming as a modification of pre-existing 
mental representations (Bowers, 2000; Tenpenny, 1995) (see Figure 1.1).  For 
example, presentation of a picture of a familiar object is likely to entail activation of a 
pre-existing representation of that object.  This activation may lead to temporary or 
long-lasting changes in the representation’s baseline level of activation such that re-
activation of that representation in the future occurs more rapidly (e.g., Morton, 
1969).  Alternatively, activation of specific representations may lead to the 
strengthening of connections between such representations, perhaps related to 
synaptic or neural changes in the brain – the “greased tracks” metaphor (e.g., Henson, 
2003).  Evidence in favour of such “abstractionist” accounts comes from studies that 
show priming regardless of the task or context in which a stimulus is initially 
presented.  For example, priming has been shown for low-frequency words when the 
task was switched between presentations (Bowers & Turner, 2003) and even for 
words embedded within prose passages at initial presentation (i.e., when stimuli were 
presented in a different context/task to subsequent presentation; Nicolas, 1998). 
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Figure 1.1.  At Study, the presentation of a visual object entails the recruitment of specific processes involved in 
the perceptual identification of the object as well as the extraction of particular (possibly semantic) task-relevant 
information prior to the generation of an appropriate response.  Under the component process account, one or 
more of these process are facilitated at Test (i.e., when a stimulus is repeated) therefore resulting in priming.  
Alternatively, a previously encoded Stimulus-Response (S-R) binding is retrieved, resulting in the effective by-
passing of previously engaged component processes. 
 
 
1.2.1.2 Perceptual representation systems 
 
Such priming need not depend on pre-existing representations however.  Instead, 
facilitation could arise from the construction of novel stimulus representations, for 
example within a Perceptual Representation System (PRS) (e.g., Schacter, 1990).  
Here priming is thought to reflect the activation of a representation that was 
constructed on initial presentation.  Such activation is thought to be less time 
consuming than the processes involved in the construction of a new representation, 
resulting in faster RTs.  Consistent with the specialised role of a PRS, priming has 
been shown for novel 2D pictures of 3D “possible”, but not “impossible”, objects, 
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suggesting that priming can reflect the construction (and subsequent activation) of 3D 
“structural” representations of objects (Schacter, Cooper & Delaney, 1990).  Indeed, 
the mechanisms involved in the learning of new representations may be the same as 
the modifications thought to occur in standard abstractionist accounts, as illustrated 
for example by weight changes in connectionist models (Bowers, Damian & Havelka, 
2002; Marsolek, Schnyer, Deason, Ritchey & Verfaellie, 2006; Stark & McClelland, 
2000). 
 
1.2.2.3 Component process theories 
 
A different, though related, conception is that priming involves the facilitation of 
specific processes or procedures entailed by a task (Kolers & Roediger, 1984; Logan, 
1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis1989b).  Such processes might be thought of as 
task-specific computations and/or mappings between representations.  Although this 
conception would seem to make similar predictions to abstractionist theories, the 
procedural conception does not focus on individual representations of stimuli. Thus it 
can explain practice effects in tasks like reading inverted or mirror-reversed text.  
With practice, participants are able to rapidly read such text despite a change in 
stimulus set (i.e., prose passage) between practice and test (Kolers & Perkins, 1975).  
In other words, such practice effects can generalise to new items.  Procedural theory 
therefore offers greater explanatory flexibility in that it can accommodate highly task-
specific novel processes. At the same time however, the procedural conception makes 
few a priori predictions regarding the specific types of processes that are engaged by 
tasks or that can demonstrate facilitation. 
Though having few a priori predictions about the types of processes that can 
be primed, one useful heuristic within the procedural framework has been the broad 
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distinction between perceptual and conceptual processes (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993).  Such a distinction is primarily based on studies that show a 
dissociation between data-driven tasks thought to engage primarily perceptual 
processes, such as word identification, and conceptually-driven tasks thought to 
engage more conceptual processes, such as word generation when presented with an 
antonym (e.g., Jacoby, 1983b; though see Tenpenny & Shoben, 1992 for a critique of 
the data-driven/conceptually-driven distinction).  More generally however, it is likely 
that there are multiple different computations that can be facilitated during any one 
task, the so-called component process (CP) view of priming (Tenpenny & Shoben, 
1992; Witherspoon & Moscovitch, 1989) (see Figure 1.1). For example, priming in 
word-stem completion paradigms has been shown despite changes in modality 
between presentations (Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1996), suggesting a 
conceptual locus for such effects.  However, word-stem completion priming is also 
reduced following graphemic versus phonological study tasks (Richardson-Klavehn & 
Gardiner, 1998), suggesting a perceptual component. Such results are therefore 
difficult to characterise with the broad perceptual vs. conceptual distinction, 
suggesting facilitation can occur at a lexical level too. Note though that not all 
component processes necessarily make a significant contribution to the final amount 
of priming, in that the critical ones that can be facilitated significantly by repetition 
are likely to be those that are not already maximally efficient (Henson, 2003). 
According to the CP theory, the amount of priming reflects the degree of 
overlap between processes performed on initial and repeated presentation of a 
stimulus (analogous to Transfer Appropriate Processing - TAP; Morris, Bransford & 
Franks, 1977).  In favour of such an account, priming (particularly for high-frequency 
words) has been shown to be sensitive to switches in task between presentations 
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(Franks, Bilbrey, Lien & McNamara, 2000), with the transfer of priming dependent 
on the similarity of semantic information retrieved by tasks at initial and subsequent 
presentation (Xiong, Franks & Logan, 2003). 
Critically, both abstractionist and CP accounts are what have been termed 
“modification” accounts of priming.  They both predict that the same mental 
representations and/or psychological processes are activated or engaged at initial and 
subsequent presentations of a particular stimulus, and that these 
representations/processes are in some way modified resulting in facilitation.  In short, 
assuming that task demands remain constant, the “qualitative” 
representations/processes engaged in the generation of a response remain constant 
regardless of repetition.  Given CP theory has become the modal theory of repetition 
priming, the present thesis uses this theory as the primary example of a modification 
account of repetition priming. 
 
1.2.2 Episodic accounts 
 
An alternative view to such modification theories of priming suggests that priming 
reflects the formation and retrieval of unique “episodes” (Hintzman, 1976).  Such 
episodes would encode, at a minimum, the stimulus presented and response made 
(Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Hommel, 2004), but may also include additional contextual 
information (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986) (note however that such episodes are not 
necessarily related to the idea of conscious "episodic" memory; Tulving, 1972).  In 
support of such a conception, priming has been shown to be sensitive to changes in 
contextual detail between presentations (Tenpenny, 1995). Furthermore, episodic 
representations would seem necessary to explain priming for novel associations 
between stimuli (Goshen-Gottstein & Moscovitch, 1995; Paller et al., 1992).  Within 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 8
the broad domain of episodic accounts of priming, theories that focus on the binding 
of stimuli and responses are often referred to as “response learning” or “Stimulus-
Response” (S-R) theories.  The focus of the present thesis is on such S-R theories of 
priming. 
 
1.2.2.1 S-R theories 
 
One specific example of an S-R theory of priming is the "instance theory" proposed 
by Logan (1990), as an extension of his theory of expertise (Logan, 1988). This theory 
assumes that the response to the initial presentation of a stimulus is generated by an 
algorithmic processing route (i.e., the engagement of specific component processes), 
but that this response also becomes stored together with the stimulus in a separate 
"instance" (i.e., episode/S-R binding). When the stimulus is repeated, there is a race 
between the algorithmic route and retrieval of any previous instances. If the retrieval 
of a previous instance wins the race, the RT will be shorter, producing priming (see 
Figure 1.1).  Importantly, stimulus repetition is not thought to result in the speeding 
up of the algorithmic route (e.g., facilitation of component processes); priming instead 
results from a qualitative shift in processing, from the generation of a response via an 
algorithmic route to one of instance retrieval.  By assuming that each stimulus-
response repetition (i.e., trial) leads to the formation of a new instance, Logan's theory 
provides an elegant account of the change in both the mean and variance of RTs as a 
function of the number of repetitions. 
Critically, Instance Theory predicts that priming should only be present when 
a response is repeated between initial and subsequent presentation.  When a response 
is changed between presentations of a stimulus, the theory predicts that no priming 
should occur as the system reverts to the algorithmic route that does not show 
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facilitation.  Note that the two routes to response generation are independent in 
Logan’s model, with the fastest route winning the race for response selection.  In 
situations where the response should be reversed between presentations (e.g., 
following a task-switch), the successful retrieval of an inappropriate/incorrect 
response code should cause both an error and a speeding up of RTs.  Alternatively, if 
the algorithmic route wins the race and is not itself error-prone, RTs should show no 
change.  As such, RTs should never be slower than the time taken for the algorithmic 
route to produce a response.  This lack of interference predicts that RTs for correct 
responses to repeated stimuli should never be slower than for novel stimuli when a 
response is changed between presentations (i.e., negative priming cannot occur). 
The encoding of S-R bindings is also consistent with the Event File theory 
proposed by Hommel (1998).  This theory can be seen as an extension of the object-
file theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Kahneman, Treisman & Gibbs, 1992) 
originally proposed as a system that binds together visual information relating to a 
single object.  These bindings were thought to include, though not exclusively, 
information relating to the stimulus shape, colour and location. The Event File theory 
extends this proposal to include bindings between stimuli and information relating to 
the task performed and response made, as well as additional contextual information.  
This theory has thus far focussed on interfering effects of prior encounters with a 
stimulus, whereby discrepancies between the present circumstances and retrieved 
Event Files tend to slow RTs compared to novel stimuli (Hommel, 2004).  Given this 
focus on interference, it is presently unclear how the theory predicts positive priming 
(i.e., a speeding of RTs) as a result of response repetition (though see Waszak & 
Hommel, 2007).   
Note that in the above discussion of S-R theories of repetition priming I have 
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not given a precise definition of what constitutes a “response” or a “stimulus”.  For 
example, the question of whether responses in S-R bindings relate to specific motor-
actions (e.g., left/right finger-press) or more abstract task-dependent decisions (e.g., 
“yes”/“no” in a binary classification task) is still disputed in the literature (e.g., 
Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie & Schacter, 2004; Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007), as 
is the question of whether or not S-R effects are “hyper-specific” to repetition of 
exactly the same stimulus (e.g., identical pictures of an object) (Denkinger & 
Koutstaal, 2009; Schnyer et al., 2007). I address these issues directly in Chapter 4. 
 
1.2.3 Predictions of S-R versus CP theories 
 
To summarise, the Instance Theory predicts positive priming (shorter RTs) only when 
a response is repeated between presentations (i.e., when response retrieval wins the 
race).  When a response is changed/reversed, Instance Theory predicts that no nett 
priming should occur.  This is because the system reverts back to the algorithmic 
route, that does not show facilitation.  The Event File Theory predicts that the reversal 
of a response between presentations results in slowing of RTs (i.e., negative priming).  
Although it is unclear what the theory predicts when a response is repeated, it is 
plausible to suggest the theory predicts no nett priming.  More importantly, the 
Instance and Event File Theory predict a difference in priming dependent upon the 
repetition/reversal of response between presentations. In contrast to these S-R 
theories, the CP account of priming predicts that positive priming should occur 
regardless of response repetition/reversal – as long as the same component processes 
are engaged at initial and subsequent presentation.  This is because CP theories 
predict that priming can only result from the facilitation of processes that are stimulus 
specific.  Although response-selection processes may show facilitation, if they are not 
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bound to a specific (repeated) stimulus, facilitation will occur for both repeated and 
novel stimuli and therefore no priming will occur.  Thus, repeating/reversing a 
response between repetitions should have no effect on priming. 
In light of these predictions, S-R and CP accounts of priming are typically 
assessed by means of a response switch (versus response repetition), usually effected 
by a switch in task between initial and subsequent presentation of a stimulus.  Using 
this manipulation, S-R learning has been shown to contribute to repetition priming of 
RTs and/or errors in long-lag classification tasks (e.g., Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; 
Schnyer et al., 2007), though its contribution is normally believed to supplement that 
from facilitation of component processes.  Importantly, if priming does reflect such a 
qualitative shift in processing, and a “by-passing” of previously engaged processes, 
these S-R learning effects question the commonly held assumption that priming can 
be used as a tool with which to investigate the nature of stimulus representations, and 
question the nature of memory processes that are intact in amnesia. 
 
1.2.4 S-R learning across numerous paradigms 
1.2.4.1 Task-switching paradigms 
 
S-R effects have been studied extensively within the context of task-switching 
(Allport & Wylie, 1999; Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003).  
These experiments show that RTs are usually slower after a task-switch, the so-called 
task-switch cost (Rogers & Monsell, 1995).  More importantly for present purposes, 
RTs are also modulated by the prior task and/or response history of a repeated 
stimulus (Allport & Wylie, 1999; Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak et al., 2003).  In 
particular, RTs tend to be slower (relative to novel stimuli) when a stimulus is 
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repeated in a task that is incongruent with the task performed on its prior 
presentations.  Such stimulus-specific task-switch costs are thought to result from the 
retrieval of information relating to the previous task and/or response, which interferes 
with the selection of a new response.  Note however that such research has focussed 
primarily on the behavioural costs associated with switches in response between 
stimulus presentations, rather than the benefits (e.g., faster RTs) associated with 
response repetition as shown in long-lag repetition priming paradigms (though see 
Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak et al., 2003).   
 
1.2.4.2 Masked priming paradigms 
 
S-R learning has also been used to explain aspects of short-lag subliminal priming 
(Abrams, Klinger & Greenwald, 2002; Damian, 2001; Kiesel, Kunde & Hoffmann, 
2006; Kiesel, Kunde & Hoffmann, 2007; Klauer, Eder, Greenwald & Abrams, 2007; 
Kunde, Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2003).  Subliminal priming paradigms typically assess 
priming for a “probe” stimulus that is immediately preceded by a “prime” stimulus.  
This prime stimulus is rendered subliminal by brief presentation accompanied by 
some form of masking.  Facilitation is normally seen when the prime and probe are 
the same stimulus (Forster & Davis, 1984).  Recently however there has been much 
debate as to whether “semantic” effects can be seen, where a stimulus is preceded by 
a semantically related masked prime (e.g., Hodgson, 1991).   
Although such effects have been seen, it has been argued that they are due 
solely to S-R learning (Damian, 2001).  This is because such subliminal semantic 
priming has typically been found in paradigms in which the stimuli are repeated 
across trials, such that a stimulus used as the probe on one trial can be used as a prime 
in later trials. This raises the possibility that stimuli can become associated with a 
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response when they generate that response as a probe, and that this response can be 
triggered when that stimulus is presented briefly as a prime in a subsequent trial 
(causing priming), without that prime stimulus necessarily being processed 
semantically.  
Although more recent studies have controlled for S-R contributions and still 
found evidence for subliminal semantic priming, there is little doubt that S-R learning 
plays a dominant role in such paradigms if not controlled (see Van den Bussche, Van 
den Noortgate & Reynvoet, 2009 for a meta-analysis).  Such results are theoretically 
interesting in that they suggest that, whereas the encoding of S-R bindings requires 
conscious awareness of the stimulus (i.e., they are only formed when the stimulus is 
shown as a probe), such bindings are retrieved automatically with no need for 
conscious awareness (i.e., when previous probe stimuli are repeated as subliminal 
primes), as tested empirically by recent studies of masked categorical priming (e.g., 
Eckstein & Henson, submitted). Note however that further studies have shown that, 
while awareness for the prime may not be necessary to see masked priming effects, 
spatial (e.g., Lachter, Forster & Ruthruff, 2004) and temporal (e.g., Naccache, 
Blandin & Dehaene, 2002) attention are necessary. The issue of attention is revisited 
in the next section. 
 
1.2.4.3 Negative priming paradigms 
 
S-R learning has also been used as an explanation for negative priming effects 
(Frings, Rothermund & Wentura, 2007; MacDonald & Joordens, 2000; Rothermund, 
Wentura & De Houwer, 2005).  Negative priming refers to a slowing of RTs when 
previous non-target (unattended) stimuli are repeated as targets (attended) (see Fox, 
1995; Tipper, 2001 for reviews).  This effect is often thought to reflect the inhibition 
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of task-irrelevant stimulus representations (Tipper, 1985).  Such inhibition is thought 
to produce carry-over effects from initial to subsequent presentation, resulting in a 
slowing of RTs.  Alternatively, unattended task-irrelevant stimuli might be tagged 
with a “do-not-respond” code that interferes with response generation on subsequent 
presentation (Neill, 1997). Again however, a third type of explanation for negative 
priming has appealed to S-R learning. According to such accounts, the response given 
to an attended stimulus becomes bound to the critical task-irrelevant unattended 
stimulus.  In other words, a response becomes bound to any co-occurring stimulus, 
regardless of attention.  When the unattended stimulus is repeated (and attended) 
negative priming can manifest if the response previously bound to the stimulus is 
incongruent to the newly generated response.  Studies showing such effects therefore 
suggest that attention is not a necessary condition in the encoding of S-R bindings. I 
return to the issue of attention in Chapter 7. 
 
1.2.5 Limitations of S-R theories of repetition priming 
 
Although S-R contributions to priming have been seen across the range of paradigms 
described above, certain results are more difficult to explain in terms of the encoding 
and retrieval of unique S-R bindings.  In particular, although long-lag classification 
paradigms have shown clear S-R learning effects (e.g., Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; 
Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007), the results from studies using identification tasks 
would seem less explicable in terms of S-R learning (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993; Roediger et al., 1989a).  For example, tasks requiring the 
identification of a degraded or fragmented stimulus at test (e.g., word-stem 
completion) are difficult to reconcile with S-R accounts, particularly given that the 
type of response made between study and test phases can be dissimilar (e.g., counting 
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syllables at study and completing a word-stem at test, Schott et al., 2005).  Although 
the present thesis focuses on the role of S-R binding in classification paradigms, I 
return to the differences between classification and identification paradigms in the 
final chapter. 
 
1.3 S-R theories and repetition suppression 
 
More recently S-R theories have been offered as a means to explain the reductions 
seen in neural activity following stimulus repetition, as measured by functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto/electro-encephalography (M/EEG). 
In the case of fMRI, these repetition-related reductions in certain (but not all) cortical 
regions has been termed repetition suppression (RS; Grill-Spector, Henson & Martin, 
2006).  For example, when a visual object is repeated in the context of a given task, 
reductions in neural activity are often seen in lateral occipital and inferior temporal 
visual regions (i.e., the ventral visual stream) as well as distinct regions in prefrontal 
cortex (PFC).  Given the co-occurrence of behavioural priming and these reductions 
in cortical activity, RS is often thought of as a neural analogue of behavioural 
priming.  RS may therefore represent a fundamental form of long-term stimulus-
specific neural plasticity, reflecting more efficient neural processing.  In turn, such 
increased neural efficiency may contribute to analogous improvements in behavioural 
performance, such as priming (e.g., faster reaction times to make a categorisation; see 
Henson, 2003; Schacter & Buckner, 1998). 
As in the behavioural priming literature, such RS is often attributed to the 
facilitation of certain processes engaged at both initial and subsequent presentation 
(i.e., component process accounts; Henson, 2003).  In the previous example, the RS 
seen within ventral visual regions following repetition of a visual stimulus is often 
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thought to result from the facilitation of visual identification processes.  RS within 
inferior PFC however is often thought to result from the facilitation of task-specific 
semantic/conceptual and/or phonological processes (e.g., Poldrack et al., 1999; 
Wagner, Desmond, Demb, Glover & Gabrieli, 1997; Wagner, Koutstaal, Maril, 
Schacter & Buckner, 2000).  Under this conception (as in the priming literature), RS 
can be used as a tool to investigate the nature and localisation of neural 
representations.  For example, RS has been used to investigate the nature of object 
(e.g., Eger, Henson, Driver & Dolan, 2004; Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2001; Vuilleumier, 
Henson, Driver & Dolan, 2002) and face (e.g., Eger, Schweinberger, Dolan & 
Henson, 2005; Eger, Schyns & Kleinschmidt, 2004; Winston, Henson, Fine-Goulden 
& Dolan, 2004) representations within the ventral visual processing stream. 
S-R accounts however suggest that RS results not from the facilitation of 
particular component processes, but from the by-passing of such processes.  Whereas 
an experimentally novel stimulus will still recruit certain component processes (i.e., 
the algorithmic route) in the generation of a task-appropriate response, a repeated 
stimulus no longer requires the engagement of such processes.  In other words, a 
previously encoded S-R binding is automatically retrieved enabling the rapid 
execution of a response. This results in the effective by-passing (or curtailing) of 
previously engaged component processes, causing a reduction in activity in the neural 
implementation of the algorithmic route.  In support of such an explanation, an 
influential paper by Dobbins et al. (2004) (which prompted many of the experiments 
herein, and which informed the present paradigms) recently presented evidence 
suggesting that the RS effect, even within “early” perceptual regions, is dependent 
upon response repetition between stimulus presentations.  Whereas they saw robust 
RS in ventral visual and inferior prefrontal regions for repeated stimuli when a 
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response was repeated, RS was significantly curtailed (and no longer reliable) when a 
response was reversed between presentations.  These results are striking in that they 
suggest that RS, even in supposed “visual” regions, simply reflects the retrieval of an 
S-R binding (though see Horner & Henson, 2008; Race, Shanker & Wagner, 2009 and 
Chapter 5 of the present thesis).  Importantly, these results undermine the use of RS as 
a tool with which to investigate particular neural representations. 
 
1.4 Pitting CP versus S-R theories 
 
Although I have detailed a number of studies in favour of either CP or S-R accounts 
of repetition priming, it is plausible that priming results from the combination of both 
the facilitation of repeated component processes as well as the retrieval of S-R 
bindings.  Indeed, a recent study suggested that contributions to priming from S-R 
learning – but not from component processes – are disrupted in amnesic patients 
(Schnyer et al., 2006).  Specifically, amnesic patients did not demonstrate greater 
priming following response repetition than response reversal (that the controls did, 
and as S-R theories predict).  Nonetheless, amnesics did show reliable priming for 
repeated objects that received either the same or a reversed response between 
repetitions.  This significant priming was attributed to the facilitation of component 
perceptual and/or conceptual processes that are assumed to be intact in these amnesics 
(e.g., occurring in cortical regions unaffected by their brain damage, which was 
primarily to MTL regions).  This finding therefore suggests a possible dissociation 
between S-R and CP contributions to behavioural priming. 
If indeed priming can result from the facilitation of component processes and 
the retrieval of S-R bindings, a theory of priming is needed that incorporates both 
contributions.  In particular, such a theory would need to explain how these 
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independent contributions ultimately interact to effect a response.  In the development 
of such a theory, several issues regarding S-R learning need to be addressed.  I next 
introduce several questions that the present thesis will attempt to answer.  In the final 
chapter the answers to these questions will be used in the development of a novel 
framework designed to incorporate S-R and CP contributions to behavioural and 
neural repetition effects.  Specifically, this framework will aim to relate the repetition-
related changes in neural activity, as measured by fMRI and EEG in Chapters 5 & 6 
with the behavioural priming effects seen in Chapters 2, 3, 4 & 7. 
 
1.4.1 Question 1: How dominant are S-R contributions within long-
lag classification paradigms? 
 
As previously stated, S-R learning contributions to priming have been seen within 
long-lag classification paradigms (Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Dobbins et al., 2004).  
Such S-R learning has been generally thought to supplement contributions from 
facilitation of component processes.  For example, in the Dobbins et al. (2004) study, 
the authors saw greater priming when stimuli and responses were repeated between 
presentations compared to when responses were reversed.  Significant positive 
priming was still present despite reversal in responses however.  This significant 
positive priming following response reversal is not predicted by any current S-R 
theory and was therefore proposed to reflect the facilitation of component processes. 
Although these data support the idea that both component process and S-R 
contributions can be seen within the same experimental paradigm, the relative 
magnitude of these effects is still unclear.  The Dobbins et al. (2004) study 
manipulated response repetitions/reversals by means of between-block 
repetitions/reversals in task.  During a “Start” phase, participants classified pictures of 
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objects as to whether they were “bigger than a shoebox” in real life.  Repetitions of 
stimuli in this block therefore required completion of the same task and as a result the 
same response.  In a subsequent “Switch” phase, participants were asked the opposite 
question, viz. whether the object was “smaller than a shoebox”.  As such, any 
stimulus that was initially presented in the Start phase required a reversal of response 
during the Switch phase (e.g., an item that is “bigger than a shoebox” will receive a 
“yes” response in the Start phase and a “no” response in the Switch phase).   
One issue with the Start/Switch response manipulation is it remains unclear 
whether the retrieval of S-R bindings are increasing priming in the Start phase or 
decreasing priming in the Switch phase.  In other words, is the retrieval of S-R 
bindings facilitating processing when a response is repeated or interfering with 
processing when a response is reversed?  Although positive priming is seen in the 
Switch phase, it is possible that this could be the nett result of facilitation from 
repeated component processes and interference from S-R learning (presuming 
facilitation outweighs interference).  As such, the Start/Switch paradigm does not 
offer a means to assess the baseline level of component process facilitation within an 
experiment. 
In the experiments described in Chapters 2-3, I utilised a similar design to that 
of Dobbins et al. (2004) in order to replicate and extend their previous results.  At 
Study, I asked participants whether pictures of objects were “bigger than a shoebox”. 
In two of the conditions at Test, I either asked them the same question (i.e., “bigger 
than a shoebox?”) or the reverse question (i.e., “smaller than a shoebox?”). One half 
of the stimuli at Test are repetitions of those at Study (Repeated), the other half are 
experimentally novel (Novel), comparison of which gives the basic measure of 
priming. These Same and Reverse conditions are analogous to the Start and Switch 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 20
phases of Dobbins et al. (2004), but within a more conventional “Study-Test” design 
that equates the lag between initial and repeated presentations across the conditions; a 
confound of the Dobbins et al. study (see Chapter 2 for more details).  To address the 
baseline issue outlined above, I introduced a third Test condition in which I asked a 
question at Test (e.g., “is the object man-made?”) that was unrelated to that at Study.  
Here the stimuli were chosen so that responses made at Test were, on average, 
orthogonal to those made at Study (i.e., 50% of stimuli required the same response, 
50% required a reversal of response).  This condition was designed to act as a baseline 
measure against which possible facilitatory and/or interference effects in the 
Same/Reverse condition could be measured.  I therefore used this design to assess the 
relative contribution of S-R learning compared to facilitation of component processes 
(Chapters 2-3). 
 
1.4.2 Question 2: At what level are stimuli and responses 
represented within S-R bindings? 
 
Whereas Chapters 2-3 were concerned with measuring both S-R and CP contributions 
to priming, in Chapter 4 I turned my attention to the type of information encoded 
within S-R bindings.  Specifically, I asked: at what level(s) of representation are 
stimuli and responses encoded in S-R bindings?  Although some previous research 
has attempted to address this issue, it has led to contradictory conclusions about 
whether S-R binding occurs at highly specific motor-action representations (e.g., 
right/left finger press; Dobbins et al., 2004) or more abstract decision representations 
(e.g., "yes"/"no"; Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007).  Research focussing on the level 
of stimulus representation has led to similar contradictory conclusions, with evidence 
for S-R bindings at highly specific representations that are tied to the specific visual 
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format of the stimulus (Schnyer et al., 2007) or representations that are able to 
abstract across different object exemplars (e.g., two differing pictures of a lion; 
Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009).   
One possibility however is that S-R bindings can occur at multiple levels of 
stimulus and response abstraction.  Here I can distinguish at least two levels of 
stimulus representation: a specific depiction of an object and an abstract 
representation of the identity of that object, and three possible levels of response 
representation: a particular motor Action (e.g., left/right finger-press), a particular 
binary Decision (e.g., yes/no) and a particular task-dependent Classification (e.g., 
bigger/smaller) (see Figure 1.2).  Each of these levels of stimulus and response 
abstraction have been proposed in previous research (Abrams et al., 2002; Damian, 
2001; Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009; Dobbins et al., 2004; Koch & Allport, 2006; 
Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007), but normally when contrasting one with another, 
under the assumption that only one true level of stimulus or response representation 
needs to be identified. 
 This issue of multiple response codes is particularly pertinent to the results of 
Dobbins et al. (2004).  Specifically, whereas the Start/Switch design results in the 
reversal of response at the level of both Action (e.g., left/right finger-press) and 
Decision (e.g., yes/no), it does not require a reversal at the level of a task-dependent 
Classification (e.g., a lion is always “bigger” regardless of the direction of the 
question).  If responses are coded at such an abstract level of representation, it is 
possible that the Start/Switch design fails to control appropriately for S-R learning.  
Indeed, this may explain why residual priming was present in the Switch phase of the 
Dobbins et al. experiment, a result previously thought to reflect the facilitation of 
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component processes.  In Chapter 4 I address the issue of the level of both stimulus 
and response representation within S-R bindings. 
 
 
Figure 1.2.  Two possible levels of stimulus representation (“specific” and “abstract”) and three 
possible levels of response representation (Classification, Decision and Action).  Either stimulus 
representations are specific to repetition of the same visual stimulus between presentations (e.g., a 
picture of an octopus), or they form at an abstract level and can be retrieved despite a change in visual 
format between presentations (e.g., a picture of an octopus and the word “octopus”).  With regard to 
response representations, when a stimulus is presented in the context of the “bigger-than-shoebox” task 
the participant must first compare the size of the stimulus to that of a shoebox, resulting in a size-
classification of “bigger”.  Due to the particular direction of the question (i.e., “bigger-than”), a 
“bigger” Classification is mapped to a “yes” decision.  This “yes” decision is then mapped to the 
appropriate motor-response, resulting in a right finger-press Action. 
 
1.4.3 Question 3: Does retrieval of S-R bindings result in facilitation 
when a response is repeated, and/or interference when a response is 
reversed? 
 
Although S-R learning has been clearly demonstrated within long-lag classification 
paradigms (Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Dobbins et al., 2004; Schnyer et al., 2007; 
Schnyer et al., 2006), these effects have largely been thought of as facilitatory in 
nature.  Within the task-switching literature however, such task/response reversals 
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have been shown to result in a slowing of RTs, suggesting that retrieval of S-R 
bindings can interfere with current response selection (Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak 
et al., 2003).  To date, no long-lag classification experiment has demonstrated both 
facilitation and interference effects owing to the retrieval of S-R bindings.  This issue 
is particularly important given the predictions of Instance Theory, where a slowing of 
RTs should not occur.  Specifically, when a trial requires a change or reversal in 
response between presentations, Instance Theory predicts that priming should not 
occur if a correct response reversal is made (as the system reverts to algorithmic 
processing).  Alternatively, response retrieval could win the race, resulting in faster 
RTs but an incorrect response.  Thus, Instance Theory predicts a trade-off between 
RTs and accuracy.  In situations where a reversal of response is required, priming 
should not be seen when a “correct” response is made.  Using a variety of 
manipulations to effect repetitions/reversals in response I address the issue of 
facilitation/interference across Chapters 2-6. 
 
1.4.4 Question 4: Are repetition-related changes in neural activity, 
as measured by fMRI and EEG, related to S-R learning or 
component process contributions to behavioural priming? 
 
Whilst the results of Dobbins et al. (2004) suggest that RS effects, as measured by 
fMRI, are sensitive to the retrieval of S-R bindings, other studies have found robust 
RS, particularly within occipital/temporal ventral visual regions, under conditions 
deliberately chosen to limit the occurrence of S-R learning.  For example, RS in 
inferior temporal regions has been seen when using tasks that had no explicit response 
requirements for the critical stimuli (Henson, Shallice & Dolan, 2000), when 
changing tasks such that the response on repetition of a stimulus was (on average) 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 24
orthogonal to its previous response (Henson et al., 2003; Horner & Henson, 2008), 
and when changing both the stimulus and response, resulting in no obvious S-R 
binding, such as in identification paradigms that involve different tasks at study and 
test (e.g., word-stem completion Schacter, Alpert, Savage, Rauch & Albert, 1996; 
Schott et al., 2005).  Thus S-R bindings would not appear sufficient to explain RS in 
all brain regions, particularly parts of the ventral visual processing stream. 
 In Chapter 5, I present an fMRI experiment designed to assess the relative 
roles of S-R and CP contributions in RS.  The design of the experiment was based on 
the behavioural results presented in Chapters 2-4.  Specifically, it controlled for S-R 
bindings at the three levels of response representation that I proposed above, and 
simultaneously examined changes in both response and stimulus representation. With 
this “optimised” experimental design, I was able to test for S-R and CP contributions 
to RS in a more rigorous manner than the design of the Dobbins et al. (2004) study 
allowed.   
One problem with fMRI is it lacks the resolution to temporally dissociate 
particular effects that could occur within-trial.  Indeed, it is possible that fMRI RS 
may reflect changes in activity post-response and therefore may not be behaviourally 
relevant (see General Discussion – Chapter 5).  I therefore present the results of an 
EEG study, using the same experimental design as the fMRI study, in Chapter 6.  
Although previous studies have demonstrated repetition-related changes in event-
related potentials (ERPs) (Henson, Rylands, Ross, Vuilleumeir & Rugg, 2004; 
Schendan & Kutas, 2003) and induced responses in the gamma frequency (Gruber & 
Muller, 2002, 2006) using pictures of common objects (as used in the present thesis), 
these studies have not addressed whether such effects are related to S-R learning or 
facilitation of component processes.  Using the experimental design introduced in 
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Chapter 5, I directly assessed whether the repetition-related changes seen in these 
previous studies were specific to the repetition of responses between presentations. 
 
1.4.5 Question 5: Is attention necessary for both the encoding and 
retrieval of S-R bindings? 
 
The final question focuses on the role of attention in both the encoding and retrieval 
of S-R bindings.  Previous research has suggested that negative priming can result 
from the binding of a particular response with an unattended stimulus on an 
immediately preceding trial (Rothermund et al., 2005).  These short-lag interference 
effects mirror those of Hommel (2005), who presented evidence to suggest that Event 
Files can form in the absence of attention, even when a particular stimulus is task-
irrelevant.  It is presently unclear whether such effects can be seen in long-lag 
paradigms such as those in the present thesis.  Interestingly, negative priming has 
been shown across long-lags (Grison, Tipper & Hewitt, 2005), however the issue of 
whether such effects were due to the binding of a response to a unattended stimulus 
were not explored.  In Chapter 7 I therefore assessed whether bindings can form 
between responses (to task-relevant stimuli) and co-occurring though unattended 
(task-irrelevant) stimuli.  Furthermore, I asked whether previously encoded S-R 
bindings are automatically retrieved when a repeated stimulus is unattended (task-
irrelevant). In other words, I tested whether spatial attention (like awareness in 
masked priming) is necessary for the encoding and/or retrieval of S-R bindings in 
long-lag designs. 
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1.5 General methods 
 
In Chapters 2-7, I present the results of several long-lag classification priming 
experiments.  All experiments used a Study-Test design.  At Study, a number of 
stimuli were presented; at Test, the same stimuli were repeated (Repeated) along with 
experimentally novel stimuli (Novel).  The lag between Study and Test presentations 
of a particular stimulus were in the order of minutes (e.g., approx. 5-10mins), but 
“long-lag” in the sense that there were many trials between initial and repeated 
presentations of the same stimulus (Henson et al., 2004), and as distinct from the 
“immediate” repetition across trials that is typical of negative priming studies, or the 
“within-trial” repetition in masked priming studies.  I used speeded classification 
tasks (e.g., “is the object bigger than a shoebox?”) throughout, inline with previous 
behavioural and neuroimaging research in this area (e.g., Denkinger & Koutstaal, 
2009; Dennis & Schmidt, 2003; Dobbins et al., 2004; Franks et al., 2000; Horner & 
Henson, 2008, submitted; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Schnyer et al., 2007; Schnyer et al., 
2006; Wig, Buckner & Schacter, 2009) 
 To ensure response reptitions/reversals between presentations I manipulated 
the task between Study and Test blocks.  Although I used several manipulations 
throughout Chapters 2-7, in Chapters 2-3 I used a similar design to that introduced by 
Dobbins et al. (2004).  Whereas at Study I asked: “is the object bigger than a 
shoebox?”, at Test I either asked the same question (“bigger than a shoebox?”; the 
Same condition), the opposite question (“smaller than a shoebox?”; the Reverse 
condition), or an unrelated question (e.g., “is the object man-made”; the Orthogonal 
condition). 
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Stimuli in all experiments were taken from a set of 400 colour images of 
common objects. These were generated from the sets used by Dobbins et al. (2004) 
and Koutstaal et al. (2001).  To confirm their suitability for British participants, the 
objects were named and rated independently by six participants according to several 
different classifications (e.g., “is it bigger than a shoebox?” and “is it man-made?”).  
Object names and classifications were chosen by taking the modal response across 
raters.  High naming agreement was present across raters (>80% of objects given the 
same name across all six subjects) with most names corresponding to the “basic 
category” level (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976).  
Nonetheless, given a high degree of inter-subject variability of responses in 
the classification tasks used, accuracy was defined according to the modal response 
across participants within each separate experiment.  Thus, although I report analyses 
of accuracy data in Appendix A, these results should be interpreted with caution given 
there is some subjectivity in the definition of an “error”.  Reaction times (RTs) for 
correct trials at Test constituted the main dependent variable.  An additive and 
proportional priming measure was calculated for all experiments.  Additive priming 
was defined as the difference in RTs for Repeated vs. Novel stimuli (Novel – 
Repeated).  Proportional priming was defined as the difference in RTs for Repeated 
vs. Novel stimuli divided by Novel RTs (Novel – Repeated / Novel).  Though the 
appropriate measure depends on one’s theory of priming, the proportional measure 
can be useful to rule out “range effects”, particularly if Novel RTs vary across 
conditions (i.e., in case the amount of priming scales linearly with overall RT).  
Nonetheless, given the additive measure of priming is more conventional in the 
priming literature, I report analyses of additive priming in the main text of each 
experiment, and the analyses of proportional priming in Appendix A.  
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1.6 Outline of thesis 
 
The present thesis therefore aims to assess modification versus episodic theories of 
repetition priming introduced above.  In particular, it is concerned with the relative S-
R and CP contributions to repetition priming and associated repetition-related neural 
changes (e.g., RS).  In Chapter 2 I outline an experimental design that seeks to 
replicate and extend the results of Dobbins et al. (2004).  Here I assessed priming 
across three conditions: (1) when the task (and response) was repeated across Study 
and Test (the Same condition), (2) when the task (and response) was reversed across 
Study and Test (the Reverse condition) and (3) when the task at Test was unrelated to 
that at Study (the Orthogonal condition).  This design revealed several important 
signatures of S-R learning.  Surprisingly, little evidence of residual priming was found 
that might be attributable to the facilitation of component processes (Question 1). 
 Given the lack of evidence for CP contributions to priming in Chapter 2, the 
experiments presented in Chapter 3 aimed to increase the chances of seeing such 
contributions.  Here I used the same task manipulations outlined in Chapter 2, 
however I attempted to boost potential perceptual and/or conceptual facilitation using 
other tasks and stimuli.  Mirroring the results of Chapter 2, these experiments failed to 
reveal any priming effects that could be unequivocally attributed to the facilitation of 
component processes (Question 1).   
 However, in order to explain the results of Chapters 2 and 3 fully in terms of 
S-R learning, it was necessary to presume that S-R bindings form at multiple levels of 
response representation.  In Chapter 4 I present two experiments that directly tested 
this assumption.  These experiments revealed that S-R bindings can form 
simultaneously at three distinct levels of response representation, from a particular 
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Action (e.g., right/left finger-press) to a Decision (e.g., “yes/no”) to a task-dependent 
Classification (e.g., “bigger/smaller”) (Question 2).  I also present evidence that S-R 
bindings form at an abstract level of stimulus representation, with evidence consistent 
with S-R learning at two levels of stimulus representation (Question 2).  Throughout 
Chapters 2-4, I saw evidence for both facilitation, resulting from response repetition, 
and interference, resulting from response reversal, suggesting that the retrieval of S-R 
bindings can both facilitate/interfere with component processes at Test (Question 3). 
 In Chapter 5, I outline an experimental design, based on the results of Chapters 
2-4, that appropriately controls for S-R learning at all levels of response 
representation.  This design allows proper separation of S-R from CP contributions to 
priming.  Using this design in Chapter 5, I present an fMRI study that assessed S-R 
and CP contributions to RS.  This study suggests that both S-R and CP contributions 
can be seen within separate cortical regions (Question 4).  Specifically, I present 
evidence for a dissociation between occipital/temporal regions, where RS is robust to 
response repetitions/reversals, and inferior prefrontal regions, where RS is sensitive to 
response repetition/reversals.  In Chapter 6, I present an EEG experiment using the 
same design that again showed both S-R and CP contributions to repetition-related 
changes in ERPs (Question 4).  These effects are shown to be topographically distinct, 
suggesting that they are produced by differing neural generators (in line with the 
fMRI results) and, importantly, at different times prior to response onset. The latter 
result helps rule out alternative explanations of the fMRI results, for example that the 
fMRI RS reflects reduced attention to stimuli after a behavioural decision is made 
(given the poor temporal resolution of fMRI).  
 Finally, in Chapter 7 I address the last question posed in this chapter 
concerning the role of attention in both the encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings 
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within long-lag classification paradigms.  Contrary to previous studies (using 
immediate repetition designs) that suggest that S-R bindings can form between 
responses and unattended stimuli (Rothermund et al., 2005), I found no evidence for 
S-R learning when repeating previously unattended stimuli over multiple trials in the 
present Study-Test design.  I also found no evidence for S-R learning when a 
previously attended stimulus was unattended (task-irrelevant) at Test.  The results of 
Chapter 7 therefore suggest that attention is necessary for both the encoding and 
retrieval of S-R bindings (Question 5), at least within the present long-lag 
classification paradigms. 
 The results presented in Chapters 2-7 present a challenge for current S-R and 
CP accounts of priming and repetition-related changes in neural activity (e.g., RS).  In 
particular, the existence of both S-R and CP contributions to priming (i.e., in 
classification and identification paradigms) suggests that a framework is needed that 
integrates these two contributions to priming.  In Chapter 8 I focus on the limitations 
of previous theories of priming, identifying specific results from Chapters 2-7 that a 
future theory of priming would need to accommodate.  In light of this appraisal I 
propose a novel framework that attempts to explain the present priming and RS 
effects.  This framework incorporates multiple routes (i.e., component process and S-
R retrieval routes) with multiple stages (e.g., perceptual vs. conceptual component 
processes) to response generation and is better able to explain the present data than 
any existing S-R or CP theory of priming. 
 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
 
Priming, a change in response times and/or accuracy following stimulus repetition, is 
a robust phenomenon seen across a range of paradigms.  These behavioural changes 
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have been associated with repetition-related changes in neural activity, particularly 
repetition suppression (RS), as measured by fMRI and EEG.  Priming and RS are 
often thought to reflect the facilitation of one or more cognitive processes during 
initial and subsequent presentations of a stimulus.  Alternatively, priming could also 
reflect the formation of stimulus-response (S-R) bindings, retrieval of which can 
bypass many of the processes engaged during the initial presentation.  In this chapter, 
I have introduced CP and S-R theories of repetition priming, focussing on the specific 
predictions of each theory in relation to response repetition versus response reversal.  
I then posed a number of questions that have not been answered fully by the present 
literature.  I next introduced the basic methodology used to address these questions, 
namely long-lag classification priming of common objects.  In the next chapter, I use 
this methodology to address the first question posed in the present chapter: just how 
important are S-R contributions within long-lag classification paradigms? 
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Chapter 2 
S-R versus CP contributions to repetition priming 
 
As described in the preceding chapter, stimulus-response (S-R) and component 
process (CP) theories of priming make differing predictions under conditions that 
require either a repetition or a reversal in response between stimulus presentations 
(i.e., response-congruency).  Whereas CP theories predict priming should occur 
regardless of response-congruency, as long as the same processes are engaged at 
Study and Test presentations, S-R theories predict priming should be greater 
following a response repetition than a reversal.   
 The present chapter outlines an experimental paradigm designed to assess 
possible CP and S-R contributions to repetition priming.  The design was based on the 
Start/Switch manipulation first introduced by Dobbins et al. (2004).  At Study, 
pictures of common objects were presented and participants were asked “is the object 
bigger than a shoebox?” in real life.  At Test, the stimuli seen at Study were repeated 
along with experimentally novel stimuli.  In line with Dobbins et al. (2004), 
participants performed the same task (“bigger than a shoebox” – the Same condition) 
or the reverse task (“smaller than a shoebox” – the Reverse condition) at Test.  
Critically, responses at the level of Action (right/left finger-press) and Decision 
(yes/no) will be repeated in the Same condition but reversed in the Reverse condition. 
In the present experiments, a further condition was also added, whereby an 
unrelated question was asked at Test (e.g., “is the object man-made?”) such that any 
“bigger” or “smaller” Classification responses that are bound to stimuli in the Study 
task would be irrelevant to the Test task.  This condition was carefully constructed 
such that responses (Action and Decisions) at Study were on average orthogonal to 
those at Test.  Thus it was assumed that any effects of S-R learning at the level of 
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Actions or Decisions would cancel on average.  This Orthogonal condition was 
therefore an attempt to control for possible facilitation and/or interference in the 
Same/Reverse condition respectively.  The Orthogonal condition also presented an 
opportunity to assess S-R contributions within-block, by comparing priming for 
stimuli that received the same Action/Decision response between Study and Test 
(response-congruent) versus stimuli that received the opposite Action/Decision 
response (response-incongruent).  The present experiments also utilised a 
manipulation introduced by Dobbins et al. (2004) where stimuli at Study were either 
presented once (Low-primed) or three times (High-primed).  This manipulation was 
included to increase possible SR and CP contributions to priming by increasing the 
number of Study repetitions, thus increasing the amount of exposure participants had 
with particular stimuli.  This experimental design is presented in Figure 2.1. 
Importantly, the present Study-Test design equates for lag between 
presentations, a potential confound in the Dobbins et al. (2004) study.  In this study, 
the first presentation for all primed stimuli occurred during the Start phase.  A certain 
proportion of these stimuli were repeated in this same block, and priming was 
assessed as the difference in RTs between first and subsequent presentations.  In the 
later Switch phase (where the task was reversed) a certain proportion of the stimuli 
seen during the Start phase were repeated along with Novel stimuli and priming was 
assessed as the difference in RTs between these Repeated and Novel items.  As such, 
the lag between presentations was greater for repeated stimuli in the Switch than Start 
phase.  Given priming has been shown to decrease with increasing lag (Henson et al., 
2004), the reductions in priming seen in the Switch phase may have been due to 
increased lag rather than resulting from a switch in response between presentations. 
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Figure 2.1.  (A) Experimental design of Experiment 1.  Stimuli were presented once (Low-primed) or 
three times (High-primed) at Study.  Participants were asked “is the object bigger than a shoebox?”.  At 
Test the stimuli presented at Study were repeated (Repeated) intermixed with experimentally novel 
stimuli (Novel).  Participants were either asked the same question (Same condition) the reverse 
question (Reverse condition) or an unrelated question (Orthogonal condition).  (B) Trial sequence in 
both Study and Test blocks.  A fixation cross was presented for 500ms followed by stimulus 
presentation for 2000ms.  Each trial ended with a 500ms blank screen.  Participants were free to 
respond at any point prior to the start of the next trial. 
  
Before presenting the experimental results it is worth outlining the predictions 
that CP and S-R theories make.  These predictions are presented in Figure 2.2.  
Firstly, if priming is solely a consequence of facilitation of perceptual processes, 
equivalent positive priming would be expected across all three task conditions (Figure 
2.2-A).  This is because all three tasks are likely to recruit similar object identification 
processes.  A similar pattern of results might be expected from facilitation of 
conceptual processes.  Here though, one might expect reduced priming in the 
Orthogonal condition if the Test task does not engage all the same conceptual 
processes as the Study task (a question addressed in Chapter 3) (Figure 2.2-B).  In 
both cases, priming should generally increase for High-primed compared to Low-
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primed stimuli (i.e., facilitation should generally increase with increased stimulus 
exposure). 
 The predictions of an S-R theory depend on the nature of the response (R) 
representation.  If responses are coded at the level of Actions (right/left finger-press) 
or Decisions (yes/no), positive priming should be seen in the Same condition.  The 
Reverse condition should show significantly reduced priming compared to the Same 
condition.  This is because the response given at Study is not repeated at Test in the 
Reverse condition (see below).  In the Orthogonal condition, the mean amount of 
priming should be intermediate between that in the Same and Reverse conditions.  
This is because the same numbers of stimuli require a response repetition (“Congruent 
trials”) as require a response reversal (“Incongruent trials”).  Furthermore, if 
Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition are split, greater 
priming should be seen for Congruent than Incongruent trials. 
 The exact nature of the priming effects seen in either the Reverse condition or 
for Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition depend on the degree to which 
retrieved S-R bindings can cause interference.  If retrieved incongruent S-R bindings 
are effectively ignored, as predicted by Instance Theory, then no nett priming should 
be seen in either the Reverse condition or for Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition (Figure 2.2-C).  This is because the retrieved response is simply ignored and 
the system reverts to algorithmic processing.  If, however, retrieved S-R bindings 
actively interfere with processing, then negative priming (i.e., a slowing of RTs 
compared to baseline) should be seen in both conditions (Figure 2.2-D).  Indeed, if the 
amount of facilitation for Orthogonal Congruent items owing to response repetition 
matches the amount of interference for Orthogonal Incongruent items owing to 
response reversal, there should be zero nett priming in the Orthogonal condition. 
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Figure 2.2.  Predictions made by various CP and S-R theories of priming in (i) the Same, Reverse and 
Orthogonal conditions and (ii) for Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition.  (A) 
CP theory solely predicting perceptual facilitation, (B) CP theory solely predicting conceptual 
facilitation and S-R theory predicting S-R bindings are coded solely at the level of Classifications (e.g., 
“bigger”/”smaller”), (C) S-R theory predicting that retrieval of S-R bindings facilitates, but does not 
interfere, with processing and (D) S-R theory predicting that retrieval of S-R bindings both facilitates 
and interferences with processing. 
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 If multiple Study presentations lead to the formation of more S-R episodic 
bindings, or a strengthening of an S-R association, High-primed stimuli should 
produce greater priming in the Same condition compared to Low-primed stimuli.  In 
the Reverse condition, High-primed stimuli should show equivalent or even reduced 
priming, owing to greater interference, compared to Low-primed stimuli.  As a result, 
the High-primed vs. Low-primed manipulation should interact with the Same vs. 
Reverse tasks.  This pattern should also be present when comparing Congruent vs. 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition. 
If, on the other hand, responses are only coded at the more abstract level of the 
Classification, then S-R theories would predict similar priming for the Same and 
Reverse conditions, but no priming in the Orthogonal condition for either Congruent 
or Incongruent trials.  Note that this is the same prediction made for conceptual CP 
contributions to priming (Figure 2.2-B), and as such the present design is unable to 
distinguish between these two possible contributions to repetition priming (though see 
Chapter 4).   
Of course, the actual pattern of priming could be a combination of several of 
the above causes.  Given the relative importance of CP theories of priming (e.g., for 
inferring the nature of psychological and neural representations; see Chapter 1), the 
present chapter concentrates on trying to refute S-R theories of priming.  The finding 
of reliable positive priming in the Orthogonal condition, particularly for Incongruent 
trials, would be particularly informative in this regard.  If positive priming for 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition were seen, such a result would be 
difficult to explain in terms of the retrieval of an S-R binding. 
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2.1 Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 was designed to assess the relative contributions of S-R and CP 
accounts of long-lag repetition priming of visual objects, as outlined above.  The 
experimental design of Experiment 1 is shown in Figure 2.2-A.  At Study, participants 
performed the “bigger-than-shoebox” task.  At Test, participants performed the 
“bigger-than-shoebox” task (the Same condition), the “smaller-than-shoebox” task 
(the Reverse condition) and the “man-made” task (the Orthogonal condition) in 
separate Study-Test blocks.  Specifically, I was interested in comparing: (1) the Same 
vs. the Reverse condition and (2) Congruent vs. Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition.  I was also interested in whether reliable priming would be seen in the 
Orthogonal condition, particularly for Incongruent trials, as this would be strong 
evidence for facilitation of component processes. 
 
2.1.1 Method 
2.1.1.1 Participants 
Participants in all experiments were recruited from the MRC-CBU subject panel, or 
from the student population of Cambridge University; all participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision.  All experiments were of the type approved by a local 
research ethics committee (CPREC reference 2005.08).  Note that the number of 
participants in each experiment across Chapter 2-7 does vary in order to fully 
counterbalance each individual experiment.  Participation was predominantly 
confined to a single experiment; however on occasions when individuals participated 
in multiple experiments, I ensured a minimum of six months between testing. 
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Twelve participants (7 male) gave informed consent to participate in 
Experiment 1.  The mean age across participants was 23.3 years (σ = 4.5).  By self-
report, all participants were right-handed. 
2.1.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were 240 images taken from the main stimulus set.  They were selected so 
that 25% were “bigger than a shoebox” and “man-made”, 25% were “bigger than a 
shoebox” and “natural”, 25% were “smaller than a shoebox” and “man-made”, and 
25% were “smaller than a shoebox” and “natural”.  Each picture was randomly 
assigned to one of 12 groups relating to the 12 experimental conditions (3x2x2; Task 
x Repetition x Prime-level), resulting in 20 stimuli per group.  The assignment of 
groups to experimental condition was rotated across participants. 
2.1.1.3 Procedure 
Prior to the experiment, participants performed a practice session using the “bigger 
than a shoebox” task, where it was made clear that this comparison referred to the 
object's typical size in real life.  They responded using a “yes” or “no” key with their 
right or left index finger respectively. Although participants were told the question 
may change during the course of the experiment, the other test tasks were only 
explained to the participants prior to each test block. They were told to respond as 
quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy.  No error feedback was provided 
either in the practice session or the main experiment. 
The experiment consisted of three alternating study-test cycles, with each 
cycle lasting approximately 10mins. During each Study phase, 40 stimuli were shown; 
20 were presented once (Low-primed) and 20 were presented three times (High-
primed), resulting in 80 trials (Figure 2.2-A). Apart from ensuring no immediate 
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repetitions, the stimulus presentation order within each Study block was randomised 
so that High-primed stimuli were approximately evenly distributed throughout.  
During each Test phase, the 40 stimuli from the Study phase (Repeated) were 
randomly intermixed with 40 novel stimuli.  The order of the three test conditions 
(Task) was counterbalanced across participants.   
An example trial sequence is shown in Figure 2.2-B.  A central fixation cross 
was presented for 500ms, followed by a stimulus for 2000ms, followed by a blank 
screen for 500ms.  Images subtended approximately 6o of visual angle. Participants 
were able to respond at any point up to the start of a new trial (i.e., the presentation of 
another fixation cross). 
2.1.1.4 Behavioural analyses 
Trials in which reaction times (RTs) were less than 400ms, or two or more standard 
deviations above or below a participant's mean for a given task, were excluded.  
Given that there is some subjectivity in the “bigger-than-shoebox?” and “man-made?” 
questions (i.e., some variability of opinions across participants for some stimuli), 
accuracy was defined by the modal response across participants for each object.  
Although analyses of such “errors” are reported in Appendix A, these results should 
be interpreted with caution given the definition of an “error” is less clear than in some 
other priming experiments. RTs for correct trials at Test constituted the main 
dependent variable.  Given the focus on S-R learning, RTs were further restricted to 
objects also given a correct judgment on every occurrence at Study.  Repeated-
measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was applied to mean RTs, with a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for all F-values with more than one degree of freedom 
in the numerator. All statistical tests had alpha set at .05; T-tests were two-tailed 
except where stated otherwise. 
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Priming was defined as the difference in mean RTs between Novel and 
Repeated trials. To control for possible Novel RT differences across Task conditions, 
an additional proportional measure of priming was calculated by dividing the 
difference between Novel and Repeated trials by the mean RT for Novel trials 
(Schnyer et al., 2006).  Analyses of proportional priming scores are reported in 
Appendix A. 
To investigate whether responses made at Study had a significant effect on 
RTs at Test,  Repeated trials in the Orthogonal condition were split further according 
to whether the participant had given the same (“Congruent”), or opposite 
(“Incongruent”), response at Study, regardless of accuracy. For High-primed stimuli, 
such trials were restricted to objects for which the same response was given across all 
three Study presentations. Note that this means that effects in this response 
congruency analysis of the Orthogonal condition (such as effects of High- versus 
Low-primed) can differ from those in the main analysis, because “incorrect” (as 
defined by modal response over participants) trials may be included in the former but 
not latter.  
 
2.1.2 Results  
 
After excluding 0.3% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown 
in Table 2.1.  Note that most "errors" were likely to reflect a degree of subjectivity, 
particularly for the “shoebox” task (see Methods).  Analyses of errors revealed no 
significant effects of repetition (Appendix A-1), suggesting the RT priming effects 
reported below are unlikely to reflect a speed-accuracy trade-off.  A further 4.1% of 
Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
Study (see Methods).   
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Table 2.1.  Mean percentage errors and error priming (plus standard deviations) across Task 
(questions denote Tasks carried out at Test), Prime-level, and Repetition for Experiments 1-3.  LP = 
Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = Repeated; P = Priming (Novel-Repeated). Note that 
the division of Novel stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
 
 
Table 2.2 displays mean RTs, together with subtractive (Novel-Repeated) and 
proportional ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel) measures of priming. A 3x2x2 (Task x 
Repetition x Prime-level) ANOVA on RTs revealed a significant Task x Repetition 
interaction, F(1.5, 17.0) = 7.15, p<.01 (plus main effects of Task, F(1.9, 21.0) = 
14.39, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 11) = 21.82, p<.001).  Given no reliable effects 
involving Prime-level (F’s<2.0, p’s>.16), subsequent tests collapsed across this factor. 
Pairwise tests of priming across tasks revealed significantly greater priming in the 
Same relative to Reverse, t(11) = 2.48, p<.05, and Same relative to Orthogonal, t(11) 
= 3.90, p<.01, conditions (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(11) = 1.57, p=.14).  Furthermore, 
although priming was significantly greater than zero in the Same and Reverse 
conditions, t’s>2.92, p’s<.01, it was not reliable in the Orthogonal condition, t(11) = 
0.60, p=.56.  Thus, switches in task decreased priming in the Reverse condition and 
prevented reliable priming in the Orthogonal condition. This pattern of results is 
Task /  Same Reverse Orthogonal 
Prime-level  LP HP LP HP LP HP 
        
% Errors        
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Man-made? 
Experiment 1 N 13.3 (3.9) 12.9 (7.5) 9.6 (4.5) 10.8 (5.6) 2.9 (3.3) 1.3 (2.3) 
 R 8.3 (4.9) 10.8 (7.9) 12.5 (6.9) 14.6 (7.8) 2.1 (2.6) 2.1 (4.5) 
 P 5.0 (7.4) 2.1 (11.0) -2.9 (8.9) -3.8 (10.0) 0.8 (3.6) -0.8 (4.2) 
        
  Man-made? Natural? Bigger than shoebox? 
Experiment 2 N 2.8 (3.9) 2.8 (2.6) 1.7 (4.9) 1.7 (2.4) 9.7 (6.1) 13.1 (7.1) 
 R 0.8 (2.6) 1.7 (3.0) 3.9 (4.0) 2.2 (3.9) 10.0 (6.4) 11.4 (5.1) 
 P 1.9 (3.5) 1.1 (2.7) -2.2 (5.2) -0.6 (3.8) -0.3 (9.3) 1.7 (7.1) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Bigger than shoebox? Bigger than shoebox? 
Experiment 3 N 10.0 (5.6) 15.4 (9.4) 12.9 (5.4) 11.2 (9.3) 11.2 (4.3) 10.4 (5.4) 
 R 7.5 (4.5) 8.3 (4.9) 15.4 (9.9) 12.5 (8.7) 10.0 (4.8) 14.6 (8.7) 
 P 2.5 (8.1) 7.1 (10.3) -2.5 (10.3) -1.3 (13.0) 1.3 (6.4) 4.2 (9.0) 
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presented in Figure 2.3-A.  Analogous ANOVAs on the proportional measure of 
priming showed the same pattern of results (Appendix A-1), suggesting that the 
difference in priming between the Same/Reverse and Orthogonal conditions was not a 
range effect owing to the shorter overall RTs in the Orthogonal (“man-made”) task. 
 
Table 2.2.  Mean reaction times (RT), RT priming and proportional priming (plus standard deviations) 
across Task (questions denote Tasks carried out at Test), Prime-level, and Repetition for Experiments 
1-3.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = Repeated; P = Priming (Novel-
Repeated); PP = Proportional Priming ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel). Note that the division of Novel 
stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
 
The Orthogonal trials were split according to Response-congruency between 
Study and Test (i.e., objects given the same “yes” or “no” response at Study and Test, 
regardless of accuracy, versus those given differing responses).  The resultant priming 
data were entered into a 2x2 (Response-congruency x Prime-level) ANOVA.  Only 
the main effect of Response-congruency was reliable, F(1, 11) = 7.73, p<.05, 
demonstrating greater priming for Congruent (+50ms) than Incongruent  (-6ms) trials.  
Task /  Same Reverse Orthogonal 
Prime-level  LP HP LP HP LP HP 
        
RT        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Man-made? 
Experiment 1 N 914 (161) 903 (157) 1021 (228) 1018 (215) 882 (165) 863 (184) 
 R 781 (154) 758 (192) 956 (210) 923 (191) 834 (202) 874 (228) 
 P 133 (75) 145 (99) 65 (118) 94 (102) 48 (75) -11 (157) 
 PP .15 (.07) .16 (.11) .06 (.10) .09 (.10) .06 (.08) -.02 (.16) 
        
  Man-made? Natural? Bigger than shoebox? 
Experiment 2 N 757 (154) 759 (135) 773 (148) 781 (176) 960 (209) 969 (214) 
 R 677 (138) 651 (128) 746 (150) 754 (160) 946 (180) 935 (194) 
 P 79 (60) 108 (77) 27 (72) 27 (79) 13 (91) 34 (165) 
 PP .10 (.08) .14 (.09) .03 (.09) .03 (.10) .00 (.10) .02 (.16) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Bigger than shoebox? Bigger than shoebox? 
Experiment 3 N 888 (193) 841 (193) 861 (128) 839 (152) 912 (113) 896 (153) 
 R 768 (170) 739 (129) 804 (122) 782 (138) 862 (122) 901 (149) 
 P 120 (104) 103 (121) 57 (86) 57 (97) 50 (86) -5 (81) 
 PP .14 (.11) .11 (.11) .06 (.09) .06 (.10) .05 (.09) -.01 (.10) 
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Despite this main effect, priming did not reach significance for either Congruent, t(11) 
= 1.48, p=.17, or Incongruent, t(11) = .25, p=.81, trials alone (see Figure 3.2-B). 
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 1.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals of priming effect.  
* p<.05. 
 
2.1.3 Discussion 
 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that the retrieval of S-R bindings plays an 
important role within the present paradigm. The binding of stimuli to a particular 
response is apparent from two reliable effects: (1) a reduction in priming for the 
Reverse condition relative to Same condition and (2) greater priming for Congruent 
than Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition. It is also consistent with the lack 
of reliable nett priming in the Orthogonal condition, where there were approximately 
equal numbers of Congruent and Incongruent trials.  The lack of priming in the 
Orthogonal condition was surprising, and suggests that other causes traditionally 
linked to perceptual priming (such as faster object identification for repeated pictures) 
play a negligible role in the present paradigm (see also Bruce, Carson, Burton & Ellis, 
2000). The lack of evidence for any modulation of priming by High vs. Low primed 
stimuli was also surprising, though there was a numerical pattern consistent with S-R 
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learning that was reproduced and reached significance in subsequent experiments (see 
inter-experimental analysis of Chapter 3).  
 
 
2.2 Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 1 used the “shoebox” task on the basis of previous work by Dobbins et al. 
(2004) and Schnyer et al. (2006).  Such a task is likely to represent a rather “ad hoc” 
categorisation (Barsalou, 1983).  In other words, it is likely to involve a considerable 
strategic/executive component, which may encourage, or leave greater scope for, S-R 
learning. Experiment 2 therefore switched to the “man-made” categorisation task as 
the main task.  It was thought this categorisation was a more natural categorisation, in 
that it is more likely to be a distinction represented within semantic memory (Farah & 
McClelland, 1991). This is consistent with the faster RTs for this task than the 
shoebox task in Experiment 1.  The man-made task is also one that has been used in 
many previous priming studies (Bruce et al., 2000; Franks et al., 2000; Vriezen, 
Moscovitch & Bellos, 1995; Zeelenberg & Pecher, 2003).  Thus the design of 
Experiment 2 was a mirror-reflection of Experiment 1, in the sense that the man-made 
and shoebox tasks were swapped (i.e., the man-made task was used in all phases, 
except the Orthogonal Test phase, when the shoebox task was used). Again, it was of 
interest whether significant priming would be seen in the Orthogonal condition, 
particularly for Incongruent trials. 
 
2.2.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. 
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2.2.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (5 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 22.6 years (σ = 3.0).  By self-report, 3 participants 
were classified as left-handed, 15 right-handed. 
2.2.1.2 Design 
Participants were always asked “is the object man-made?” at Study.  At Test, in the 
Same condition, the man-made task was repeated; in the Reverse condition, the 
opposite question was presented (“is the object natural?”); in the Orthogonal 
condition, the “bigger than a shoebox?” question was asked. 
 
2.2.2 Results  
 
After excluding 0.6% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors are shown 
in Table 2.1. Consistent with expectations, RTs for Novel stimuli were faster in the 
Man-made task (i.e., Same and Reverse conditions) than the Shoebox task (i.e., 
Orthogonal task).  Analyses of errors revealed no significant effects of Repetition 
(Appendix A-2).  A further 1.9% of Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis 
due to incorrect responses given at Study (see Methods).   
Table 2.2 displays mean RTs and priming effects. A 3x2x2 ANOVA revealed 
a significant Task x Repetition interaction, F(1.6, 26.5) = 5.29, p<.05 (plus main 
effects of Task, F(1.4, 23.5) = 42.57, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 17) = 18.85, 
p<.001).  Given no reliable effects involving Prime-level (F’s<.84, p’s>.37), 
subsequent tests collapsed across this factor. These tests revealed significantly greater 
priming in the Same relative to the Reverse, t(17) = 3.80, p<.01, and Same relative to 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 2.83, p<.05, conditions (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 0.12, 
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p=.91).  Furthermore, although priming was significantly greater than zero in the 
Same and Reverse conditions, t’s>2.0, p’s<.05, it was not reliable in the Orthogonal 
condition, t(17) = 0.94, p=.36 (see Figure 2.4-A).  The proportional priming measure 
revealed a similar pattern of results (Appendix A-2).   
A 2x2 (Response-congruency x Prime-level) ANOVA for the Orthogonal 
condition showed only a main effect of Response-congruency, F(1, 17) = 23.18, 
p<.001, with greater priming for Congruent (+73ms) than Incongruent (-18ms) trials. 
Indeed, priming was reliable for Congruent trials, t(17) = 3.42, p<.01, but not 
Incongruent trials, t(17) = .71, p=.49 (see Figure 2.4-B). 
 
 
Figure 2.4.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 2.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.  ** p<.01; * 
p<.05. 
 
2.2.3 Discussion  
 
The priming results of Experiment 2 replicate those of Experiment 1, most notably 
with an absence of reliable priming in the Orthogonal condition. Again, most of the 
results appear explicable in terms of S-R learning: (1) greater priming in the Same 
condition than Reverse condition, and (2) greater priming for Congruent than 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition. This suggests that S-R learning plays 
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an important role even with the relatively easier (and less “ad hoc”) decisions required 
by the man-made categorisation task (relative to the shoebox task). 
 
2.3 Experiment 3 
 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated clear S-R effects using both the 
“bigger-than-shoebox” and “man-made” classification tasks.  Such S-R effects would 
therefore seem to be replicable across tasks that demonstrate clear differences in 
response accuracy and RTs (see later inter-experimental analysis).  Experiment 3 
further tested the robust nature of these effects by switching the tasks undertaken at 
Study and Test.  In Experiments 1 and 2 the Study task was held constant, whilst the 
Test task was varied.  As such, priming differences at Test may have resulted from 
overall differences in task difficulty (consistent with overall task differences in RTs 
and accuracy).  To control for such differences at Test, Experiment 3 varied the Study 
task whilst maintaining a constant Test task.  At Test, participants always undertook 
the “bigger-than-shoebox” task.  At Study, either the Same (“bigger-than-shoebox”), 
Reverse (“smaller-than-shoebox”) or Orthogonal (“man-made”) tasks were 
performed. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
12 participants (5 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 20.8 years (σ = 3.5).  By self-report, 1 participant 
was classified as left-handed, 11 right-handed. 
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2.3.1.2 Design 
Participants were always asked “is the object bigger than a shoebox?” at Test.  At 
Study, in the Same condition, the “bigger-than-shoebox” task was performed; in the 
Reverse condition, the opposite question was performed (“is the object smaller then a 
shoebox?”); in the Orthogonal condition, the “man-made” task was performed. 
 
2.3.2 Results  
 
After excluding 1.0% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors are shown 
in Table 2.1.  Analyses of errors revealed no significant effects of Repetition 
(Appendix A-3).  A further 3.2% of Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis 
due to incorrect responses given at Study. 
Table 2.2 displays the mean RTs and priming effects.  A 3x2x2 ANOVA 
revealed a significant Task x Repetition interaction, F(1.9, 20.9) = 4.98, p<.05 (plus 
main effects of Task, F(2.0, 21.9) = 11.27, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 11) = 17.89, 
p<.001).  Given no reliable effects involving Prime-level (F’s<2.26, p’s>.16), 
subsequent tests collapsed across this factor.  These tests revealed significantly greater 
priming in the Same relative to the Reverse, t(11) = 2.58, p<.05, and Same relative to 
the Orthogonal, t(11) = 2.74, p<.05, condition (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(11) = 1.14, 
p=.28).  Furthermore, although priming was significantly greater than zero in the 
Same and Reverse conditions, t’s>2.4, p’s<.05, it was not reliable in the Orthogonal 
condition, t(11) = 1.08, p=.31 (see Figure 2.5-A).  The proportional priming measure 
revealed a similar pattern of results (Appendix A-3). 
A 2x2 (Response-congruency x Prime-level) ANOVA for the Orthogonal 
condition showed only a main effect of Response-congruency, F(1, 11) = 12.28, 
p<.01, with greater priming for Congruent (+70ms) than Incongruent (-40ms) trials.  
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Indeed, priming was reliable for Congruent, t(11) = 2.97, p<.05, but not Incongruent, 
t(11) = 1.16, p=.27, trials (see Figure 2.5-B). 
 
 
Figure 2.5.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 3.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.  * p<.05. 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 3 therefore replicates the results of Experiments 1 and 2.  As in the first 
two experiments, most of the results appear explicable in terms of the retrieval of S-R 
bindings: (1) greater priming in the Same than Reverse condition and (2) greater 
priming for Congruent than Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition.  These 
results suggest that S-R learning is a robust phenomenon that occurs regardless of 
overall differences in task difficulty at either Study (Experiment 3) or Test 
(Experiments 1 and 2).  Once again, Experiment 3 failed to find reliable priming for 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition. 
 
2.4 Inter-experimental analyses 
 
The pattern of results across Experiments 1-3 was remarkably consistent despite 
changes in both Study and Test tasks between experiments.  Figure 2.6 displays these 
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main priming effects collapsed across Experiments 1-3. In order to formally compare 
such results, the data were subjected to a 3x2x2x3 (Task x Repetition x Prime-level x 
Experiment) mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects Experiment factor relating to 
Experiments 1-3.  The only significant result involving the Experiment factor was a 
Task x Experiment interaction, F(3.7, 71.8) = 19.64, p<.001.  This effect was driven 
by differences between the “bigger-than-shoebox” and “man-made” tasks used at Test 
in Experiments 1 and 2, with longer RTs in the “bigger-than-shoebox” task, t(29) = 
4.24, p<.001 (collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2).  Importantly, such task 
differences did not affect priming as the Experiment factor showed no significant 
interactions with the remaining factors, F’s<1.84, p’s>.17.  The present analysis also 
replicated the significant Task x Repetition interaction seen in each experiment 
separately, F(3.7, 71.8) = 19.64, p<.001 (as well as showing main effects of Task, 
F(1.8, 71.8) = 28.26, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 39) = 60.64, p<.001).  Post-hoc 
tests revealed significantly greater priming in the Same than Reverse, t(41) = 5.29, 
p<.001 (see Figure 2.6-A), and Orthogonal, t(41) = 5.44, p<.001, conditions (Reverse 
vs. Orthogonal, t(41) = 1.54, p=.13).  Interestingly, this analysis failed to reveal any 
effect of Prime-level on the pattern of priming across the Same and Reverse 
condition, although a numerical trend for greater priming in the Same condition for 
High-primed stimuli was seen.  I will return to this issue in Chapter 3.  Finally, I delay 
the issue of whether the task-order across participants affects the pattern of priming 
seen across conditions until the end of Chapter 3. 
A further inter-experimental analysis was conducted on the congruency data 
from the Orthogonal condition of Experiments 1-3.  A 2x2x3 (Congruency x Prime-
level x Experiment) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Congruency, F(1, 
39) = 39.53, p<.001, with greater priming for Congruent (+66ms) than Incongruent (-
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20ms) trials (see Figure 2.6-B).  As in the separate experimental analyses, priming 
was reliable for Congruent, t(41) = 4.49, p<.001, but not Incongruent, t(41) = 1.31, 
p=.20, trials.  No further significant effects or interactions were present, F’s<2.51, 
p’s>.10, though there was a numerical pattern for congruency effects across 
conditions to be exaggerated for High-primed vs. Low-primed stimuli. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6.  Main effects and interactions of interest averaged across Experiments 1-3.  (A) Greater 
priming in the Same than Reverse condition (collapsed across Experiment and Prime-level).  (B) 
Greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli in the Orthogonal condition (collapsed across 
Experiment and Prime-level).  Errors bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed).  *** 
p<.001. 
 
 
2.5 General Discussion 
 
In Experiments 1-3, I introduced a classification paradigm designed to assess S-R and 
CP contributions to long-lag repetition priming of visual objects.  The results from 
Experiments 1-3 were clear, with much of the priming effects explicable in terms of 
S-R learning at the level of Actions (right/left finger-press) and/or Decisions (yes/no).  
Firstly, I saw greater priming for the Same than Reverse condition (see Figure 2.6-A).  
Secondly, I saw greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent trials in the 
Orthogonal condition (see Figure 2.6-B).  Both effects are not readily explicable in 
terms of facilitation of component processes and would seem to rely upon repetition 
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of responses between Study and Test.  Indeed, once I controlled for S-R contributions 
(i.e., in the Orthogonal condition), little if any priming remained.  These results 
suggest that, at least in the present paradigm, facilitation of component processes 
(e.g., perceptual facilitation) is not a necessary consequence of stimulus repetition. 
Only one aspect of the data is difficult to explain in terms of bindings between 
stimuli and Action/Decision responses, namely the residual priming in the Reverse 
condition. Here the prior Action/Decision response given at Study should not result in 
facilitation at Test.  Indeed, retrieval of an Action/Decision response might be 
expected to interfere with processing at Test, producing slower RTs compared to 
novel items. One possibility is that this residual priming reflects facilitation of 
conceptual processing, given that the same semantic information about the everyday 
size of an object is required in the Study and Test phases of the Reverse condition (but 
not the Orthogonal condition).  I return to this possibility in the next chapter.   
However, an alternative S-R account is that the “right/left” Action or "yes/no" 
Decision from the Study phase is retrieved rapidly at Test, but the participant 
develops a strategy of simply reversing this response, which may still take less time 
than re-computing a decision from semantic knowledge (as necessary for Novel 
stimuli).  In other words, the Reverse condition may be susceptible to a conscious 
“retrieve and reverse” strategy, suggesting that the residual priming in this condition 
may not reflect the recruitment of processes thought to be automatic (e.g., CP 
facilitation; though see Chapter 3).  A second alternative S-R account is that the 
positive priming in the Reverse condition reflects stimuli becoming bound with a 
more abstract response representation than the “right/left” Action or “yes/no” 
Decision that is reversed in this condition.  For example, stimuli may be bound to a 
higher-level Classification (e.g., “bigger/smaller”) that would remain the same 
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regardless of whether the size-judgement task is reversed (e.g., a lion is always 
“bigger” than a shoebox regardless of the direction of the question).  Rapid retrieval 
of this Classification for a repeated stimulus would enable the generation of an overt 
response without the need to re-compute the typical size of the object.  However, such 
an account would not explain the decrease in priming in the Reverse than Same 
condition.  To explain such a result, S-R learning would need to occur at two levels of 
response representation (e.g., a particular “yes/no” Decision and a “bigger/smaller” 
Classification).  I return to the possibility of different levels of response representation 
in Chapter 4. 
Although significant priming was present in the Reverse condition, despite a 
switch in response between Study and Test, no priming was present for Incongruent 
Orthogonal trials.  One possibility for this lack of priming is that there are no CP 
contributions present in the current long-lag classification paradigm.  However, a 
second possibility is that response retrieval in the case of Incongruent trials led to 
interference, slowing overall RTs.  Such an interference effect would act against any 
possible CP contributions, potentially cancelling each other out (i.e., resulting in no 
nett reliable priming). In order to confirm the presence of such interference effects 
one would need to demonstrate either significant slowing of RTs compared to novel 
items (i.e., negative priming) or significantly diminished priming for High- than Low-
primed Incongruent trials.  Although Experiments 1-3 presented a trend towards 
negative priming for Incongruent trials, as well as a trend for diminished priming for 
High- than Low-primed Incongruent trials, these effects were not significant, even in 
the inter-experimental analysis.  Therefore, at present there is no definitive evidence 
for interference effects resulting from the retrieval of previous S-R bindings (though 
see Chapter 3). 
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2.5.1 Chapter Summary 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced an experimental paradigm designed to assess potential CP 
and S-R contributions to repetition priming.  Presenting pictures of everyday visual 
objects in a long-lag classification paradigm, CP and S-R theories were assessed by 
means of task switches between Study and Test blocks.  Three task manipulations 
were used: (1) the Same condition, where the same task was used at Study and Test, 
resulting in a response repetition, (2) the Reverse condition, where the opposite task 
was used at Test to that at Study, resulting in a response reversal and (3) the 
Orthogonal condition, where the task at Test was unrelated to that at Study and 
responses at Test were on average orthogonal to those at Study.  Two possible 
markers of S-R learning were seen across three separate experiments: (1) greater 
priming in the Same than Reverse condition and (2) greater priming for Congruent 
than Incongruent items in the Orthogonal condition.  These results confirm that the 
retrieval of S-R bindings can modulate priming in the present paradigm.  
Interestingly, once such S-R effects were appropriately controlled for, little if any 
priming effects remained.  As such, the present results failed to provide unequivocal 
evidence for facilitation of particular perceptual and/or conceptual processes.  The 
results of Chapter 2 therefore suggest that S-R effects dominate in the present 
paradigm.  Given the prevalence of CP accounts of repetition priming, the next 
chapter attempts to increase potential perceptual and/or conceptual CP contributions 
to priming. 
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Chapter 3 
 
In search of CP contributions to repetition priming 
 
 
Chapter 2 provided clear evidence of S-R contributions to repetition priming, but no 
results that could only be explained in terms of the facilitation of other component 
processes (e.g., object identification or semantic access).  Most notable was the failure 
to observe priming in the Orthogonal condition, which was intended to provide a 
baseline measure of priming with which to compare the Same and Reverse conditions.  
These results are striking given how widespread CP accounts of priming are within 
the literature.  Given such unexpected results, Experiments 4-6 in Chapter 3 were 
designed to increase the contributions of facilitation of component processes, such as 
perceptual and/or conceptual processes.  If Experiments 4-6 provide similar results to 
those of Experiments 1-3, with little evidence for facilitation of component processes, 
this would strengthen the argument that S-R contributions dominate in the present 
paradigm.  As in Experiments 1-3, demonstrating significant positive priming for 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition would be particularly informative in 
this regard. 
 
3.1 Experiment 4 
 
In Experiment 4, I decided to use a new task for the Orthogonal condition that is 
likely to be closer matched to the “bigger-than-shoebox” task in terms of semantic 
processing.  I opted for the “taller-than-it-is-wide” task previously used by Vriezen et 
al. (1995 - Experiment 6), reasoning that this categorisation at least requires access to 
similar “size semantics” about objects. Again, objects were selected so that half of 
those larger than a shoebox were generally taller than they were wide, as were half of 
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those smaller than a shoebox, such that on average the response given at Test was not 
predicted by the response given at Study in the Orthogonal condition. 
 
3.1.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 4 was identical to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. 
3.1.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (11 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 21.7 years (σ = 2.5).  All participants were right-
handed (self-report). 
3.1.1.2 Design 
Experiment 4 used the same shoebox task as Experiment 1 in the Same and Reverse 
conditions, and in the Study phase of the Orthogonal condition; the only difference 
was in the Orthogonal Test phase, where participants were asked whether the object 
was “taller than it is wide” in real life (i.e., not based on the picture's on-screen 
dimensions). Again, correct responses for a given object were based on the modal 
response across participants. 
 
3.1.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.9% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors are shown 
in Table 3.1 (the higher error rates in the Orthogonal task reflected greater individual 
differences in the "taller-than-wide" judgment; see Methods).  Analyses of errors 
revealed no significant effects of Repetition (Appendix A-4).  A further 4.9% of 
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Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
Study.   
 
Table 3.1.  Mean percentage errors and error priming (plus standard deviations) across Task 
(questions denote Tasks carried out at Test), Prime-level, and Repetition for Experiments 4-6.  LP = 
Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = Repeated; P = Priming (Novel-Repeated). Note that 
the division of Novel stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
  
 
Table 3.2 displays mean RTs, together with measures of priming. A 3x2x2 
ANOVA revealed a significant Task x Repetition interaction, F(1.4, 23.0) = 15.91, 
p<.001 (plus main effects of Task, F(1.7, 29.6) = 69.52, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 
17) = 43.95, p<.001).  Collapsing across Prime-level, subsequent tests revealed 
significantly greater priming in the Same relative to the Reverse, t(17) = 6.63, p<.001, 
and Same relative to Orthogonal, t(17) = 4.41, p<.001, conditions (Reverse vs. 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 1.44, p=.17).  Furthermore, although priming was significantly 
greater than zero in the Same and Reverse conditions, t’s>2.86, p’s<.05, it was not 
reliable in the Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 0.56, p=.58 (see Figure 3.1-A). RTs in 
Task /  Same Reverse Orthogonal 
Prime-level  LP HP LP HP LP HP 
        
% Errors        
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 4 N 7.8 (7.3) 8.9 (4.4) 11.9 (8.4) 11.1 (7.2) 20.0 (9.2) 19.7 (12.4) 
 R 6.7 (4.5) 9.2 (7.7) 11.9 (8.1) 15.6 (8.4) 25.8 (13.1) 18.1 (11.1) 
 P 1.1 (8.5) -0.3 (7.2) 0.0 (9.1) -4.4 (10.6) -5.8 (13.9) 1.7 (12.7) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 5 N 11.9 (7.5) 12.8 (6.5) 16.4 (6.8) 10.6 (6.8) 23.6 (9.8) 21.4 (10.5) 
 R 9.7 (4.4) 10.6 (7.5) 17.8 (8.1) 16.1 (9.9) 20.6 (11.5) 20.8 (10.7) 
 P 2.2 (8.6) 2.2 (10.2) -1.4 (9.0) -5.6 (10.6) 3.1 (9.7) 0.6 (10.8) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 6 N 11.1 (5.8) 11.1 (7.8) 12.8 (6.5) 13.1 (8.9) 19.4 (10.3) 21.1 (13.1) 
 R 10.8 (7.7) 10.3 (5.8) 11.4 (7.0) 10.0 (6.4) 22.2 (12.6) 19.7 (9.2) 
 P 0.3 (8.8) 0.8 (9.9) 1.4 (9.2) 3.1 (10.0) -2.8 (12.0) 1.4 (11.1) 
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the "taller-than-wide" task were longer than in the "shoebox" task, but the 
proportional measure of priming showed the same pattern of results (Appendix A-4).  
  
Table 3.2.  Mean reaction times (RT), RT priming and proportional priming (plus standard deviations) 
across Task (questions denote Tasks carried out at Test), Prime-level, and Repetition for Experiments 
4-6.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = Repeated; P = Priming (Novel-
Repeated); PP = Proportional Priming ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel). Note that the division of Novel 
stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
 
Task /  Same Reverse Orthogonal 
Prime-level  LP HP LP HP LP HP 
        
RT        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 4 N 915 (124) 914 (140) 1028 (177) 986 (181) 1177 (232) 1220 (211) 
 R 788 (115) 722 (90) 949 (154) 958 (182) 1196 (239) 1176 (183) 
 P 128 (107) 192 (126) 79 (117) 28 (96) -19 (154) 44 (112) 
 PP .13 (.11) .20 (.11) .07 (.12) .02 (.10) -.02 (.14) .03 (.09) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 5 N 954 (141) 944 (151) 1035 (219) 1030 (200) 1373 (229) 1384 (200) 
 R 827 (119) 769 (122) 1000 (199) 969 (187) 1305 (237) 1322 (201) 
 P 127 (69) 175 (96) 36 (116) 61 (73) 68 (176) 63 (94) 
 PP .13 (.06) .18 (.09) .03 (.10) .06 (.07) .04 (.13) .04 (.07) 
        
  Bigger than shoebox? Smaller than shoebox? Taller than wide? 
Experiment 6 N 1169 (143) 1169 (148) 1332 (192) 1305 (235) 1497 (246) 1545 (220) 
 R 987 (106) 910 (123) 1124 (171) 1146 (183) 1455 (309) 1434 (280) 
 P 182 (95) 259 (82) 207 (106) 159 (148) 42 (134) 111 (139) 
 PP .15 (.07) .22 (.06) .15 (.07) .11 (.10) .03 (.09) .07 (.10) 
        
 
Interestingly, there was a trend towards a Task x Prime-level x Repetition 
interaction, F(1.8, 30.4) = 2.83, p=.08.  Given the predictions regarding possible 
facilitation and interference in the Same and Reverse condition respectively, a further 
2x2x2 (Task x Prime-level x Repetition) ANOVA on the mean RT data from the 
Same and Reverse conditions only was conducted.  This revealed a significant Task x 
Prime-level x Repetition interaction, F(1, 17) = 5.60, p<.05, reflecting numerically 
greater priming for High- than Low-primed stimuli in the Same condition (+64ms), 
Chapter 3: In search of CP contributions to repetition priming 
 60
and numerically less priming for High-primed stimuli in the Reverse condition (-
51ms). 
 Priming in the Orthogonal condition was split according to Congruent and 
Incongruent responses and entered into a 2x2 ANOVA.  Despite numerically greater 
priming for Congruent (+23ms) than Incongruent (-18ms) trials, as in Experiments 1-
3, the main effect of congruency did not reach significance, F(1, 17) = 1.37, p=.26 
(nor did any other effects) (see Figure 3.1-B). Priming was significant for High-
primed Congruent trials (+86ms), t(17) = 2.49, p<.05, but not for the other trial-types, 
t’s<1.02, p’s>.32. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 4.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.  *** p<.001. 
 
3.1.3 Discussion  
 
Experiment 4 replicated the results of Experiments 1-3; in particular, there was still no 
reliable nett priming in the Orthogonal condition, despite trying to maximise the 
overlap in semantic processing required by the Study and Test tasks. As in 
Experiments 1-3, most of the results are explicable in terms of S-R learning, namely 
(1) greater priming in the Same than Reverse condition, and (2) a trend for greater 
priming for Congruent than Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition.  
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Furthermore, Experiment 4 was the first to show a reliable interaction between Task 
and Prime-level, suggesting that increasing the number or strength of S-R bindings at 
Study can significantly increase the difference in priming across the Same and 
Reverse conditions.  It is unclear however whether this effect is primarily driven by 
facilitation in the Same condition (i.e., greater priming for High- than Low-primed 
stimuli), interference in the Reverse condition (i.e., less priming for High- than Low-
primed stimuli), or a combination of both.  Indeed, a response facilitation effect for 
Congruent trials together with a response interference effect for Incongruent trials 
may explain the lack of nett priming in the Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 1-3.  
This point is revisited in the combined analysis across Experiments 4-6.   
Regardless of whether this interaction is a result of facilitation or interference, 
it can be taken as evidence against one of the explanations put forward to explain the 
decrease in priming seen in the Reverse compared to Same condition in Chapter 2 
(see General Discussion – Chapter 2).  It was suggested that participants could adopt a 
conscious strategy to retrieve and rapidly reverse a previously encoded Action and/or 
Decision response.  This process of reversal could slow RTs relative to the Same 
condition however still produce significant positive priming as it relies on the rapid 
retrieval of an S-R binding.  If this were the case, one would expect to see greater 
priming for High- than Low-primed trials in both the Same and Reverse condition.  In 
the terminology of Instance Theory, this is because increasing the number of 
repetitions at Study should increase the probability of response retrieval “winning the 
race”.  Presuming the process of response reversal is unaffected by the speed of 
response retrieval, this should result in greater priming for High- than Low-primed 
trials in the Same and Reverse condition.  This was not the case in the present 
experiment.  Although I saw an increase for High-primed trials in the Same condition, 
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no increase was seen in the Reverse condition.  Such an interaction is difficult to 
explain in terms of a conscious “retrieve and reverse” strategy. 
 
3.2 Experiment 5 
 
Experiment 4 still failed to produce significant nett priming in the Orthogonal 
condition.  These results were particularly surprising given that significant priming 
was seen in the Vriezen et al. study (1995 - Experiment 6) that used the same “bigger-
than-shoebox” and “taller-than-wide” tasks.  One important difference however is that 
Vriezen et al. used words rather than pictures. Experiment 5 was therefore a 
replication of Experiment 4, except that I replaced the pictures of objects with the 
object names.   
 
3.2.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 5 was identical to Experiment 4, with the 
following exceptions. 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (11 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 22.9 years (σ = 3.7).  All participants were right-
handed (self-report). 
3.2.1.2 Materials 
The same objects were used as in Experiment 4, except that the stimuli were the 
names of the objects rather than pictures of them (see General Methods – Chapter 1).  
Words were presented in black on a white background with the same pixel dimensions 
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as the object picture stimuli. 
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
After excluding 1.3% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors are shown 
in Table 3.1.  Analyses of errors revealed no main effect of Repetition, though there 
was a significant repetition effect in the Reverse condition reflecting greater errors for 
Repeated than Novel stimuli (Appendix A-5).  Given the failure to find this effect in 
previous and subsequent experiments it will not be discussed further.  A further 5.2% 
of Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
Study.   
 Table 3.2 displays mean RTs, together with the mean RT priming effect 
(Novel-Repeated) and proportional priming. A 3x2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant 
Task x Repetition interaction, F(1.9, 32.2) = 8.86, p<.01 (plus main effects of Task, 
F(1.7, 28.3) = 94.88, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 17) = 42.49, p<.001).  Given no 
reliable effect involving Prime-level (F’s<2.09, p’s>.15), subsequent tests collapsed 
across this factor.  These tests revealed significantly greater priming in the Same 
relative to the Reverse, t(17) = 4.17, p<.01, and Same relative to Orthogonal, t(17) = 
3.50, p<.01, conditions (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 0.58, p=.57).  As in 
Experiments 1-3, significant priming was present in the Same and Reverse conditions, 
t’s>2.40, p’s<.05.  Unlike Experiments 1-3, significant priming was also present in 
the Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 2.53, p<.05 (see Figure 3.2-A).  The proportional 
measures of priming showed the same pattern of results (Appendix A-5).  
 A 2x2 ANOVA on the Orthogonal priming data revealed a main effect of 
Response Congruency, F(1, 17) = 14.26, p<.01, showing greater priming for 
Congruent (+103ms) than Incongruent (-29ms) stimuli (indeed, priming was reliable 
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for Congruent trials, t(17) = 3.56, p<.01, but not Incongruent trials, t(17) = 1.09, 
p=.29; Figure 3.2-B). A main effect of Prime-level was also present, F(1, 17) = 5.26, 
p<.05, revealing greater priming for Low- than High-primed stimuli.  This latter 
finding was unexpected, but given that it was not found in the other Experiments here, 
it is not considered further. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 5.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.  *** p<.001; ** 
p<.01. 
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
The use of words (object names) rather than pictures in Experiment 5 produced, for 
the first time in the present series of experiments, significant nett priming in the 
Orthogonal condition. This "cross-task" priming in Experiment 5 replicates that found 
by Vriezen et al. (1995).  One possibility is that significant priming can be induced 
even after controlling for S-R effects, by facilitation of one or more component 
processes. Why would this be the case for words, but not for the pictures in 
Experiments 1-3? One reason may be that performing the "shoebox" and "taller-than-
wide" tasks with words requires the participant to imagine a specific (or prototypical) 
exemplar of the object, perhaps even forming a visual image. These processes of 
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exemplar-selection and/or image-generation may be particularly prone to facilitation 
if they have been performed in the recent past - e.g., during the Study phase - 
producing a "savings" effect for Repeated stimuli. Because a picture of an object 
provides direct access to a specific exemplar, no such selection/image-generation 
processes would be necessary in Experiments 1-4.  Indeed, previous research has 
shown priming during imagery tasks that require participants to form a mental image 
of an object (McDermott & Roediger, 1994).  Another reason for priming in the 
Orthogonal condition for words but not for pictures may be facilitation of 
phonological access, given evidence that phonological representations are 
automatically accessed during word processing (Bowers & Turner, 2003), but not 
object processing (Damian & Bowers, 2003).   
 Nonetheless, priming in the Orthogonal condition was driven primarily by the 
Congruent trials, which could reflect retrieval of the previous response associated 
with a word repeated from the Study phase. Priming was not reliable for Incongruent 
trials.  Indeed, this was also the case in Vriezen et al. (1995 – Experiment 6).  In other 
words, the present results could still be explained by retrieval of S-R bindings, 
particularly if it is assumed that facilitation due to response repetition is greater than 
any interference due to response reversal. Thus the results from the present 
experiment cannot be taken as unequivocal evidence for the CP view of priming.  
These issues are revisited in Chapter 8.  In the next experiment, I returned to pictures 
and tried another method to increase the potential for measurable facilitation of a 
more perceptual component process.  
 
3.3 Experiment 6 
 
In Experiment 6, I sought further evidence for the existence of CP contributions to 
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priming. One reason for the failure to see evidence of perceptual facilitation in 
Experiments 1-4 may be that recognition of the objects depicted in the coloured 
pictures was already as efficient as possible (i.e., could not be facilitated appreciably 
by repetition). To tax object recognition processes to a greater extent, I visually 
degraded stimuli at Test in Experiment 6, anticipating more scope for perceptual 
facilitation owing to prior exposure of intact versions at Study. 
 
3.3.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 6 was identical to Experiment 4, with the 
following exceptions. 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (10 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 22.6 years (σ = 4.4).  One participant was 
ambidextrous, all other participants were right-handed (self-report). 
3.3.1.2 Procedure 
Images were displayed in exactly the same manner as Experiment 4 during Study 
blocks, however at Test they were ‘degraded’ (see Figure 3.3).  At stimulus onset the 
image was completely masked by setting 100% of pixels to gray.  The amount of this 
noise was reduced gradually by randomly removing gray pixels from 100% at onset to 
0% after 1000ms, over 25 steps.  The unmasked stimulus then remained on screen for 
a further 1000ms.  Participants performed the same Study and Test tasks as in 
Experiment 4, and were given exactly the same instructions (i.e., to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible). 
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Figure 3.3.  Trial sequence for (A) Study presentations and (B) Test presentations in Experiment 6.  At 
Test stimuli were masked by visual noise at stimulus onset.  The amount of this noise was gradually 
reduced over 1000ms followed by 1000ms of complete stimulus presentation. 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.8% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors are shown 
in Table 3.1.  Analyses of errors revealed no significant effects of Repetition 
(Appendix A-6).  A further 4.0% of Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis 
due to incorrect responses given at Study.   
 Table 3.2 displays mean RTs, together with measures of priming. Inspection 
of both additive priming and proportional priming scores suggests that priming was 
greater in Experiment 6 than previous Experiments.  Tests confirmed that the mean 
additive priming, t(17) = 4.48, p<.001, and proportional priming, t(17) = 3.26, p<.01, 
was indeed greater in Experiment 6 than when using intact pictures in Experiment 4. 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA revealed a significant Task x Repetition interaction, F(1.5, 26.3) = 
16.28, p<.001 (plus main effects of Task, F(1.3, 22.8) = 45.27, p<.001, and 
Repetition, F(1, 17) = 156.85, p<.001).  Collapsing across Prime-level, subsequent 
tests revealed significantly greater priming in the Same, t(17) = 6.23, p<.001, and 
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Reverse, t(17) = 3.28, p<.01, conditions relative to the Orthogonal condition.  Note 
that although the Same versus Reverse contrast did not reach significance, t(17) = 
1.73, p=.10, analysis of the proportional measure of priming did reveal significantly 
greater priming in the Same condition, t(17) = 3.15, p<.01 (Appendix A-6).  As in 
Experiments 1-5, significant priming was seen in the Same and Reverse conditions, 
t’s>9.82, p’s<.001; and as in Experiment 5, there was also significant priming in the 
Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 3.25, p<.01 (see Figure 3.4-A).  
 
 
Figure 3.4.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across (A) the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal 
conditions (collapsed across Prime-level) and (B) Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal 
condition in Experiment 6.  Error bars represent 95% two-tailed confidence intervals.  ** p<.01. 
 
 As in Experiment 4, a trend towards a Task x Prime-level x Repetition 
interaction was present, F(1.5, 25.6) = 2.83, p=.09.  A 2x2x2 ANOVA for the Same 
and Reverse conditions only revealed a significant Task x Prime-level x Repetition 
interaction, F(1, 17) = 5.19, p<.05 (as seen in Experiment 4). This interaction 
reflected greater priming for High- than Low-primed stimuli in the Same condition 
(+77ms), t(17) = 3.00, p<.01; a pattern that was not present in the Reverse condition (-
49ms), t(17) = 1.01, p=.33. 
A 2x2 ANOVA on the Orthogonal priming data revealed only a main effect of 
Congruency, F(1, 17) = 16.51, p<.001, with greater priming for Congruent (+134ms) 
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than Incongruent (+21ms) stimuli, as in previous experiments (see Figure 3.4-B). As 
in Experiment 5, priming was reliable for Congruent trials, t(17) = 5.51, p<.001, but 
not for Incongruent trials, t(17) = 0.89, p=.39. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 6 showed that a second type of experimental manipulation (in addition to 
the use of words rather than pictures in Experiment 5) - visual degradation of object 
pictures - can also reveal reliable nett priming in the Orthogonal condition. Indeed, 
this manipulation seemed to increase priming across all conditions relative to the non-
degraded pictures in Experiment 4. One possible explanation is that, by "slowing 
down" object identification at Test via the gradual removal of visual noise, there was 
more scope for facilitation of this process by prior identification of objects at Study.  
 As in Experiment 4 however, priming in the Orthogonal condition was only 
reliable for Congruent trials. It is of course possible that there was a positive priming 
effect caused by perceptual facilitation for both Congruent and Incongruent trials, 
which was augmented by S-R contributions for Congruent trials, but counteracted by 
response interference for Incongruent trials.  Such interference may have resulted in 
no nett priming for Incongruent trials.  This would fit with the trend for positive 
priming for Incongruent trials seen in the present experiment compared to previous 
experiments that showed a trend towards negative priming.  However, it is also 
possible that there was no contribution of perceptual facilitation at all, and retrieval of 
S-R bindings causes greater facilitation (for Congruent trials) than it does interference 
(for Incongruent trials), such that there was positive priming for Congruent trials but 
no negative priming for Incongruent trials. This is consistent with multiple study 
exposures (High-primed) increasing priming in the Same condition, but having little 
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effect on priming in the Reverse condition. It is also consistent with the “instance” 
theory of Logan (1990), in which response retrieval can only cause facilitation (such 
that RTs for primed stimuli can never be slower than the “algorithmic” route required 
on initial presentation of a stimulus). The greater overall priming across all conditions 
when degrading stimuli (i.e., in Experiment 6 relative to Experiment 4) might simply 
be explained by the longer RTs allowing the retrieval of S-R bindings to have greater 
influence. Thus, to unequivocally rule out S-R learning as the explanation for “cross-
task” priming, reliable positive priming needs to be demonstrated for Incongruent 
trials in the Orthogonal condition, and this was not found. 
 
3.3.4 Inter-experimental analyses 
 
Figure 3.5 displays the main priming effects seen across Experiments 4-6.  In order to 
compare Experiments 4-6 formally, the results were entered into a 3x2x2x3 (Task x 
Repetition x Prime-level x Experiment) mixed ANOVA.  Firstly, a significant 
Repetition x Experiment interaction was revealed, F(2, 51) = 13.15, p<.001, showing 
significantly greater priming in Experiment 6 than Experiment 4, t(34) = 4.96, p<.001, 
and Experiment 5, t(34) = 3.86, p<.001.  This interaction however was modulated by 
Task (i.e., we found a significant Task x Repetition x Experiment interaction), F(3.5, 
88.7) = 3.12, p<.05.  Inspection of priming scores in Table 3.2 suggests that the 
increase in priming in Experiment 6 compared to Experiments 4 and 5 was greatest in 
the Reverse than the Same or Orthogonal condition.  Comparing Experiments 4 and 6, 
post-hoc tests confirmed that the difference in priming between Experiments was 
greater in the Reverse than Same condition, t(17) = 2.85, p<.05, with a similar pattern 
of results when comparing Experiments 5 and 6, t(17) = 2.44, p<.05.  Given this 
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difference in priming across Task and Experiment did not affect the main priming 
effects of interest seen in Experiments 4-6 it is not discussed further. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Main effects and interactions of interest across Experiments 4-6.  (A) Greater priming in 
the Same than Reverse condition (collapsed across Experiment and Prime-level) and a Task x Prime-
level interaction showing greater priming for High- than Low-primed items in the Same condition 
(collapsed across Experiment).  (B) Greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli in the 
Orthogonal condition (collapsed across Experiment and Prime-level).  Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals (two-tailed).  *** p<.001; ** p<.01. 
 
 This analysis also revealed a significant Task x Repetition x Prime-level 
interaction, F(1.9, 95.6) = 4.64, p<.05.  As Experiments 4 and 6 demonstrated a 
significant three-way interaction when analyses focussed specifically on the Same and 
Reverse condition, post-hoc tests were conducted comparing priming for High- vs. 
Low-primed items in the Same and Reverse conditions only.  As in Experiments 4 and 
6, these analyses revealed significantly greater priming for High- than Low-primed 
items in the Same condition, t(53) = 3.23, p<.01, and a non-significant trend for 
greater priming for Low- than High-primed items in the Reverse condition, t(53) = 
1.17, p=.25 (see Figure 3.5-A).  The main ANOVA also revealed a significant 
interaction between Task and Repetition, F(1.7, 88.7) = 35.00, p<.001, showing 
greater priming in the Same than Reverse condition (see Figure 3.5-A).  Finally, a 
Task x Prime-level interaction was revealed, F(1.9, 95.5) = 5.55, p<.01 (and a 
marginal Repetition x Prime-level interaction, F(1, 51) = 3.91, p=.06), as well as main 
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effects of Task, F(1.6, 79.3) = 192.66, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 51) = 220.18, 
p<.001. 
A further inter-experimental analysis was conducted on the congruency data 
from the Orthogonal condition of Experiments 4-6.  A 2x2x3 (Congruency x Prime-
level x Experiment) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant effect of Congruency, F(1, 
51) = 26.04, p<.001, with greater priming for Congruent (+86ms) than Incongruent (-
8ms) trials (see Figure 3.5-B).  As in the separate experimental analyses, priming was 
reliable for Congruent, t(53) = 5.25, p<.001, but not Incongruent, t(53) = .57, p=.57, 
trials.  No further significant effects or interactions were present, F’s<2.73, p’s>.08. 
 One final analysis was conducted in order to assess the effects of 
counterbalancing order on priming across our conditions of interest.  This entailed a 
3x2x2x6x6 (Task x Repetition x Prime-level x Experiment x Order) mixed ANOVA, 
where the between-subjects factor “Order” refers to the six counterbalancing orders of 
the three task conditions.  The data from Experiments 1-6 were entered into this 
analysis so as to maximise the power to reveal any possible effect of Order.  This 
resulted in a total of 16 participants per counterbalancing order, comparable in 
number to the individual experiments in Chapters 2 and 3.  No main effect of Order 
was present, F(5, 60) = .76, p=.58, nor did this factor interact significantly with any 
other factor, F’s<1.62, p’s>.17.  Thus there was no evidence for any task order 
effects. 
 
3.4 General Discussion 
 
As in Chapter 2, the results of Experiments 4-6 from the present chapter were 
remarkably consistent.  Again, across all three experiments greater priming was seen 
in the Same than Reverse condition as well as greater priming for Congruent than 
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Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition.  As previously stated, these results are 
difficult to explain in terms of facilitation of component processes and serve to 
underline the dominance and consistency of S-R contributions within the present 
paradigm.  Experiments 4 and 6 also revealed a further possible marker of S-R 
learning, with greater priming for High- than Low-primed items in the Same 
condition, and a trend in the opposite direction in the Reverse condition.  This 
significant interaction was further confirmed in the inter-experimental analysis of 
Experiments 4-6, and is consistent with the notion that repeated co-occurrences of 
stimulus and response lead to greater facilitation when the same response is repeated 
at Test (i.e., in the Same condition). 
 Experiments 5 and 6 were the first in this thesis to demonstrate significant nett 
priming in the Orthogonal condition.  Such a result is consistent with the notion of 
facilitation of component processes.  In Experiment 5, I attempted to maximise the 
overlap in semantic processing between the Study and Test tasks in the Orthogonal 
condition, and presented word stimuli to increase possible exemplar generation and/or 
phonological processes.  In Experiment 6, I visually degraded stimuli at Test thereby 
slowing down object identification.  It was thought that such a manipulation would 
maximise the possibility of seeing facilitation of perceptual processes by taxing object 
recognition processes.  Although facilitation of such processes is readily able to 
explain the nett priming in the Orthogonal condition, both experiments failed to 
demonstrate significant priming for Incongruent trials.  As such, the priming seen in 
the Orthogonal conditions of these experiments may have been driven primarily by 
response repetition for Congruent trials.  In short, these data cannot be taken as 
unequivocal evidence for facilitation of component processes. 
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3.4.1 Implications for S-R theories of priming 
3.4.1.1 Extending Instance Theory? 
 
Before progressing to the next chapter it is worth considering the results of Chapters 2 
and 3 more carefully.  In particular, it is worth examining whether existing S-R 
theories of priming can accommodate the present data.  As previously discussed, one 
concrete example of an S-R theory of priming is the “Instance Theory” proposed by 
Logan (1990), as an extension of his theory of automaticity (Logan, 1988).  This 
theory assumes that the response to the initial presentation of a stimulus is generated 
by an algorithmic processing route, but that this response also becomes stored 
together with a stimulus in a separate “instance” (i.e., an S-R binding).  When the 
stimulus is repeated, there is a race between the algorithmic route and retrieval of any 
previous instances.  When retrieval of a previous instance wins the race, the RT will 
be shorter, producing priming.   
 In situations in which participants realise that responses from previous tasks 
are likely to be inappropriate (i.e., in the present Reverse and Orthogonal conditions), 
Logan proposed that they revert to algorithmic processing, ignoring retrieval of 
previous instances.  That is, the system should “run off the relevant algorithm and 
compute…a response” (Logan, 1988; p. 495).  Because processing in the algorithmic 
route is assumed to be unaffected by repetition (unlike CP theories of priming), such 
situations should therefore not show any priming.  However, the reliable priming in 
the present Reverse condition and for Congruent trials in the Orthogonal condition 
would suggest otherwise. 
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 In order to accommodate the significant priming in the Reverse condition, 
Instance Theory could assume that S-R bindings are coded solely at the level of 
Classifications (e.g., “bigger/smaller”).  That is, retrieval of an instance might provide 
a “bigger” Classification.  Such a Classification would then be mapped to a “yes” 
Decision in the case of the Same condition, or a “no” Decision in the case of the 
Reverse condition.  If S-R bindings were coded solely at the level of Classification, it 
is unclear why one should see a decrease in priming in the Reverse compared to the 
Same condition.  If the only response information retrieved relates to the task-
dependent Classification, equivalent priming should be seen across these conditions.  
Furthermore, it is unclear why High-primed trials (coded by three instances) would 
not produce greater priming than Low-primed trials in the Reverse as well as the 
Same condition.  This is because increasing the number of repetitions at Study should 
increase the probability that retrieval of a Classification response “wins the race”, 
producing greater priming in both the Same and Reverse condition.  Finally, one 
would not expect a congruency effect in the Orthogonal condition, where Decisions 
and Actions are repeated or reversed, but the Classification is quite different (e.g., 
“bigger” vs. “man-made” in Experiments 1-3).  These data would seem to require 
either instances that encode multiple levels of response, or multiple separate instances 
for each level of response. 
 How would such an “extended” Instance Theory explain the congruency effect 
in the Orthogonal condition?  In this condition (unlike the Reverse condition), 
Classifications from previous tasks are completely irrelevant.  Furthermore, Actions 
and Decisions are not predictive of the correct response at Test given these responses 
are on average orthogonal to responses at Test.  In such situations participants should 
revert to algorithmic processing, and no priming should occur for either Congruent or 
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Incongruent trials.  Although this explanation fails to fit the RT data, it is consistent 
with the generally low error rates seen across Experiments 1-6 (i.e., <20% errors 
across all experiments and <3% in Experiment 1).  In short, reverting to the 
algorithmic route should produce high accuracy rates but no nett priming. 
Alternatively, one could assume that previous Action/Decision responses are 
retrieved and enacted, even if they are not predictive.  This would explain the positive 
priming for Congruent trials.  It could also explain the lack of reliable priming for 
Incongruent trials if one assumes that “Incongruent trials” represent situations in 
which the algorithm won the race (producing the opposite response to that made at 
Study).  If this were the case however, one would expect to see much higher error 
rates as the algorithmic route is effectively ignored.  Indeed, if response retrieval was 
consistently winning the race, errors should be as high as 50% as trials that should 
receive an Incongruent response are answered incorrectly.  In other words, retrieved 
responses should be enacted without regard for accuracy (as the response retrieval 
route has no conception of whether the retrieved response is “correct”).  This was not 
the case in the present experiments; in particular Experiment 1 had error rates of less 
than 3% in the Orthogonal condition. 
In summary, the Orthogonal condition was able to show greater priming for 
Congruent than Incongruent trials whilst maintaining high accuracy levels.  The only 
way to account for this pattern of results is to suggest that the response retrieval and 
algorithmic route interact prior to the generation of a response.  During Congruent 
trials for example, there may be mutual reinforcement between the response retrieved 
from instances and the response currently favoured (even if not selected) by the 
algorithmic route, speeding up RTs.  During Incongruent trials, there may be 
interference between the Action/Decision retrieved from instances and the response 
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currently favoured by the algorithmic route.  Such incongruency may lead to the 
algorithmic route running to completion, resulting in no nett priming.  Alternatively, 
interference may in fact have slowed RTs, but this was counteracted by a small 
speeding of RTs from facilitation of perceptual processes.  This latter possibility is not 
currently supported by the data as no significant interference effects have been seen in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (though see Chapter 4).  Regardless, such interaction between the 
algorithmic and response retrieval routes would reflect a major departure from the 
original Instance Theory. 
 
3.4.1.2 Extending Event-File Theory? 
 
The proposal that responses are coded at multiple levels of response 
(Actions/Decisions and Classifications) would seem consistent with the Event-File 
theory proposed by Hommel (1998).  This theory focuses more on interference effects 
of prior encounters, whereby discrepancies between the present circumstances and 
retrieved Event Files tend to slow RTs (Hommel, 2004).  Although it does allow for 
the presence of multiple, separate Event Files (Waszak & Hommel, 2007), it is 
generally conceived that such bindings are temporary.  As such, the theory has more 
often been applied to short-lag priming paradigms (though see Posse, Waszak & 
Hommel, 2006).  Furthermore, it does not specify a mechanism (such as the race in 
Logan’s model) by which multiple records interact to generate a response (e.g., for 
High-primed stimuli). 
 More importantly, it is unclear how the theory predicts positive priming, given 
its focus on interference effects arising from prior experience.  Waszak & Hommel 
(2007) have presented evidence of positive priming under certain experimental 
conditions. While they attribute the increase in priming to a disruption of S-R 
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associations by an intervening task, it is unclear how such a reduction in interference 
can lead to significant positive priming without a separate mechanism (and indeed, 
Waszak and Hommel appeal to some form of additional facilitation of perceptual 
processing). As with Instance Theory, the present results would seem to require some 
form of interaction between “episodes” retrieved from previous trials and the 
component processes (algorithm) that compute the response in completely novel 
circumstances.  This possible interaction between the response retrieval and 
algorithmic route is revisited in Chapter 8. 
 
3.4.2 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 3 presented three experiments designed to assess S-R and CP contributions to 
repetition priming.  In Experiment 4, a new Orthogonal Test task was introduced (i.e., 
“taller than wide?”) that was thought to increase the overlap in possible conceptual 
processing, requiring access to similar “size semantics” needed in the “bigger than 
shoebox” task.  In Experiment 5, word rather than picture stimuli were presented to 
increase possible facilitation of exemplar generation/mental imagery and/or 
phonological processing.  In Experiment 6, picture stimuli were degraded at Test to 
increase the scope to see possible facilitation of perceptual processes, by slowing 
overall RTs.  Despite revealing significant nett priming in the Orthogonal condition of 
Experiments 5 and 6, no nett positive priming was seen for Incongruent trials.  As 
such, Chapter 3 failed to provide unequivocal evidence for facilitation of particular 
component processes. 
 Chapter 3 revealed three possible markers of S-R learning: (1) greater priming 
in the Same than Reverse condition, (2) greater priming for Congruent than 
Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition and (3) greater priming for High- than 
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Low-primed trials in the Same condition, but no difference in the Reverse condition.  
These S-R effects were considered in relation to current S-R theories of repetition 
priming, specifically Instance Theory and Event-File Theory.  Although both theories 
were capable of explaining certain portions of the data, they were unable to explain all 
the present results.  Two critical issues were discussed: (1) the possibility that S-R 
bindings are coded at multiple levels of response representation and (2) the necessary 
interaction between response retrieval and algorithmic routes prior to response 
generation.  The issue of interaction between these two routes will be addressed in 
Chapter 8. The next chapter focuses on the issue of multiple levels of response (and 
stimulus) representation.  Although such multiple response representations were 
needed in order to explain the full set of results in Chapters 2 and 3 (without requiring 
additional CP contributions), no direct evidence has been provided for the existence of 
such representations.  The experiments presented in the next chapter therefore directly 
assess this assumption of multiple response representations. 
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Chapter 4 
S-R bindings at multiple levels of stimulus and response 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 suggested that S-R contributions dominate in the present long-lag 
classification paradigm.  Interestingly, I found little, if any, evidence for significant 
CP contributions to priming.  These results question the commonly held assumption 
that priming reflects the facilitation of particular perceptual and/or conceptual 
processes.  Having provided evidence for this dominance, the present chapter focuses 
on the S-R bindings that produce these S-R learning effects.  Specifically, I asked: at 
what level of abstraction are both the response and stimulus represented within such 
S-R bindings?  Whereas Experiments 7 and 8 concentrate on the level of response 
representation, Experiment 9 focuses on the level of stimulus representation. 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the pattern of priming across the Same, 
Reverse and Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 1-6 can be explained fully by S-R 
learning.  One effect that would seem difficult to explain is the significant priming 
found in the Reverse condition.  In Chapter 3, I discussed the concept that S-R 
learning may occur at differing levels of response representation.  Specifically, in 
order to explain the significant priming found in the Reverse condition, I suggested 
that responses may form at the abstract level of a “Classification” (e.g., 
“bigger/smaller” in the case of the shoebox task).  Such abstract response coding 
however would not appear sufficient to explain the reliable congruency effects seen in 
the Orthogonal condition, where a previously learnt Classification (e.g., “bigger”) is 
irrelevant to the Test task (e.g., “is the object man-made?”).  As such, S-R learning 
would also need to be occurring at the more specific level of a Decision (e.g., 
“yes/no”) or perhaps even an Action (e.g., right/left hand finger-press).  Thus I can 
distinguish between at least three potential levels of response representation, an 
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Action (right/left finger-press), a Decision (yes/no) and a Classification 
(bigger/smaller). 
The conditions in Experiments 1-6 could not distinguish S-R binding at the 
level of Decisions from the level of Actions, given that the assignment of “yes/no” to 
keys was fixed for a given participant.  Furthermore, they could not provide direct 
evidence for S-R binding at the level of Classifications given the significant priming 
seen in the Reverse condition could have resulted from facilitation of conceptual 
processes (e.g., retrieval of semantic information relating to an object’s size in real 
life in the case of the “bigger than a shoebox” task – see predictions in Chapter 2). 
These response manipulations are illustrated in Table 4.1.  The aim of Experiments 7 
and 8 was to distinguish these, and provide more direct evidence that stimuli become 
bound simultaneously to each of these three levels of response representation.  In 
Experiment 7 I manipulated responses at the level of Action and Decision, whereas in 
Experiment 8 I manipulated responses at the level of Decision and Classification.  In 
order to address the issue of Classification responses in Experiment 8, I introduced a 
new response-congruency manipulation whereby I changed the referent in the “bigger 
than shoebox” task between Study and Test (e.g., to “bigger than a wheelie bin”).  
Changing the referent size has the effect of changing Classification responses between 
Study and Test for particular stimuli (i.e., stimuli that are “bigger” than a shoebox but 
“smaller” than a wheelie bin).   
This new manipulation was then used in Experiment 9 to explore the related 
question about the level of stimulus abstraction within S-R bindings.  Specifically, I 
asked: can S-R effects be seen despite switching from the name of an object (e.g., the 
word “lion”) to a picture of an object (e.g., a picture of a lion)?  Given previous 
research has primarily focussed on Action and Decision response representations 
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within S-R bindings (e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Logan, 1990; Schnyer et al., 2007), I 
first turned to distinguishing between these two responses. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1.  Schematic of all conditions across Experiments 1-8 in terms of three different levels of 
response representation (Classification, Decision and Action).  S = Same response; R = Reverse 
response; D = Different response. * indicates the critical differences in Contrast 1 of the inter-
experimental analysis of Experiments 7 and 8, related to changes in Action (see text); + indicates the 
critical differences in Contrast 2 of the inter-experimental analysis of Experiments 7 and 8, related to 
changes in Classification (see text). 
 
 
 Classification Decision Action 
    
Experiments 1-6    
    
Same S S S 
Reverse S R R 
Orthogonal    
    Congruent D S S 
    Incongruent D R R 
    
Experiment 7    
    
Same-Action 
Same-Decision S S S* 
Different-Action 
Same-Decision S+ S D* 
Different-Action 
Different-Decision D+ D D 
    
Experiment 8    
    
Classification-Congruent 
Decision-Congruent S S S* 
Classification-Congruent 
Decision-Incongruent S+ R R* 
Classification-Incongruent 
Decision-Congruent R S S 
Classification-Incongruent 
Decision-Incongruent R+ R R 
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4.1 Experiment 7 
 
In Experiment 7, participants always performed the “shoebox” task at Test.  There 
were three different conditions at Study. In two conditions, the “shoebox” task was 
also performed, but participants either responded with key-presses (same Action and 
same Decision as at Test) or with vocal “yes/no” responses (different Action but same 
Decision from Test); in the third Study condition, participants were required to 
vocalise the object’s name (different Action and different Decision from Test). This 
design therefore separated learning of an Action (finger-press vs. vocal response) 
from learning of a Decision (yes/no vs. object-naming), as illustrated in Table 4.1.   
 
 
Figure 4.1.  RT priming predictions (A-C) and results (D) from Experiment 7 across Task (Same-
Action Same-Decision, Different-Action Same-Decision, Different-Action Different-Decision; 
collapsed across Prime-level).  (A)  S-R binding at the level of Actions predicts priming only in the 
Same-Action Same-Decision condition; (B) S-R binding at the level of Decisions predicts equivalent 
priming in the Same-Action Same-Decision and Different-Action Same-Decision condition; (C) S-R 
binding at the level of Actions and Decision predicts reduced though significant priming in the 
Different-Action Same-Decision condition.  (D) Mean RT priming across Task collapsed across Prime-
level.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed).  *** p<.001; ** p<.01. 
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Figure 4.1 presents the patterns of priming expected if S-R bindings are coded 
at the level of Actions, Decisions or Actions and Decisions.  If responses are only 
coded at the level of Actions, significant priming should only be present in the Same-
Action Same-Decision condition, with no nett priming in the other two conditions 
(Figure 4.1-A).  This is because the response manipulation in Experiment 7 changed 
rather than reversed particular responses (e.g., the Action response changed from a 
finger-press to a vocal response instead of switching from a right to a left finger-
press), decreasing the possibility of interference effects.  If responses are coded at the 
level Decisions, equal priming should be present in the Same-Action Same-Decision 
and Different-Action Same-Decision conditions, with no priming in the Different-
Action Different-Decision condition (Figure 4.1-B).  However, if responses are coded 
at the level of Actions and Decisions priming should be present in both the Same-
Action Same-Decision and Different-Action Same-Decision condition, however I 
should see significantly reduced priming in the latter condition (Figure 4.1-C).  Again, 
no priming should be present in the Different-Action Different-Decision condition as 
no S-R bindings were repeated in this condition.  Indeed, if priming was present in 
this condition this could be taken as evidence for the facilitation of particular 
component processes. 
 
4.1.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 7 was identical to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. 
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4.1.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (7 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 24.7 years (σ = 6.0).  4 participants were left-
handed, the remaining 14 participants were right-handed (self-report). 
4.1.1.2 Design 
Experiment 7 involved three study-test cycles.  At Test, participants always performed 
the “bigger-than-shoebox” task, using key-press responses.  At Study, participants 
completed one of three tasks: (1) the “bigger-than-shoebox” task with a key-press 
response (Same-Action Same-Decision), (2) the “bigger-than-shoebox” task verbally 
stating “yes” or “no” (Different-Action Same-Decision), or (3) a verbal naming task 
(Different-Action Different-Decision).  
 
4.1.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.3% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors, together 
with mean RTs, mean RT priming and proportional priming, are shown in Table 4.2.  
Analyses of errors revealed no significant effects of Repetition (Appendix A-7).  A 
further 2.1% of Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect 
responses given at Study.   
A 3x2x2 (Task x Repetition x Prime-level) ANOVA revealed significant Task 
x Repetition, F(1.6, 27.2) = 17.04, p<.001, and Prime-level x Repetition, F(1, 17) = 
6.95, p<.05, interactions (plus main effects of Task, F(1.8, 30.3) = 10.15, p<.001, 
Prime-level, F(1, 17) = 6.09, p<.05, and Repetition, F(1, 17) = 79.31, p<.001). The 
Prime-level x Repetition interaction reflected greater priming for High- than Low-
primed stimuli irrespective of Task.  To further investigate the Task x Repetition 
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interaction, subsequent pairwise comparisons across Tasks were collapsed across 
Prime-level.  These revealed significantly greater priming in the Same-Action Same-
Decision than Different-Action Same-Decision condition, t(17) = 2.85, p<.05, and 
significantly greater priming in the Different-Action Same-Decision than Different-
Action Different-Decision condition, t(17) = 3.28, p<.01 (see Figure 4.1-D).   Note 
that there were no reliable task differences in RTs for Novel stimuli across Task (as 
expected since the Test task was the same across conditions); as a result, the 
proportional priming data showed a similar pattern to those of the main analysis 
(Table 4.2 and Appendix A-7).  Therefore, changes (not reversals) in both Action and 
Decision caused a significant decrease in priming.  
 
Table 4.2.  Mean percentage errors, error priming, reaction time (RT), RT priming and proportional 
priming (Prop. Priming) (plus standard deviations) across Task, Prime-level and Repetition for 
Experiment 7.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-primed; PP = Proportional Priming ((Novel-
Repeated)/Novel). Note that the division of Novel stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an 
arbitrary, equal split. 
 
Interestingly, priming was still significant in the Different-Action Different-
Decision condition, t(17) = 2.48, p<.05. Indeed, this priming effect was significant 
even for participants who performed the Different-Action Different-Decision  
condition first, t(5) = 2.65, p<.05, suggesting that it was not simply because 
Task /  Same-Action      Same-Decision 
Different-Action 
Same-Decision 
Different-Action 
Different-Decision 
Prime-level  LP HP LP HP LP HP 
        
Errors Novel 11.1 (5.0) 12.2 (8.3) 12.5 (6.9) 11.1 (7.6) 10.3 (6.7) 12.2 (7.5) 
 Repeated 9.7 (6.3) 9.4 (5.4) 12.2 (10.2) 11.9 (7.3) 10.8 (6.2) 13.3 (7.5) 
 Priming 1.4 (7.2) 2.8 (10.9) 0.3 (10.4) -0.8 (6.5) -0.6 (6.8) -1.1 (10.2) 
        
RTs Novel 857 (131) 832 (133) 813 (126) 834 (119) 862 (174) 885 (176) 
 Repeated 708 (101) 667 (99) 734 (127) 674 (102) 832 (141) 812 (151) 
 Priming 150 (77) 165 (87) 80 (59) 161 (73) 30 (105) 73 (100) 
 PP .17 (.08) .19 (.09) .10 (.07) .19 (.08) .02 (.11) .08 (.10) 
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participants who performed the Different-Action Different-Decision condition last 
continued to (covertly) categorise objects as bigger/smaller at Study.  
 
4.1.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 7 therefore produced two important findings for S-R learning: (1) 
significantly greater priming when an Action is repeated than when it is not (from 
contrasting key presses with yes/no vocalisations at Study) and (2) significantly 
greater priming when a Decision is repeated than when it is not (from contrasting 
yes/no vocalisation with object name vocalisation at Study). These results suggest that 
responses are coded at both the level of the Action and the Decision, possibly 
explaining some of the discrepancies in this regard across previous studies (Dobbins 
et al., 2004; Koch & Allport, 2006; Logan, 1990; Rothermund et al., 2005; Schnyer et 
al., 2007; Waszak & Hommel, 2007). Note also that the Different-Action Same-
Decision and Different-Action Different-Decision conditions did not entail any 
response reversal, unlike the Reverse condition or the Incongruent trials in the 
Orthogonal condition of Experiments 1-6. Therefore there was no opportunity for a 
decrease in RTs owing to response interference, consistent with the greater overall 
priming for High- than Low-primed stimuli in Experiment 7, but no interaction of this 
effect with Task condition.   
A third finding was reliable residual priming even when neither the finger 
press nor yes/no decision was repeated (i.e., in the Different-Action Different-
Decision condition, when objects are only named at Study).  This finding cannot be 
explained by responses at the level of Classification either, since naming an object has 
nothing to do with its subsequent “bigger” or “smaller” classification; nor did it 
appear to reflect covert performance of the “shoebox” task at Study, given that it was 
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reliable even for participants who performed this condition first (though covert 
classification might have been encouraged by the practice phase). Repeating this 
condition on a group of participants who are never informed about the subsequent 
shoebox task would be informative in this regard. If reliable priming remains, this 
would be strong support for some form of facilitated perceptual processing (e.g., 
object identification).  Note this is the first time in the present thesis that an 
identification, as opposed to a classification, task has been used.  These results 
therefore underline the distinction drawn between identification and classification 
tasks in Chapter 1, with the former demonstrating CP contributions to repetition 
priming.  Nonetheless, the main focus of Experiment 7 was on S-R bindings, for 
which Experiments 1-7 taken together suggest simultaneous coding of at least three 
levels of responses: Actions, Decisions and Classifications. This proposal was tested 
further in Experiment 8. 
 
4.2 Experiment 8 
 
Given the evidence from Experiment 7 that stimuli become bound with both overt 
Actions and covert Decisions, I wanted to find analogous evidence that stimuli can 
become bound with both yes/no Decisions and task-specific Classifications. While I 
appealed to the distinction between Actions/Decisions and Classifications to explain 
the results of Experiments 1-6, this was rather post hoc and indirect. Furthermore, I 
wanted to distinguish S-R learning of Classifications from facilitation of conceptual 
processes, given that the implication of Classification response codes in Experiments 
1-6 was based partly on comparing the Reverse condition with the Orthogonal 
condition. Because this comparison entailed a change in task, it was difficult to 
guarantee that the same degree of overlap in conceptual processing occurred  in the 
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Orthogonal condition as in the Reverse condition (even when using the “taller-wider” 
task in Experiments 4-6 to be as similar as possible to the “shoebox” task). 
Experiment 8 was therefore designed to contrast the use of Classification and 
Decision codes within the context of a constant task.  
I achieved this by first introducing a referent change manipulation between 
Study and Test (e.g., “bigger than X” to “bigger than Y”).  This requires a response 
change for stimuli whose size falls in between the two referent sizes.  For example, 
whereas a picture of a monkey would be classified as “bigger” than a shoebox it 
would be “smaller” than a wheelie bin.  This ensures a reversal in response at all three 
possible levels of response representation (i.e., Actions, Decisions and Classifications) 
and is therefore a more thorough manipulation of response congruency than the Same 
vs. Reverse manipulation utilised in Experiments 1-6 (that only required a reversal of 
response at the levels of Action and Decision).  Note that this manipulation is also a 
within-block manipulation of response congruency in that some stimuli will receive a 
congruent response between Study and Test (i.e., if the object is bigger than a shoebox 
and wheelie bin), whilst others will receive an incongruent response (i.e., if the object 
is bigger than a shoebox but smaller than a wheelie bin).  As such, participants will 
have no a priori knowledge concerning whether a response should be repeated or 
reversed between presentations (analogous to the Orthogonal condition of 
Experiments 1-6). 
In order to contrast Decisions with Classifications, I combined this change in 
referent manipulation (e.g., “bigger than X” to “bigger than Y”) with task reversals 
(e.g., “bigger than X” to “smaller than X”), resulting in a factorial manipulation of 
Decision-congruency versus Classification-congruency (see Figure 4.2). For instance, 
when asked whether a monkey is bigger than a shoebox at Study, the participant is 
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likely to classify it as “bigger” (the Classification) and therefore answer “yes” (the 
Decision).  When asked at Test whether a monkey is bigger than a wheelie bin, the 
Classification will now be reversed (from “bigger” to “smaller”), as will the Decision 
(from “yes” to “no”).  This would correspond to a Classification-Incongruent, 
Decision-Incongruent trial because both responses were reversed.  However, when 
asked at Test whether a monkey is smaller than a wheelie bin, the correct Decision 
would now be “yes” as the monkey is smaller.  This would correspond to a trial that is 
Decision-Congruent (because the participant answers “yes” at both Study and Test) 
but Classification-Incongruent (because the participant classifies the monkey as 
“bigger” at Study but “smaller” at Test).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Schematic of experimental design for Experiment 8. Reversals in task (Bigger/Smaller) 
coupled with changes in size-referent (Shoebox to Wheelie Bin/Pencil Case) resulted in a 2x2 
(Classification-congruency x Decision-congruency) factorial design.  Note a referent change was also 
made to a smaller referent (a Pencil Case) as well as the larger Wheelie Bin referent change shown 
here.  Classif. = Classification. 
 
 
Study Test
Bigger than a Wheelie Bin? 
Smaller than a Wheelie Bin? 
Bigger than a Shoebox?
Classif: bigger 
Decision: yes Classif: smaller Decision: no 
Classif: smaller 
Decision: no
Classif: smaller 
Decision: no 
Classif: smaller 
Decision: yes Classif: smaller Decision: yes 
incongruent-classification 
incongruent-decision 
congruent-classification 
congruent-decision 
congruent-classification 
incongruent-decision 
incongruent-classification 
congruent-decision 
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Figure 4.3.  RT priming predictions (A-C) and results (D) from Experiment 8 across Classification-
congruency and Decision-congruency (collapsed across Prime-level).  (A) S-R binding at the level of 
Decisions predicts priming only for Decision-congruent trials, irrespective of Classification-
congruency; (B) S-R bindings at the level of Classifications predicts priming only for Classification-
congruent trials, irrespective of Decision-congruency; (C) S-R binding at the level of Decisions and 
Classifications predicts maximal priming for Classification-congruent Decision-congruent trials and 
reduced priming for Classification-incongruent Decision-congruent and Classification-congruent 
Decision-incongruent trials.  (D) Mean RT priming across Classification-congruency and Decision-
congruency collapsed across Prime-level.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed). 
 
What predictions do S-R theories make if bindings form at the level of 
Decisions, Classifications or both?  If S-R bindings form at the level of Decisions, I 
should see greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent Decisions, irrespective of 
Classification-congruency (Figure 4.3-A).  If, however, S-R bindings form at the level 
of Classifications, I should see greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent 
Classifications, irrespective of Decision-congruency (Figure 4.3-B).  Finally, if 
bindings form at the level of Decisions and Classifications, maximal priming should 
be seen for Decision-congruent Classification-congruent trials (Figure 4.3-C). 
Reduced priming should be seen for Decision-congruent Classification-incongruent 
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and Decision-incongruent Classification-congruent trials with a further reduction for 
Decision-incongruent Classification-incongruent trials.  Indeed, if CP contributions 
are not present in Experiment 8, no nett priming should be seen in this latter condition 
given that it controls for S-R learning at all three possible levels of response 
representation.  Note that the above predictions are based on the retrieval of S-R 
bindings causing facilitation when responses are congruent, but not interference when 
responses are incongruent.  This is in line with the results of Chapters 2 and 3 that 
failed to find evidence for significant interference effects (though see below). 
 
4.2.1 Method 
Experiment 8 utilised a similar study-test design to previous experiments, however 
there were several key differences. 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
24 Participants (7 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 21.7 years (σ = 3.7).  Four participants were left-
handed, the remaining 20 participants were right-handed (self-report). 
4.2.1.2 Design 
Participants performed four study-test cycles.  At Study, participants always 
performed the “bigger-than-shoebox” task.  At Test, the referent was changed from a 
“shoebox” to either a “wheelie bin” or a “pencil case”.  Importantly, half the stimuli 
seen at Study that were bigger than a shoebox were smaller than a wheelie bin (for the 
wheelie bin referent change); equally, half the stimuli that were smaller than a 
shoebox were bigger than a pencil case (for the pencil case referent change).  The 
other half of stimuli were split so that 50% were bigger than a shoebox and bigger 
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than a wheelie bin, and 50% were smaller than a shoebox and smaller than a wheelie 
bin.  The same was true for the pencil case referent change condition.  This design 
meant that, for 50% of Repeated stimuli, a congruent Classification was given 
between Study and Test (e.g., “bigger” – “bigger”), and for the remaining 50% an 
incongruent Classification was given (e.g., “bigger” – “smaller”). 
Crucially, participants were asked whether the object was either “bigger” or 
“smaller” than a wheelie bin or a pencil case at Test.  In other words, four possible 
questions were posed at Test: (1) “bigger-than-wheeliebin?”, (2) “smaller-than-
wheeliebin?”, (3) “bigger-than-pencilcase?”, and (4) “smaller-than-pencilcase?”.  
These manipulations factorise the Decision (yes/no) and Classification 
(bigger/smaller).  For example, an object that is smaller than a shoebox and smaller 
than a pencil case will have a congruent Classification and congruent Decision in both 
“bigger than” tasks at Test (i.e., "smaller-smaller" and "no-no" respectively). For the 
"smaller than" tasks at Test on the other hand, that object will have a congruent 
Classification but incongruent Decision (i.e., "smaller-smaller" and "no-yes" 
respectively). However, an object that is smaller than a shoebox but bigger than a 
pencil case will have an incongruent Classification but congruent Decision for the 
“smaller-than-pencilcase” task at Test (i.e., "smaller-bigger" and "no-no" 
respectively).  For the "bigger-than-pencilcase" task at Test on the other hand, that 
object will have both an incongruent Classification and incongruent Decision (i.e., 
"smaller-bigger" and "no-yes" respectively) (see Figure 4.2). 
This results in a 2x2x2 factorial design of Classification-congruency 
(Congruent/Incongruent), Decision-congruency (Congruent/Incongruent), and Test-
referent (Wheeliebin/Pencilcase).  Two further factorial manipulations were also 
added: (1) Repetition (Novel, Repeated), and (2) Prime-level (Low-primed, High-
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primed).  Following the logic of previous experiments, the Novel stimuli were 
arbitrarily split into groups equal in size to the Repeated conditions.  Order of Test 
tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 
4.2.1.3 Materials 
384 stimuli from the main stimulus were split between the two Test referents (wheelie 
bin/pencil case) so that, of the 192 stimuli per referent, 48 were bigger than a shoebox 
and bigger than a wheelie bin (or pencil case), 96 were bigger than a shoebox and 
smaller than a wheelie bin (or smaller than a shoebox and bigger than a pencil case), 
and 48 were smaller than a shoebox and smaller than a wheelie bin (or pencil case).  
Therefore 96 stimuli were Classification-congruent, and 96 were Classification-
incongruent.  These 96 stimuli were then randomly assigned to one of 8 groups 
relating to the remaining 8 experimental conditions (2x2x2 – Decision-congruency x 
Prime-level x Repetition), resulting in 12 stimuli per group.  The assignment of 
groups to experimental conditions was rotated across participants. 
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
After excluding 6.2% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors, together 
with mean RTs, mean RT priming and proportional priming, are shown in Table 4.3.  
Analyses of errors revealed no significant main effect of Repetition, however a 
Repetition x Prime-level interaction was present reflecting fewer errors for Repeated 
Low-primed than High-primed stimuli (Appendix A-8). A further 7.7% of Repeated 
trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at Study.   
Given that there was no significant difference in RTs across the two Test-
referents (wheelie bin/pencil case), t(23) = 1.12, p=.28, and the lack of theoretical 
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interest in this manipulation, the RT data were collapsed across Test-referent for all 
further analyses.  The resulting RT data were entered into a 2x2x2x2 (Classification-
congruency x Decision-congruency x Prime-level x Repetition) ANOVA, which 
revealed several significant interactions and main effects.  A similar pattern of results 
were seen for the proportional measure of priming (Appendix A-8). 
 
Table 4.3.  Mean percentage errors, error priming, reaction time (RT), RT priming and proportional 
priming (plus standard deviations) across Classification-congruency, Decision-congruency, Prime-
level, and Repetition for Experiment 8.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = 
Repeated; P = Priming (Novel – Repeated); PP = Proportional Priming ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel). 
Note that the division of Novel stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
 
The highest-order interaction was a Decision-congruency x Prime-level x 
Repetition interaction, F(1, 23) = 5.63, p<.05.  Further tests revealed a significant 
decrease in priming for High-primed Decision-Incongruent than Low-primed 
Decision-Incongruent trials, t(23) = 3.64, p<.01, which was not present for the 
Decision-Congruent trials, t(23) = 0.37, p=.72.  Therefore, increasing the number of 
repetitions at Study resulted in greater interference when the Decision was 
incongruent at Test.  Although the Classification-congruency x Prime-level x 
Repetition interaction did not reach significance, F(1, 23) = 2.38, p=.14, there was a 
trend in the same direction as above, with significantly decreased priming for High-
Classification: Congruent Incongruent 
Decision: Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
  LP HP LP HP LP HP LP HP 
          
Errors N 3.5 (4.0) 3.6 (3.5) 4.2 (3.7) 4.0 (4.7) 4.9 (4.0) 3.0 (3.6) 5.6 (5.3) 3.0 (4.2) 
 R 2.4 (3.2) 3.5 (3.2) 3.0 (2.9) 4.0 (4.2) 2.8 (3.2) 3.0 (3.6) 4.0 (3.6) 3.6 (3.7) 
 P 1.0 (4.6) 0.2 (4.5) 1.2 (4.7) 0.0 (6.5) 2.1 (5.5) 0.0 (5.4) 1.6 (6.6) -0.7 (5.4) 
          
RT N 838 (132) 845 (139) 887 (106) 849 (92) 939 (118) 918 (114) 910 (144) 926 (136) 
 R 775 (120) 755 (96) 835 (104) 849 (94) 886 (115) 900 (115) 893 (134) 932 (153) 
 P 60 (87) 91 (67) 47 (75) -4 (67) 57 (88) 18 (59) 20 (69) -12 (76) 
 PP .07 (.04) .10 (.02) .05 (.03) -.01 (.03) .06 (.04) .02 (.02) .02 (.03) -.01 (.03) 
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primed Classification-Incongruent than Low-primed Classification-Incongruent trials, 
t(23) = 2.91, p<.01, which was not present for Classification-Congruent trials, t(23) = 
0.98, p=.34.   
The main ANOVA also revealed a significant Decision-congruency x 
Repetition interaction, F(1, 23) = 19.19, p<.001, as well as a trend towards an 
Classification-congruency x Repetition interaction, F(1, 23) = 3.66, p=.07 (and no 
evidence for a three-way interaction between Decision-congruency, Classification-
congruency and Repetition, F(1, 23) = .83, p=.37).  Given I predicted greater priming 
for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, one-tailed t-tests revealed significantly 
greater priming for Decision-Congruent than Decision-Incongruent trials, t(23) = 
4.38, p<.001, and for Classification-Congruent than Classification-Incongruent trials, 
t(23) = 1.91, p<.05 (collapsed across Prime-level, Classification-congruency and 
Decision-congruency respectively).  Thus, congruency of both the Decision and the 
Classification significantly affected priming (see Figure 4.3-D).  There were also 
significant two-way interactions between Prime-level and Repetition, F(1, 23) = 8.32, 
p<.01, and Classification-congruency and Prime-level, F(1, 23) = 4.92, p<.05, as well 
as main effects of Classification-congruency, F(1, 23) = 77.04, p<.001, Decision-
congruency, F(1, 23) = 21.38, p<.001, and Repetition, F(1, 23) = 41.59, p<.001, but 
no further interactions involving Repetition.  Finally, priming in the Incongruent-
Classification Incongruent-Decision condition was not reliable (+4ms), t(23) = .42, 
p=.68, suggesting that once S-R learning is controlled at all three levels of response 
representation, no additional contributions to priming (i.e., facilitation of component 
processes) remained (see Figure 4.3-D). 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
 
The two main findings of Experiment 8 were (1) significantly greater priming for 
Decision-Congruent than Decision-Incongruent trials, and (2) significantly greater 
priming for Classification-Congruent than Classification-Incongruent trials, with no 
reliable interaction between these two effects. These findings support the prior 
hypothesis that responses are coded at the level of the Classification separately and 
simultaneously from the levels of Decision and/or Action. Importantly, these findings 
were in the context of conditions that appeared to be matched in their semantic 
requirements (i.e., differing only in the direction of the comparison - “bigger-than-X” 
vs. “smaller-than-X” - and in the referent, X). This makes the congruency effects 
unlikely to reflect differential levels of conceptual processing (as may have been the 
case when comparing the Reverse and Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 1-6).  
When both Classifications and Decisions were incongruent, there was no 
reliable priming, consistent with the lack of any contribution from facilitation of 
conceptual processes. This is unlike Experiment 7, where there was evidence of 
priming despite no overlap in the Classification, Decision or Action (in the Different-
Decision Different-Action condition). However, the third notable finding of 
Experiment 8 was a significant reduction in priming for High- relative to Low-Primed 
stimuli given an incongruent response at Test. This would suggest greater amounts of 
response interference when an S-R pairing has occurred three times at Study. This is 
the first appreciable evidence in the present thesis for the presence of interference in 
S-R learning. This point will be revisited in Chapter 8. 
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4.2.4 Inter-experimental analyses of experiments 7 and 8 
 
The results of Experiments 7 and 8 suggest that S-R bindings can form at the level of 
Actions, Decisions, and Classifications.  In Experiment 7, I manipulated Actions and 
Decisions.  Note however that the change in Decision also entailed a change in 
Classification (e.g., from “monkey” to "bigger” in the Different-Decision Different-
Action condition). The decrease in priming associated with this change may therefore 
reflect the change in Classification rather than Decision.  In Experiment 8, on the 
other hand, I manipulated Decisions and Classifications.  Here however the change in 
Decision also entailed a change in Action (e.g., a switch from “yes” to “no” also 
entailed a switch from “right” to “left”).  As such, the decrease in priming associated 
with this change may have been due to a change in Actions rather than Decisions.  It 
might therefore be possible to explain the results of Experiments 7 and 8 by proposing 
just two levels of response representation, namely Actions and Classifications. 
In order to address this concern, I calculated the difference in proportional 
priming (to control for baseline RT differences across experiments) between certain 
conditions from Experiments 7 and 8 (collapsing across Prime-level). For each 
experiment, two difference scores were calculated across pairs of conditions. For 
Experiment 7, these were: (1) the difference between the Same-Action Same-Decision 
condition and the Different-Action Same-Decision condition, and (2) the difference 
between the Different-Action Same-Decision condition and the Different-Action 
Different-Decision condition. For Experiment 8, these were: (1) the difference 
between the Classification-Congruent Decision-Congruent condition and the 
Classification-Congruent Decision-Incongruent condition, and (2) the difference 
between the Classification-Congruent Decision-Incongruent condition and the 
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Classification-Incongruent Decision-Incongruent condition. For both experiments, as 
can be seen from Table 4.1, Contrast (1) is a measure of Action change, whereas 
contrast (2) is a measure of Classification change.  Importantly however, Contrast (1) 
is a pure measure of Action change in Experiment 7, but a measure of both Action and 
Decision change in Experiment 8.  Similarly, Contrast (2) is a pure measure of 
Classification change in Experiment 8, but a measure of both Classification and 
Decision change in Experiment 7. 
Thus in order to test for an effect of Decision change, a 2x2 (Action vs. 
Classification x Experiment 7 vs. Experiment 8) ANOVA was conducted.  If 
responses form at the level of the Decision, Contrast (1) should be greater in 
Experiment 7 than in Experiment 8, but Contrast (2) should be greater in Experiment 
8 than Experiment 7 (i.e., there should be a significant Response-level x Experiment 
interaction). Such an interaction was indeed significant, F(1, 40) = 6.05, p<.05. This  
reflected a larger change in priming for Contrast (2) in Experiment 7 than in 
Experiment 8, t(40) = 2.75, p<.01, and a numerical trend for a larger change in 
priming for Contrast (1) in Experiment 8 than in Experiment 7, t(40) = 1.20, p=.24.  
This result is therefore consistent with all three levels of response representation 
having an effect on priming. 
 
4.3 Experiment 9 
 
Experiments 7 and 8 provided evidence for S-R effects at three distinct levels of 
response representation, the Action (e.g., right/left key-press), the Decision (e.g., 
“yes/no”) and the Classification (e.g., “bigger/smaller”).  In Experiment 9 I changed 
my focus to the level of stimulus representation.  Specifically, I asked: can S-R 
learning abstract away from the specific visual format of the stimulus presented at 
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Study?  As with the level of response representation, previous research has presented 
conflicting evidence for either highly specific (Schnyer et al., 2007) or more abstract 
(Denkinger & Koutstaal, 2009) levels of stimulus representation, with the latter study 
demonstrating S-R learning effects despite a change in exemplar (e.g., between two 
differing pictures of a lion) between presentations.  Given this more recent evidence 
for abstract stimulus representations I decided to go one step further and ask: can I see 
S-R learning effects despite switching from the name of an object (e.g., the word 
“lion”) to a picture of an object (e.g., a picture of a lion)?  This manipulation was 
particularly important given recent evidence suggesting that across-exemplar 
repetition effects can in fact be driven by visual similarity between exemplars (e.g., 
two pictures of a lion are likely to share visual information not shared by two pictures 
of unrelated objects) (Chouinard, Morrissey, Köhler & Goodale, 2008).  I reasoned 
that switching from visual word stimuli at Study to visual pictures at Test was 
unlikely to suffer from the same issues of visual similarity.  As such, if S-R learning 
effects are still present despite such a switch, this would provide compelling evidence 
for S-R learning at an abstract level of stimulus representation (e.g., at the 
lexical/semantic level). 
Experiment 9 utilised the same Response-congruency manipulation introduced 
in Experiment 8, changing the size of the referent between Study and Test.  At Test 
the referent was changed to either a smaller (pencil case) or larger (wheelie bin) 
object, however the direction of the question remained constant (i.e. “bigger than X”).  
As a result of the referent change, half of the stimuli seen during Study will have 
required the same (i.e., Congruent) response at Test whereas half will have required 
the reverse response (i.e., Incongruent).  Note that this manipulation of congruency 
requires a reversal of response at all three levels of response representation (see 
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Introduction of Experiment 8).  This “optimal” experimental design is therefore used 
in the present experiment as well as Chapters 5 and 6.  Importantly, I now added a 
stimulus manipulation whereby items were either presented as pictures, or as printed 
names, during the Study phase.  At Test all items were presented as pictures.  
Therefore, half the picture stimuli were primed with a visually identical stimulus (the 
Picture-Picture condition) and half were primed with their named equivalent (the 
Word-Picture condition).  I also included two further factorial manipulations of 
Prime-level (Low-primed, High-primed) and Repetition (Novel, Repeated).  This 
resulted in a 2x2x2x2x2 factorial design with factors Referent (Pencilcase, 
Wheeliebin), Response-congruency (Congruent, Incongruent), Stimulus (Words, 
Pictures), Prime-level (Low-primed, High-primed), and Repetition (Novel, Repeated). 
Before presenting the results of Experiment 9 it is worth considering the 
different predictions made if stimuli within S-R bindings were coded at a level that is 
specific to the visual format of the stimulus or at a more abstract level of 
representation.  Firstly, if S-R bindings were specific to the visual format of the 
stimulus presented at Study, I would expect to see a Response-congruency effect in 
the Picture-Picture condition alone.  If no interference is present, this should result in 
significant priming in the Picture-Picture Congruent condition and no priming in the 
Picture-Picture Incongruent condition (see Figure 4.4-A).  However, if stimuli are 
coded at a level that abstracts away from the specific visual format of the stimulus 
presented at Study (e.g., at the semantic/lexical level), I should see equivalent 
Response-congruency effects in the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition (see 
Figure 4.4-B).  Finally, if stimuli are coded at multiple levels of representation, one 
that is specific to the visual format of the stimulus and one that abstracts away from 
the visual format, I should see a Response-congruency effect in both the Picture-
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Picture and Word-Picture condition.  Critically, the Response-congruency effect 
should be greater in the Picture-Picture than Word-Picture condition (i.e., I should see 
a Response-congruency x Stimulus-type interaction; see Figure 4.4-C).  This is 
because the Picture-Picture condition should benefit from the retrieval of S-R 
bindings at both levels of stimulus representation, whereas only S-R bindings that 
code “abstract” stimulus representations will be retrieved in the Word-Picture 
condition (as no visual similarity is present between object names and picture). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4.  RT priming predictions (A-C) and results (D) from Experiment 9 across Response-
congruency and Stimulus-type (collapsed across Prime-level).  (A) S-R binding at a stimulus level that 
is specific to the visual format of the stimulus; (B) S-R binding at a stimulus level that abstracts away 
from the visual format of the stimulus; (C) S-R binding at a specific and abstract stimulus level.  (D) 
Mean RT priming across Response-congruency and Stimulus-type collapsed across Prime-level.  Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed). 
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4.3.1 Method 
The experimental design of Experiment 9 was identical to Experiment 8 with the 
following exceptions. 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
16 participants (5 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 24.2 years (σ = 4.1).  By self-report, two 
participants were left-handed; the remainder were right-handed. 
4.3.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 8.  As in Experiment 8, 96 stimuli 
would receive a Congruent response between Study and Test and 96 stimuli would 
receive an Incongruent response (split across referent).  Each group of 96 stimuli were 
then randomly assigned to one of 8 groups relating to the 8 remaining experimental 
conditions (Stimulus-type x Prime-level x Repetition), resulting in 12 stimuli per 
group (24 collapsed across referent). The assignment of groups to experimental 
conditions was rotated across participants. 
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
During each Study phase, 48 stimuli were shown; 12 were words presented once 
(Word-Picture – Low-primed), 12 were words presented three times (Word-Picture – 
High-primed), 12 were pictures presented once (Picture-Picture – Low-primed) and 
12 were pictures presented three times (Picture-Picture – High-primed), resulting in 
96 trials.  Importantly, for each set of 12 stimuli, half received a Congruent and half 
received an Incongruent response at Test. During each Test phase, the 48 stimuli from 
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the Study phase (Repeated) were randomly intermixed with 48 novel stimuli.  All the 
stimuli presented at Test were pictures (i.e. for items primed with words at Study, 
their picture equivalent was presented at Test).  Words were presented in black on a 
white background with the same pixel dimensions as the object picture stimuli. 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
After excluding 0.4% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentage of errors, together 
with mean RTs and proportional priming, are shown in Table 4.4 (collapsed across 
Referent).  Analysis of errors is reported in Appendix A-9.  A further 7% of Repeated 
trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at Study. 
 
Table 4.4.  Mean percentage errors, error priming, reaction time (RT), RT priming and proportional 
priming (plus standard deviations) across Stimulus-type, Response-congruency, Prime-level, and 
Repetition for Experiment 9.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-primed; N = Novel; R = Repeated; P = 
Priming (Novel – Repeated); PP = Proportional Priming ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel). Note that the 
division of Novel stimuli into High- and Low-primed is based on an arbitrary, equal split. 
 
Given the Referent manipulation did not significantly interact with any other 
factor (F’s<.60, p’s>.45), and the lack of theoretical interest in this factor, subsequent 
analyses were collapsed across Referent (note however that a main effect of Referent 
Stimulus-type: Picture-Picture Word-Picture 
Congruency: Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
  LP HP LP HP LP HP LP HP 
          
Errors N 5.0 (4.6) 3.9 (3.6) 17.7 (9.1) 16.2 (8.0) 6.0 (3.7) 5.7 (4.0) 17.2 (5.7) 14.8 (5.3) 
 R 5.7 (4.8) 4.2 (5.0) 20.1 (9.5) 19.3 (11.3) 3.6 (3.0) 2.9 (3.3) 18.2 (9.2) 17.4 (5.9) 
 P -0.8 (6.1) -0.3 (6.9) -2.3 (11.2) -3.1 (12.4) 2.3 (4.3) 2.9 (4.5) -1.0 (8.7) -2.6 (7.9) 
          
RT N 794 (134) 827 (134) 837 (119) 896 (166) 800 (138) 805 (146) 889 (139) 908 (169) 
 R 729 (150) 709 (121) 873 (163) 942 (159) 788 (149) 755 (114) 942 (182) 955 (166) 
 P 65 (95) 118 (61) -37 (94) -46 (106) 12 (71) 50 (72) -54 (129) -47 (90) 
 PP .08 (.11) .14 (.06) -.04 (.11) -.06 (.12) .01 (.09) .05 (.08) -.06 (.14) -.06 (.10) 
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was present, F(1, 15) = 9.07, p<.01, showing greater RTs when the referent was a 
pencilcase than  a wheeliebin).  Inspection of Figure 4.4-D shows that positive 
priming was seen for both Picture-Picture and Word-Picture Congruent trials, in line 
with facilitation due to response repetition.  Interestingly, both Picture-Picture and 
Word-Picture Response-incongruent trials show significant negative priming (i.e., a 
slowing of RTs relative to Novel trials).  This suggests that the retrieval of previously 
learnt responses can interfere with the process of response selection at Test.  These S-
R learning effects seem to be present in both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
condition, suggesting that stimuli within S-R bindings can form at “abstract” levels of 
representation.   
To confirm these results, I conducted a 2x2x2x2 (Response-congruency x 
Stimulus-type x Prime-level x Repetition) ANOVA on RTs.  This analysis revealed a 
trend towards a Response-Congruency x Stimulus-type x Repetition interaction, F(1, 
15) = 3.75, p=.07 (this effect was reliable in the proportional priming analysis – 
Appendix A-9).  To unpack this interaction I conducted two separate 2x2x2 
(Response-Congruency x Prime-level x Repetition) ANOVAs on the Picture-Picture 
and Word-Picture conditions separately.  The Picture-Picture analysis revealed a 
significant Response-congruency x Repetition interaction, F(1, 15) = 45.76, p<.001, 
showing greater priming for response congruent than incongruent trials, t(15) = 6.74, 
p<.001 (no further interactions with Repetition were present, F’s<2.23, p=.16).  
Therefore stimuli that required a switch in response between Study and Test 
decreased priming compared to stimuli that required a response repetition (see Figure 
4.4-D).   
The Word-Picture analysis also revealed a significant Response-Congruency x 
Repetition interaction, F(1, 15) = 15.47, p<.001, again showing greater priming for 
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response congruent than incongruent trials, t(15) = 3.98, p<.001 (no further 
interactions with Repetition were present, F’s<1.27, p’s>.28).  Thus the S-R learning 
effect seen in the Picture-Picture condition was replicated in the Word-Picture 
condition.  In other words, I have provided evidence that stimuli in S-R bindings can 
form at a representational level that abstracts away from the specific visual 
characteristics of a stimulus presented at Study.  Interestingly, this S-R learning effect 
was numerically smaller in the Word-Picture than Picture-Picture analysis.  This 
numerical trend towards a greater Response-congruency effect on RT priming in the 
Picture-Picture condition (i.e., a trend towards a full Response-congruency x 
Stimulus-type x Repetition interaction) reached significance in the proportional 
analysis (see Appendix A-9). 
The main 2x2x2x2 ANOVA also revealed a significant Stimulus-type x 
Repetition interaction, F(1, 15) = 5.48, p<.05, showing greater priming for items 
presented as pictures at Study compared to items presented as words, t(15) = 2.37, 
p<.05 (collapsed across Response-congruency and Prime-level).  Therefore, 
presenting the same picture stimulus at Study and Test resulted in greater priming 
than presenting a word at Study and a picture at Test (irrespective of Response-
congruency).  Further interactions were seen between Response-congruency and 
Prime-level, F(1, 15) = 11.91, p<.01, and Stimulus-type and Prime-level, F(1, 15) = 
6.25, p<.05, as well as main effects of Response-congruency, F(1, 15) = 136.47, 
p<.001, Stimulus-type, F(1, 15) = 20.38, p<.001 and Prime-level, F(1, 15) = 7.07, 
p<.05, however no main effect of Repetition was present, F(1, 15) = .76, p=.40.  
Given that these effects did not interact with Repetition they are of little theoretical 
interest and are therefore not discussed further. 
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4.3.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 9 therefore provided evidence for S-R learning at an abstract level of 
stimulus representation, with a significant response congruency effect despite 
switching from word stimuli at study to picture stimuli at Test.  These results go 
beyond those of Denkinger et al. (2009) who demonstrated significant S-R learning 
effects despite a change in object exemplar between repetitions.  Although the 
previous results may have been driven by the degree of visual similarity between 
object exemplars, the present word-to-picture manipulation does not suffer from the 
same concern.  As such, I can state that the stimulus within S-R bindings can be 
encoded at a representational level that abstracts away from the specific visual format 
of the initially presented stimulus. 
I also saw evidence for a greater S-R learning effect in the Picture-Picture than 
Word-Picture condition (a trend in the “additive” analysis of priming, but reliable in 
the “proportional” analyses), suggesting that S-R learning effects are maximal when 
the stimulus presented at Test is the same as that presented at Study.  This is 
consistent with the idea that S-R learning can occur at multiple levels of stimulus 
representation (akin to the multiple levels of response representation seen in 
Experiments 7 & 8), one that is tied to the specific visual form of the object and a 
second that forms at a level of abstraction that allows for S-R learning to transfer from 
a word to a picture stimulus.  Priming would therefore be greater in the Picture-
Picture Congruent condition than the Word-Picture Congruent condition because there 
are contributions from responses bound to both “visual” and “abstract” stimulus 
representations in the Picture-Picture condition, but only responses bound to 
“abstract” stimulus representations in the Word-Picture condition. 
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Note that this interaction between stimulus condition and response congruency 
could be a result of stimulus differences, with word stimuli in general demonstrating 
diminished congruency effects compared to picture stimuli (i.e., the cross-stimulus 
manipulation was always primed with words and this may have resulted in weaker S-
R bindings compared to when an item was primed with an object).  This explanation 
is unlikely however, given that I saw similar S-R learning effects in Experiment 5, 
where I presented words at both Study and Test, compared to Experiments 1-4, where 
I presented object pictures at both Study and Test.  As such, the difference in response 
congruency seen in the present experiment is likely to have resulted from the fact that 
I switched from a word to a picture, rather than because I simply primed these items 
with a word. 
Finally, Experiment 9 provided evidence for interference effects resulting 
from the retrieval of previously learnt S-R bindings.  Specifically, when a response 
given at Test was incongruent to that previously given at Study, I saw slower RTs 
compared to experimentally novel items.  These results suggest that previously learnt 
S-R bindings are automatically retrieved when an item is repeated, and that this 
retrieval can actively facilitate or interfere with the generation of a new response, 
dependent on the congruency of response between repetitions. 
 
4.4 General Discussion 
 
The present chapter has focussed on the level of both stimulus and response 
representation within S-R bindings.  In Experiments 7 and 8 I manipulated the level of 
response between Study and Test, providing evidence for S-R learning at three 
distinct levels of response representation, the Action (right/left finger-press), the 
Decision (“yes/no”) and the task-dependent Classification (e.g., “bigger/smaller”).  In 
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Experiment 9 I manipulated the level of stimulus between Study and Test, providing 
evidence for S-R learning at an abstract level of stimulus representation that does not 
require the repetition of the same visual format (e.g., between word and picture 
stimuli).  Furthermore, the results were consistent with the idea that S-R bindings can 
form at two possible levels of stimulus representation, at the level of the specific 
visual format of the stimulus, and at a more abstract “identity” level of representation.  
This conclusion is supported by the interaction between priming, response-
congruency and stimulus-type seen in Experiment 9 (i.e., the response-congruency 
effect was greater in the Picture-Picture than Word-Picture condition).  As such, the 
present results suggest that S-R learning is a highly flexible process, with S-R 
bindings forming at multiple levels of both stimulus and response representation. 
 Experiments 8 and 9 were the first in the present thesis to demonstrate 
significant interference when a retrieved response was incongruent with the response 
needed at Test.  These results concur with studies that focus on RT changes following 
task switches (e.g., Waszak et al., 2003).  These studies typically show slower RTs for 
stimuli that were previously paired with a different task and/or response, suggesting 
that retrieval of information relating to a particular task-set or response can actively 
interfere with current processing.  This interference was reflected in a reduction for 
High- compared to Low-primed items in Experiment 8, when either Decisions or 
Classifications were incongruent.  These results suggest that increasing the number of 
repetitions at Study increases the amount of interference when the retrieved response 
is incongruent.  This compliments the finding of greater priming for High- than Low-
primed items seen in the Same condition in Chapter 3.  In other words, increasing the 
number of repetitions at Study can increase priming when the retrieved response is 
congruent and decrease priming when the retrieved response is incongruent.  In 
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Experiment 9 interference was reflected by a slowing of RTs for incongruent trials in 
both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition.  Thus, retrieving an incongruent 
response can actively interfere with processing, resulting in a slowing of RTs 
compared to novel stimuli. 
 As in the previous chapter it is necessary to explore whether Instance Theory 
(Logan, 1990) can explain these results.  Firstly, the proposal that S-R bindings can 
form at multiple levels of stimulus and response is not currently predicted by Instance 
Theory.  As discussed in Chapter 3 however, Instance Theory could be extended to 
include the possibility that a single instance encodes information relating to each level 
of stimulus and response, or that separate instances form between each level of 
stimulus and response.  The finding of interference, in particular the slowing of RTs 
for incongruent items in Experiment 9, is more difficult to explain in terms of Instance 
Theory.  At present, Instance Theory predicts that negative priming should not be 
seen.  Either the response retrieval route wins the race, resulting in a speeding of RTs, 
or the system reverts to algorithmic processing, resulting in no change in RTs.  The 
finding of interference therefore underlines the necessary interaction between the 
response retrieval and algorithmic route.  The present results suggest that this 
interaction can either facilitate or interfere with processing dependent on the 
congruency of response generated by the two routes.   
Finally, the finding of multiple levels of stimulus and response representation 
as well as interference effects is readily explicable in terms of Event File Theory 
(Hommel, 1998).  In particular, this theory focuses on interference effects that result 
from incongruency between the present circumstances and the retrieved Event File.  
As previously discussed however, it is unclear how this theory could explain the 
facilitation seen across Chapters 2-4 whereby congruency between the current 
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circumstances and the retrieved Event File (i.e., S-R binding) speeds up RTs.  This 
facilitation would seem to require some mechanism that allows for facilitation.  
Although the “race” in Instance Theory is able to explain this facilitation, the 
currently proposed interaction between response retrieval and algorithmic processing 
would seem a more appropriate mechanism to explain these facilitatory effects.  Such 
an interaction between routes would readily lend itself to explaining both facilitation 
and interference effects that result from the retrieval of S-R bindings.  This possible 
interaction is discussed in depth in Chapter 8. 
 
4.4.1 Summary of chapters 2-4 
 
In summary, the results of Experiments 1-9 have shown that S-R learning dominates 
in long-lag classification paradigms.  These S-R learning effects can be shown across 
a range of classification tasks regardless of whether the task is varied at either Study 
or Test (Experiments 1-3).  The dominance of these effects was most apparent in my 
inability to show significant positive priming for Incongruent items in the Orthogonal 
condition.  This was the case despite an attempt to equate the type of semantic 
information accessed between Study and Test (Experiment 4), to increase the 
likelihood of facilitation of phonological and/or exemplar generation processes 
through the presentation of word stimuli (Experiment 5) and to increase the likelihood 
of facilitation of perceptual processes through stimulus degradation at Test 
(Experiment 6). 
Although the pattern of priming effects in Experiments 1-6 was consistent 
with the proposal that S-R learning can occur at multiple levels of response 
representation, these experiments failed to provide direct evidence for this.  As such, I 
directly manipulated response (and stimulus) representation in Experiments 7-9, 
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presenting evidence for S-R learning at multiple levels of stimulus and response.  
Finally, I have shown the retrieval of S-R bindings can both facilitate (i.e., for High-
primed items in the Same condition of Experiments 4-6) and interfere (i.e., for 
Incongruent items in Experiment 9) with processing at Test, both speeding and 
slowing RTs relative to experimentally novel items, dependent on the congruency of 
response between Study and Test.  These results were discussed in relation to Instance 
Theory and Event File theory.  Both theories were unable to explain the complete 
picture of results across Chapters 2-4.  In particular, the results highlighted the need 
for a form of interaction between response retrieval and algorithmic processing.  
These issues are discussed in depth in Chapter 8.  In the next chapter I turn my 
attention to the repetition-related decreases in neural activity (i.e., repetition 
suppression) that have recently been associated with S-R theories of repetition 
priming (Dobbins et al., 2004). 
 113 
Chapter 5 
S-R learning and repetition suppression: an fMRI study 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, S-R accounts have recently been used to explain the 
repetition-related decreases in neural activity – as measured by functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) – known as repetition suppression (RS).  Here the 
reductions in neural activity seen within distinct cortical regions are thought a result 
of an effective by-passing (or curtailing) of activation within such regions, due to the 
retrieval of an appropriate S-R binding.  In support of this idea, Dobbins et al. (2004) 
provided evidence for robust RS within occipital/temporal as well as inferior 
prefrontal regions when a response was repeated between stimulus presentations.  
When a response was reversed, they saw a significant reduction in RS within these 
regions.  Most strikingly, they no longer saw reliable RS in higher-order regions of 
the ventral visual stream (i.e., fusiform cortex) where such effects are usually assumed 
to reflect facilitation of perceptual processes.  As such, they suggested that RS reflects 
the by-passing of such regions when responses are repeated (i.e., S-R learning), rather 
than the facilitation of processes localised within such regions (i.e., facilitation of 
component processes). 
One puzzling aspect of these data is that other fMRI studies have found robust 
RS in fusiform regions under conditions deliberately chosen to limit the occurrence of 
S-R learning.  For example, reliable RS has been shown when using tasks with no 
explicit response requirements for the critical stimuli (e.g., Henson et al., 2000), when 
using task switches such that the response on repetition of a stimulus is (on average) 
orthogonal to its previous response (i.e., the Orthogonal condition of Experiments 1-
6) (Henson et al., 2003; Horner & Henson, 2008), and when using changes in both the 
stimulus and response, with no obvious S-R pairing, such as in word-stem completion 
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paradigms that involve different tasks at study and test (Schacter Alpert, 1996; Schott 
et al., 2005).  Thus, S-R bindings would not appear sufficient to explain RS in all 
brain regions, particularly parts of the ventral visual processing stream. 
Indeed, recent research has suggested a possible dissociation between 
occipital/temporal ventral visual and inferior prefrontal regions.  Whereas RS was 
shown to be robust to switches in task and/or response between presentations in 
occipital/temporal regions, RS was sensitive to such switches in inferior PFC regions 
(Horner & Henson, 2008; Race et al., 2009).  Horner & Henson (2008) assessed RS 
across the Same, Reverse and Orthogonal conditions introduced in Experiments 1-6 of 
the present thesis.  In a region in the left fusiform gyrus, similar to that seen in the 
Dobbins et al. (2004) study, equivalent RS was seen across all three conditions.  The 
authors therefore suggested that response retrieval does not result in the by-passing of 
all component processes, and that such RS was plausibly related to the facilitation of 
particular perceptual and/or conceptual processes.  RS in inferior prefrontal regions, 
specifically pars orbitalis and pars opercularis was shown to vary as a function of 
Task, with maximal RS in the Same condition (i.e., when the task and response was 
repeated).  RS in such regions, in line with Dobbins et al. (2004), was therefore 
thought to result from the repetition of responses between presentations.   
One issue with this latter conclusion however was that it was primarily based 
on finding significantly decreased RS in the Orthogonal compared to the Same 
condition (although a numerical trend for decreased RS in the Reverse compared to 
the Same condition was seen).  As discussed in Chapters 2-3, the Orthogonal 
condition requires a change in task between presentations, as well as possibly 
requiring the retrieval of differing semantic information (e.g., by switching from the 
“bigger than a shoebox?” to “man-made?” task).  Thus the RS effect in PFC regions 
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may have reflected: (1) the retrieval of bindings between stimulus and task (e.g., 
Waszak & Hommel, 2007; Waszak et al., 2003) or (2) the facilitation of processes 
involved in the controlled retrieval of task-specific semantic information (e.g., 
Wagner, Pare-Blagoev, Clark & Poldrack, 2001).  A recent study by Race et al. 
(2009), that utilised a similar across-task design, could also be interpreted in a similar 
manner.  Thus, research suggesting RS in PFC regions is primarily driven by the 
retrieval of S-R bindings has not effectively separated such effects from retrieval of S-
task bindings or the controlled retrieval of semantic information. 
Given these data, Experiment 10 was designed to assess S-R vs. CP 
contributions to RS. I used the same referent change manipulation used in 
Experiments 8 and 9 to control for S-R learning at all three levels of response 
representation (i.e., Actions, Decisions and Classifications).  Thus, I could assess RS 
following response repetition (Congruent) vs. response reversal (Incongruent).  Note 
that this Response-congruency manipulation is not confounded with switches in task 
between presentations as a task switch occurs for both Congruent and Incongruent 
trials (i.e., the task is switched from “Bigger than X” to “Bigger than Y”).  
Furthermore, all tasks require the retrieval of information relating to object size thus 
equating conceptual processing across conditions.  As such, the present experiment 
does not suffer from the same issues as the Horner & Henson (2008) and Race et al. 
(2009) studies described above. 
Given the evidence for abstract stimulus representations within S-R bindings I 
also included the word-to-picture manipulation introduced in Experiment 9.  Whereas 
at Study I presented both word and picture stimuli, at Test I only presented pictures.  
Stimuli at test were therefore either previously presented as pictures (Picture-Picture 
condition), previously presented as words (Word-Picture condition) or experimentally 
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novel (Novel condition).  Note that the Novel condition is included in the Stimulus-
type factor and there is therefore no factorial manipulation of Repetition (as in 
Experiment 9).  This resulted in a 3x2 design with factors Stimulus-type (Picture-
Picture, Word-Picture, Novel) and Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent).  I used this 
same design in Experiment 11 (Chapter 6). 
Given the behavioural evidence for a greater response-congruency effect in the 
Picture-Picture than Word-Picture condition in Experiment 9, I analysed both the 
behavioural and neuroimaging data (Chapters 5 and 6) in the following manner.  
Firstly, I conducted separate ANOVAs for the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
conditions (comparing each condition to the same Novel baseline condition in a 2x2 – 
Repetition x Stimulus-type – ANOVA).  This allowed for a separate assessment of 
repetition-related behavioural and neural changes as a function of response-
congruency for both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition.  Following these 
separate assessments, I compared the effects seen in each analysis (e.g., the response-
congruency effect in the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition).  Note that I 
have specific behavioural predictions based on each planned analysis: (1) the Picture-
Picture analysis should demonstrate a Repetition x Response-congruency interaction, 
(2) the Word-Picture analysis should demonstrate a Repetition x Response-
congruency interaction and (3) the Repetition x Response-congruency effect should 
be greater in the Picture-Picture than Word-Picture condition. 
In relation to RS, I asked the following questions. Firstly, with regard to S-R 
learning: (1) is RS in higher-order ventral visual as well as inferior prefrontal regions 
primarily driven by response repetition as predicted by S-R theories and (2) if such S-
R learning contributions are present, are they seen in both the Picture-Picture and 
Word-Picture analysis – mirroring the behavioural data from Experiment 9?  
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Secondly, in relation to facilitation of component processes: (3) can I see RS in 
higher-order ventral visual regions despite a reversal in response between 
presentations and (4) if such an effect is present, is it specific to the repetition of the 
same visual stimulus (i.e., the Picture-Picture condition) or can I see evidence for 
facilitation of component processes in both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
condition?  With regards to the latter question, a RS effect (that is unaffected by 
Response-congruency) that is specific to the Picture-Picture condition could be taken 
as evidence for facilitation of perceptual processes, whereas a RS effect that is present 
regardless of Stimulus-type could be taken as evidence for facilitation of 
semantic/lexical processes (i.e., that are not specific to repetition of the same visual 
stimulus). 
 
5.1 Experiment 10 
 
5.1.1 Method 
Apart from the following exceptions, Experiment 10 was identical to Experiment 9. 
5.1.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (10 male) gave informed consent to participate in the 
experiment.  The mean age across participants was 25.9 years (σ = 4.3).  By self-
report, all participants were right-handed. 
5.1.1.2 Materials 
The 384 stimuli, split between the wheelie bin and pencil case referent change and 
size classifications, were randomly assigned to one of three groups relating to whether 
they were presented as a picture at Study (Picture-Picture), a word at Study (Word-
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Picture) or were experimentally novel (Novel).  This resulted in 64 stimuli per 
condition collapsing across the two referent changes. This resulted in a 3x2 design 
with factors Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-Picture, Novel) and Congruency 
(Congruent, Incongruent).  The assignment of stimuli to the three Stimulus-type 
factors was rotated across participants. 
5.1.1.3 Procedure 
The experiment consisted of four Study-Test blocks (two relating to the wheelie bin 
referent change and two relating to the pencil case referent change).  During each 
Study phase, 64 stimuli were shown three times each resulting in 192 trials (i.e., all 
stimuli were “high-primed”).  32 stimuli were presented as pictures (Picture-Picture) 
and 32 were presented as words (Word-Picture).  Each set of 32 stimuli consisted of 
equal numbers of Congruent and Incongruent items.  During each Test phase, the 64 
stimuli from the Study phase (Picture-Picture and Word-Picture) were randomly 
intermixed with 32 novel stimuli (Novel).  All items at Test were presented as 
pictures. 
5.1.1.4 fMRI Acquisition 
Thirty-two T2*-weighted transverse slices (64x64 3mmx3mm pixels, TE = 30ms, 
flip-angle = 78o) per volume were taken using Echo-Planar Imaging (EPI) on a 3T 
TIM Trio system (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany).  Slices were 3-mm thick with a 
0.75mm gap, tilted approximately 30o at the front to minimise eye-ghosting, and 
acquired in descending order.  Eight sessions were acquired, equating to the four 
study-test cycles.  298 volumes were acquired during each Study phase, 154 were 
acquired during each Test phase, with a repetition time (TR) of 2000ms.  The first five 
volumes of each session were discarded to allow for equilibrium effects.  A T1-
Chapter 5: S-R learning and repetition suppression: an fMRI study 
 119
weighted structural volume was also acquired for each participant with 
1mmx1mmx1mm voxels using MPRAGE and GRAPPA parallel imaging (flip-angle 
= 9o; TE = 2.00s; acceleration factor = 2). 
5.1.1.5 fMRI Analysis 
Data were analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM5, 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm5.html).  Preprocessing of image volumes included 
spatial realignment to correct for movement, followed by slice-timing correction.  
Each image was then spatially normalised to Talairach space, using the linear and 
non-linear normalisation parameters estimated from warping each participant’s 
segmented structural image to a T1-weighted average template image from the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). These re-sampled images (voxel size 3x3x3 
mm) were smoothed spatially by an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel (final smoothness 
approximately 11x11x11 mm). 
 Statistical analysis was performed in a two-stage approximation to a Mixed 
Effects model.  In the first stage, neural activity was modelled by a delta function at 
stimulus onset.  The BOLD response was modelled by a convolution of these delta 
functions by a canonical Haemodynamic Response Function (HRF).  The resulting 
time-courses were down-sampled at the midpoint of each scan to form regressors in a 
General Linear Model.  
 For each Test session, 7 regressors were modelled – the 6 experimental 
conditions (3x2; Stimulus-type x Congruency) plus an additional regressor for 
discarded trials (using the standard behavioural exclusion criteria).  To account for 
(linear) residual artefacts after realignment, the model also included six further 
regressors representing the movement parameters estimated during realignment.  
Voxel-wise parameter estimates for these regressors were obtained by Restricted 
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Maximum-Likelihood (ReML) estimation, using a temporal high-pass filter (cut-off 
128secs) to remove low-frequency drifts, and modelling temporal autocorrelation 
across scans with an AR(1) process. 
 Images of contrasts of the resulting parameter estimates (collapsed across the 
four Test phases) comprised the data for a second-stage model, which treated 
participants as a random effect.  In addition to the 18 subject effects, this model had 6 
condition effects, corresponding to a 3x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency) repeated-
measures ANOVA. Within this model, Statistical Parametric Maps (SPMs) were 
created of the T or F-statistic for the various ANOVA effects of interest, using a 
single pooled error estimate for all contrasts, whose nonsphericity was estimated 
using ReML as described in Friston et al. (2002).   
Unless otherwise stated, all SPMs were thresholded at p<.05, corrected for 
multiple comparisons using Random Field Theory, either across the whole-brain or 
within regions of interest (ROIs) defined by contrasts from independent data. 
Stereotactic coordinates of the maxima within the thresholded SPMs correspond to the 
MNI template. 
 
5.1.2 Results 
5.1.2.1 Behavioural results 
 
After excluding 5% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown in 
Table 5.1.  Analyses of errors are detailed in Appendix A-10.  A further 11% of trials 
were excluded from RT analyses due to incorrect responses given at Study.  Table 5.1 
displays mean RTs, while Figure 5.1-C shows priming (Novel-Repeated) of RTs 
across all conditions. 
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Figure 5.1.  (A-B) Picture-Picture RS effect, small-volume corrected p<.05 FWE (see main analysis); 
(A) View of ventral surface of temporal and frontal lobes highlighting the right fusiform ROI; (B) 
View of lateral surface of right hemisphere highlighting the right pPFC ROI.  (C) Mean repetition 
priming across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-Picture) and Congruency (Congruent, 
Incongruent); (D) Mean RS effect in right fusiform ROI; (E) Mean RS effect in right pPFC ROI.  Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed). *** p<.001; ** p<.01. 
 
Inspection of Figure 5.1-C reveals a similar pattern of results to those of 
Experiment 9.  The only positive priming effect was seen in the Picture-Picture 
Congruent condition, though there was a trend in the Word-Picture Congruent 
condition.  Interestingly, the Word-Picture Incongruent condition showed a significant 
slowing of RTs relative to novel items (i.e., negative priming).  A 3x2 (Stimulus-type 
x Congruency) ANOVA revealed a significant Stimulus-type x Congruency 
interaction, F(1.7, 28.3) = 11.25, p<.01 (as well as main effects of Stimulus-type, 
F(1.5, 25.0) = 30.94, p<.001, and Congruency, F(1, 17) = 68.29, p<.001).   
As outlined in the introduction, I broke this Stimulus-type x Congruency 
interaction down into two separate 2x2 (Repetition x Congruency) ANOVAs 
comparing (1) the Picture-Picture condition with the novel condition and (2) the 
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Word-Picture condition with the novel condition.  This allowed me to assess priming 
for each Stimulus-type separately across Congruency.  The Picture-Picture analysis 
revealed a significant Repetition x Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 23.28, p<.001, 
reflecting greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, t(17) = 4.84, 
p<.001.  A main effect of Repetition was also present, F(1, 17) = 26.08, p<.001, 
revealing significant positive priming when collapsing across Congruency (as well as 
a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) = 84.62, p<.001). 
 
Table 5.1.  Mean percentage errors, error priming, reaction times (RTs), RT priming and proportional 
priming (Prop. Priming) (plus standard deviations) across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-
Picture, Novel) and Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) for Experiment 10. 
 
The Word-Picture analysis also revealed a significant Repetition x 
Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 11.63, p<.01, again reflecting greater priming for 
Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, t(17) = 3.41, p<.01.  As in the Picture-Picture 
analysis, a main effect of Repetition was present, F(1, 17) = 10.99, p<.01, in this 
instance reflecting significant negative priming (i.e., a slowing of RTs compared to 
baseline) (as well as a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) = 49.57, p<.001).  
Interestingly, the difference in priming between Congruent and Incongruent stimuli 
did not significantly differ between the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition, 
t(17) = .03, p=.98.  In other words, the S-R effects in the Picture-Picture and Word-
Picture condition were statistically equivalent (though see later inter-experimental 
Stimulus-type / Picture-Picture Word-Picture Novel 
Congruency Con Incon Con Incon Con Incon 
       
% Errors 5.4 (4.1) 11.0 (8.4) 5.1 (3.4) 11.6 (9.4) 5.1 (3.8) 11.0 (6.8) 
Error Priming 0.3 (3.6) 0.0 (3.8) 0.0 (3.7) 0.6 (6.6)   
       
RTs 685 (85) 800 (104) 739 (94) 853 (139) 752 (100) 810 (117) 
RT Priming 67 (46) 9 (34) 14 (30) -44 (49)   
RT Prop. Priming .09 (.05) .01 (.04) .02 (.04) -.05 (.06)   
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analysis in Chapter 6 focussing on this issue).  These results therefore replicate the 
main finding of Experiment 9, suggesting that S-R learning effects can be seen despite 
switching from a visual word at Study to an object picture (of the same object 
identity) at Test. 
For the subsequent fMRI results, I adopted the same approach used in the 
behavioural analyses, searching for “main effects” of Repetition (i.e., repetition 
suppression) and interactions between Repetition and Congruency separately for each 
Stimulus-type.  Thus, each Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture and Word-Picture) is 
compared separately with the same Novel baseline condition.  This approach was also 
applied to the EEG results in Chapter 6. 
 
5.1.2.2 fMRI Results 
5.1.2.2.1 Whole-brain analyses 
 
Given I was interested in regions previously shown to demonstrate RS, in particular 
prefrontal regions that have been shown to be sensitive to changes in response 
between presentations (e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008; Race et al., 
2009), I constrained my search by using a whole-brain corrected t-contrast map from 
Horner & Henson (2008).  This independently acquired t-contrast is the equivalent of 
the “main effect” of RS in the Picture-Picture condition of the present study and 
includes bilateral regions of the occipital and temporal lobes including lateral occipital 
and inferior temporal regions (i.e., the ventral visual stream).  This map also included 
two bilateral clusters in the inferior prefrontal gyrus; the first a more anterior region, 
pars triangularis (BA 45), and the second a more posterior region, pars opercularis 
(BA 44).  
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I first searched for regions that demonstrated a significant effect of RS in the 
Picture-Picture condition, using Random Field Theory to correct for multiple 
comparisons within this constrained search space.  This revealed large bilateral 
clusters in the occipital/temporal lobes, including lateral occipital and inferior 
temporal regions (see Figure 5.1-A & 5.1-B).  This effect peaked in the fusiform 
gyrus in the right hemisphere (+42, -54, -15) and the inferior occipital gyrus in the left 
hemisphere (-36, -78, -9).  A further region in the right inferior prefrontal gyrus (+39, 
+6, +30) – pars opercularis – henceforth referred to as posterior prefrontal cortex 
(pPFC), was also revealed (see Table 5.2 for peak voxels within these clusters).  I next 
searched for regions that showed a significant Repetition x Congruency interaction in 
the Picture-Picture analysis.  This revealed a significant cluster in the right inferior 
prefrontal gyrus (+42, +30, +12) – pars triangularis – that showed greater RS for 
Congruent than Incongruent stimuli.  Importantly, this Repetition-by-Congruency 
contrast failed to reveal any significant clusters within occipital/temporal regions.  
Thus these analyses demonstrate that significant RS was present in occipital/temporal 
as well as inferior prefrontal regions however it is only the inferior prefrontal regions 
where RS showed a sensitivity to switches in response between presentations. 
Turning to the Word-Picture analysis, the “main effect” of Repetition contrast 
failed to reveal any significant clusters in the small-volume correction (SVC).  
Interestingly, in the Repetition-by-Congruency contrast for the Word-Picture 
condition, a cluster in the right inferior prefrontal gyrus was revealed with identical 
co-ordinates to that revealed in the Picture-Picture Repetition-by-Congruency analysis 
(+42, +30, +12).  These results therefore mirror the behavioural priming results in that 
the RS effect in inferior prefrontal regions was sensitive to switches in response 
despite switching from a visual word at Study to an object picture at Test.   
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Table 5.2.  Peak voxels (and local maxima) showing an effect of repetition suppression in the Picture-
Picture condition (Novel > Picture-Picture) and a Repetition-by-Congruency interaction in the 
Picture-Picture condition, p<.05 FWE small-volume corrected.  Voxel numbers reported are for entire 
cluster, so are not available for local maxima. IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus. 
 
Region Voxels MNI co-ordinates Z-score 
      
Picture-Picture Repetition      
   Right Fusiform Gyrus 913 +42 -54 -15 7.84 
     Inferior Occipital Gyrus  +42 -72 -9 7.25 
     Fusiform Gyrus  +36 -39 -21 7.14 
     Middle Occipital Gyrus  +33 -87 +3 6.39 
           
   Left Inferior Occipital Gyrus 852 -36 -78 -9 6.90 
     Fusiform Gyrus  -33 -42 -18 6.40 
     Middle Occipital Gyrus  -36 -87 -3 6.10 
     Fusiform Gyrus  -42 -60 -12 5.96 
     Fusiform Gyrus  -33 -57 -12 5.95 
     Superior Occipital Gyrus  -30 -84 +21 5.25 
      
   Right Posterior IFG 38 +39 +6 +30 4.33 
      
Repetition x Congruency      
   Right Anterior IFG 55 +42 +30 +12 3.72 
      
 
In summary, these analyses revealed two main effects: (1) a RS effect in the 
inferior prefrontal gyrus that differed as a function of Congruency that was seen in 
both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture analyses and (2) a RS effect that was 
specific to the Picture-Picture condition (i.e., that was reliant upon visual similarity 
between Study and Test presentations) within bilateral occipital/temporal regions that 
did not differ as a function of Congruency.  Before discussing these findings further, I 
conducted a series of region-of-interest (ROI) analyses based on the above results. 
 
5.1.2.2.2 ROI analyses 
 
 
To further interrogate the fMRI data, I extracted data from two regions that were 
identified in the SVC Picture-Picture RS t-contrast: (1) a region in the right fusiform 
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gyrus (+42, -54, -15) and (2) a region in the posterior portion of the right inferior 
prefrontal gyrus – pars opercularis – (+39, +6, +30; pPFC).  The mean percentage 
signal change and RS effect for these regions are presented in Table 5.3.  These ROI 
data reflect a weighted average of nearby voxel values by virtue of the Gaussian 
smoothing of the fMRI images.  Note that these regions were defined by the “main 
effect” of RS in the Picture-Picture condition and therefore do not bias any further 
analyses concerned with significant Repetition-by-Congruency interactions (i.e., an 
orthogonal contrast).  The data from each region were subjected to separate 2x2 
(Repetition x Congruency) repeated-measures ANOVAs for the Picture-Picture and 
Word-Picture condition separately (mirroring the behavioural analyses). 
 
 
Table 5.3.  Mean percentage signal change and repetition suppression (RS) (and standard deviations) 
in right fusiform (+42, -54, -15), right posterior PFC (+39, +6, +30; pPFC), left fusiform (-24, -57, -
15) and left inferior PFC (-36, +33, -12; iPFC) ROIs across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-
Picture, Novel) and Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent).  Percent signal change refers to the peak of 
the fitted BOLD impulse response, and is relative to the grand mean over all voxels and scans.  Note 
that the baseline level of 0 was not estimated reliably in this design so only patterns across conditions 
are meaningful. 
 
Stimulus-type / Picture-Picture Word-Picture Novel 
Congruency Con Incon Con Incon Con Incon 
       
Right Fusiform       
% signal change .23 (.32) .22 (.32) .45 (.32) .51 (.32) .51 (.32) .46 (.29) 
RS .28 (.13) .24 (.17) .06 (.11) -.05 (.18)   
       
Right pPFC       
% signal change -.18 (.30) -.15 (.33) -.04 (.32) .07 (.30) .04 (.33) -.07 (.35) 
RS .23 (.22) .07 (.16) .09 (.13) -.14 (.25)   
       
Left Fusiform       
% signal change .13 (.36) .13 (.47) .18 (.43) .27 (.38) .30 (.40) .24 (.39) 
RS .17 (.16) .11 (.19) .12 (.21) -.03 (.19)   
       
Left iPFC       
% signal change .14 (.19) .14 (.20) .16 (.17) .23 (.23) .24 (.19) .18 (.20) 
RS .10 (.12) .03 (.14) .08 (.10) -.06 (.15)   
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Focussing on the right fusiform region (see figure 5.1-D), the main effect of 
Repetition in the Picture-Picture analysis that defined the region did not significantly 
interact with Congruency, F(1, 17) = 1.26, p=.28.  The Word-Picture analysis failed to 
reveal any significant effects or interactions (F’s<.11, p’s>.75), though I note a trend 
towards a Repetition-by-Congruency interaction was present, F(1, 17) = 4.16, p=.06.  
Thus the right fusiform region only showed significant RS in the Picture-Picture 
analysis, an effect that was robust to the Congruency manipulation.   
Turning to the right pPFC region (see Figure 5.1-E), the Picture-Picture 
analysis revealed a significant Repetition-by-Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 
12.05, p<.01, reflecting greater RS for Congruent than Incongruent trials.  The Word-
Picture analysis also revealed a significant Repetition-by-Congruency interaction, 
F(1, 17) = 11.05, p<.01, again reflecting greater RS for Congruent than Incongruent 
trials (no main effects were present in this analysis, F’s<.86, p’s>.37).  Indeed, a 
significant repetition enhancement (RE) effect was seen for Incongruent trials in the 
Word-Picture analysis (see Figure 5.1-E).  In other words, when a retrieved S-R 
binding was incongruent, pPFC showed greater activation compared to Novel trials.  
This suggests that retrieval of an incongruent S-R binding can result in interference 
within the inferior prefrontal gyrus.  Finally, no significant difference was seen when 
comparing the Repetition-by-Congruency effects in the Picture-Picture and Word-
Picture analyses, t(17) = 1.29, p=.22.  In other words, the effect of Congruency on RS 
in this region was equivalent across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition.  
The right pPFC region therefore showed a significant sensitivity to switches in 
response between Study and Test in both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
condition, mirroring the results from the behavioural analyses.  Critically, S-R 
retrieval resulted in neural decreases when the response was congruent (in both the 
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Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions) and neural increases when the response 
was incongruent (in the Word-Picture condition) compared to Novel trials. 
These ROI analyses suggest a possible dissociation between the right fusiform, 
in which RS is insensitive to switches in response between Study and Test, and right 
pPFC, in which RS is sensitive to such changes.  To formally assess this I conducted 
separate 2x2x2 (Region x Repetition x Congruency) ANOVAs for the Picture-Picture 
and Word-Picture conditions separately.  Specifically, if a dissociation is present 
between the RS effect within these two regions in terms of their sensitivity to switches 
in response I should see significant three-way interactions between Region, Repetition 
and Congruency.  Both the Picture-Picture, F(1, 17) = 7.47, p<.05, and Word-Picture, 
F(1, 17) = 7.07, p<.05, analyses revealed significant three-way interactions.  As such, 
the sensitivity of the RS effect to switches in response in the pPFC region was 
significantly greater than in the fusiform region. 
 
5.1.2.2.3 Further ROI analyses 
 
The present data are at odds with the results of Dobbins et al. (2004) in that I saw 
equivalent RS in a right fusiform region across Congruent and Incongruent trials.  
These results therefore support those of Horner & Henson (2008) and Race et al. 
(2009), suggesting that RS in occipital/temporal regions may reflect the facilitation of 
particular perceptual and/or conceptual processes that are present irrespective of 
response-congruency.  One possibility is that a functional dissociation is present 
between the fusiform regions described in Dobbins et al. (2004) and the present 
experiment.  Indeed, the Dobbins et al. fusiform region was in the left hemisphere and 
was more medial than the right hemisphere region in the present experiment.  As 
such, it is possible that some regions in occipital/temporal cortex may show sensitivity 
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to response switches whereas others may be robust to such switches.  To address this 
concern, I extracted data using the co-ordinates of the left fusiform region (-24, -57, -
15) presented in Dobbins et al. (2004) (see Table 5.3).  The Picture-Picture analysis 
from this ROI revealed a significant effect of Repetition, F(1, 17) = 15.01, p<.001, 
that did not significantly interact with Congruency, F(1, 17) = 1.83, p=.19.  A trend 
was present in the Word-Picture analysis for an effect of Repetition, F(1, 17) = 4.27, 
p=.06, however no interaction was seen with Congruency, F(1, 17) = 2.97, p=.10.  
Thus I could find no evidence that RS in occipital/temporal regions was sensitive to 
switches in response between presentations, even when focussing on the Dobbins et 
al. fusiform region. 
 A final analysis was conducted on a region in the inferior prefrontal gyrus – 
pars orbitalis – that has been previously implicated in S-R learning (Horner & 
Henson, 2008).  Whereas Horner & Henson (2008) showed that RS in this region was 
sensitive to switches in task/response between presentations, the results of Race et al. 
(2009) suggested that RS in this region was resilient to such changes.  The latter study 
concluded that RS in this inferior PFC region reflected the facilitation of processes 
involved in the controlled retrieval of semantic information, in line with the two-
process theory of inferior prefrontal function (Badre & Wagner, 2007).  Critically, this 
facilitation was believed to occur regardless of S-R retrieval and as such would 
represent evidence of facilitation of component processes in inferior PFC.   
To address this discrepancy between previous studies, I extracted the data 
from an inferior PFC region – pars orbitalis – (-36, +33, -15) using the co-ordinates 
from Horner & Henson (a similar pattern of results was also present when using the 
co-ordinates of Race et al.) (see Table 5.3).  The Picture-Picture analysis from this 
ROI revealed a significant effect of Repetition, F(1, 17) = 7.65, p<.05, and a trend 
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towards a Repetition x Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 3.50, p=.08.  The Word-
Picture analysis revealed a significant Repetition x Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 
12.67, p<.01 only.  The numerical trend in the Picture-Picture analysis and the 
significant interaction in the Word-Picture analysis reflected greater RS for Congruent 
than Incongruent trials, as seen in the pPFC region described in the main ROI 
analyses.  As the Repetition x Congruency effects in the Picture-Picture and Word-
Picture analysis showed no evidence of a statistical difference, t(17) = 1.73, p=.10, a 
t-contrast collapsing across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions revealed 
significantly greater RS for Congruent than Incongruent trials, t(17) = 3.19, p<.01.  
Indeed, RS for Incongruent trials was not reliably greater than zero in either the 
Picture-Picture, t(17) = .93, p=.37, or Word-Picture, t(17) = 1.71, p=.11, conditions.  
Thus, RS in this region was sensitive to switches in response between presentations, 
in line with the results of Horner & Henson (2008).  The consequences of these results 
for current theories of inferior prefrontal function and cognitive control are discussed 
below. 
 
5.2 General Discussion 
 
 
The present experiment revealed several important findings.  Firstly, I saw significant 
RS in bilateral occipital/temporal regions as well as distinct clusters in the inferior 
prefrontal cortex.  Whereas the RS effect in occipital/temporal regions was robust to 
switches in response between presentations, the RS effect in inferior prefrontal 
regions was sensitive to such changes.  Though previous research has shown such 
sensitivity in inferior PFC regions, these effects were not unequivocally a result of 
switches in response and may have resulted from switches in task or changes in the 
type of semantic information retrieved between presentations (Horner & Henson, 
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2008; Race et al., 2009).  The present results therefore suggest that RS in 
occipital/temporal regions is specific to the repetition of a visual stimulus, but occurs 
irrespective of whether a response is repeated or reversed.  On the other hand, RS in 
inferior PFC regions is sensitive to the repetition or reversal of a response. 
 
5.2.1 Retrieval of S-R bindings 
 
When incongruent S-R bindings were retrieved in the present study, RS decreased in 
inferior PFC regions.  Importantly, this decrease in RS was present in both the 
Picture-Picture and Word-Picture analyses.  These results therefore suggest that 
stimuli within S-R bindings can form at a level of representation that abstracts away 
from the specific visual characteristics of the stimulus presented at Study, in line with 
the behavioural repetition priming results. This is the first evidence that retrieval of 
abstract S-R bindings affects RS in inferior prefrontal regions. 
When responses were reversed between presentations, a significant repetition 
effect was still present in inferior PFC (at least in the Word-Picture condition).  This 
effect however was characterised by an increase in activation relative to Novel 
baseline – repetition enhancement (RE) – as opposed to a decrease in activation.  
Thus, when responses were repeated I saw RS and when responses were reversed I 
saw RE.  These findings mirror the behavioural repetition priming results in that I saw 
positive priming when responses were repeated and negative priming when responses 
were reversed.  These results suggest that retrieval of an incongruent S-R binding can 
interfere with the processes carried out in inferior PFC.  Such interference would 
serve to increase processing demands in inferior PFC regions, possibly slowing such 
processing, resulting in slower RTs.  Although previous research has suggested that 
repetition-related changes in neural activity within inferior PFC are primarily driven 
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by response repetition/reversal (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008; Race et 
al., 2009), such effects have largely been interpreted in terms of facilitation.  In other 
words, the retrieval of S-R bindings was considered to decrease processing demands 
in inferior PFC.  This is the first study to demonstrate significant facilitation and 
interference in the same inferior PFC regions. 
This evidence for facilitation and interference has clear implications for S-R 
theories of repetition priming (Logan, 1990) and RS (Dobbins et al., 2004).  Here RS 
is thought to result from the by-passing of previously engaged component processes 
(i.e., the algorithmic route).  When a response is incongruent with the current 
situation, this by-passing should no longer occur and the system should revert to 
algorithmic processing.  If RS in inferior PFC is a result of the by-passing of the 
processes performed in this region, the retrieval of an incongruent response should 
result in the re-engagement of such processes.  In other words, I should see similar 
levels of activation for incongruent and novel trials.  This was not the case; I saw 
greater activation for incongruent than novel trials.  In the General Discussion of 
Chapter 3, I discussed how the pattern of priming (and accuracy) across tasks could 
only be explained by an interaction between the algorithmic and response retrieval 
route prior to response generation.  The present results strengthen this claim, and 
implicate the inferior prefrontal gyrus as the site for such interaction. 
 
5.2.1.1 Theories of inferior PFC function and cognitive control 
 
One remaining issue is how such results fit with existing theories of inferior PFC 
function and cognitive control.  The two-process theory of inferior prefrontal cortex 
suggests that this region plays a critical role in the retrieval and selection of task-
specific semantic information (e.g., Badre & Wagner, 2007; Wagner et al., 2001).  
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Specifically, whereas the most anterior portion of the inferior prefrontal gyrus – pars 
orbitalis – is thought to control the retrieval of semantic information, a more posterior 
portion – pars triangularis – is thought to mediate selection between competing active 
representations in the service of goal-directed action.   
With regard to this latter selection process, it is possible to incorporate the 
present data within this framework.  Specifically, this competitor selection process 
would need to be broadened to include selection between particular response 
competitors (e.g., Actions, Decision or Classifications) generated by algorithmic and 
response retrieval routes.  In situations where the two routes generate a congruent 
response, processing demands may be decreased in pars triangularis due to a lack of 
response competition.  This in turn could result in a decrease in neural activity, i.e., 
RS.  In situations where the two routes generate an incongruent response, processing 
demands may be increased due to response competition, resulting in an increase in 
neural activity.  Such an explanation for the present inferior PFC results could readily 
be applied to the more anterior portion pars orbitalis.  In this region I again saw 
greater RS for Congruent than Incongruent trials (although I did not see significant 
RE in this region for Incongruent trials).  This idea however is at odds with the 
conception that this region controls the retrieval of semantic information.  This is 
because Congruent and Incongruent trials required the retrieval of information 
relating to object size at both Study and Test (although the comparator “referent” 
changed, this too was constant across Congruency).   
Although the present results pose questions for the two-process theory of 
inferior PFC function, they are broadly consistent with hierarchical models of 
cognitive control (e.g., Badre & D'Esposito, 2007, 2009; Fuster, 2001).  Here 
executive functions are thought to be organised on a posterior-anterior axis, with 
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regions more proximal to motor regions selecting actions closest to response output 
and progressively more anterior regions coding higher-level conceptual 
representations.  In the present circumstances, such higher-level “conceptual” 
representations coded in anterior regions might relate to the more abstract response 
representations seen in Chapter 4 (i.e., Classifications).  In turn, Decisions and 
Actions would be coded in more posterior regions of the inferior PFC en route to 
generation of an overt response.  Consistent with this perspective, Race et al. (2009) 
presented evidence that RS in a more posterior PFC region showed sensitivity to 
switches in Actions/Decisions, whereas RS in a more anterior PFC region showed 
sensitivity only to switches in Classification and/or Task.  The present results 
therefore suggest that inferior PFC is involved in the selection of task-appropriate 
responses, plausibly at multiple levels of abstraction.  The amount of neural activity is 
therefore a reflection of the degree of facilitation or interference due to the generation 
of congruent or incongruent responses from algorithmic and response retrieval routes. 
 
5.2.2 Facilitation of component processes 
 
The RS effect seen in occipital/temporal cortex was seemingly robust to switches in 
response between presentations.  These results support recent research suggesting that 
the RS effect in higher-order ventral visual regions is unaffected by response 
switches/reversals between presentations (Horner & Henson, 2008; Race et al., 2009; 
Wig et al., 2009).  Importantly, in the present study I controlled for S-R learning 
contributions at all three levels of response representation revealed in Chapter 4 (i.e., 
Actions, Decision and Classifications).  As the manipulations used in these previous 
studies did not result in the reversal of responses at all three levels of response 
representation simultaneously, the present results strengthen the claim that RS in 
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occipital/temporal regions is unaffected by the repetition and/or reversal of responses 
between stimulus repetitions.  Interestingly, this occipital/temporal RS effect was only 
seen in the Picture-Picture condition, suggesting it was specific to the repetition of the 
same visual stimulus.  These results suggest that the RS in occipital/temporal regions 
reflects the repetition of processes specific to the visual form of a stimulus (i.e., 
perceptual processes).   
Indeed, I saw no evidence for a significant Word-Picture RS effect that was 
unaffected by the Response-congruency manipulation and as such have no evidence 
for semantic and/or lexical CP contributions to RS, either in occipital/temporal or 
inferior prefrontal regions.  These results are at odds with previous research 
suggesting that RS in inferior prefrontal regions (Poldrack et al., 1999; Wagner et al., 
1997; Wagner et al., 2000), as well as specific lateral occipital (Horner & Henson, 
submitted) and/or fusiform (Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons, Koutstaal, Prince, Wagner 
& Schacter, 2003) regions in the left hemisphere, reflects the facilitation of processes 
that are not specific to repetition of the same visual stimulus (i.e., perceptual 
facilitation) or repetition of the same response (i.e., S-R learning).  In other words, 
such RS was previously attributed to facilitation of semantic and/or 
lexical/phonological processes.  The present results suggest that once one controls for 
S-R learning at all three levels of response representation, one no longer sees evidence 
for the facilitation of such processes. 
 
5.2.3 Outstanding issues 
 
The results from the present fMRI study therefore present evidence for both S-R and 
CP (i.e., perceptual facilitation) contributions to RS.  These results are somewhat at 
odds with the behavioural priming studies presented in Chapters 2-4.  Behaviourally, I 
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have thus far failed to provide convincing evidence for significant CP contributions to 
priming.  In short, priming has been dominated by S-R contributions.  One possibility 
is that CP contributions have been present in the behavioural studies of Chapters 2-4 
however they have been effectively cancelled out by interference effects owing to 
response reversal (as evidenced in the present behavioural and fMRI results).  Another 
possibility is the RS effect seen in occipital/temporal regions in the present study is 
unrelated to the behavioural priming effect.  This possibility is particularly pertinent 
given the poor temporal resolution of fMRI, a result of the sluggish nature of the 
BOLD response.  It is even possible that the RS effect seen in the present study 
reflects reduced attention to a visual stimulus once a decision or response has been 
made.  This would be consistent with an fMRI study that artificially slowed down 
object recognition, so that the BOLD response pre- and post-recognition could be 
separated (Eger, Henson, Driver & Dolan, 2007): this study found that RS (associated 
with priming object identification with an object name) in fusiform cortex occurred 
after the recognition point, not before.  This questions the causal role of fMRI RS in 
object recognition/classification.  EEG does not suffer from such issues, due to its 
high temporal resolution.  As such, EEG allows one to search for event-related 
potential (ERP) repetition effects that occur between stimulus presentation and 
response onset.  EEG also allows for the possibility of searching for effects that are 
time-locked to either stimulus presentation or response onset.  Thus EEG does not 
suffer from the same temporal limitations as the present fMRI study.  In the next 
chapter, I therefore present the results of an EEG study using the same experimental 
design as in the present chapter. 
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5.2.4 Chapter Summary 
 
The present chapter assessed both S-R and CP contributions to repetition suppression 
(RS).  Using an “optimal” design that controlled for S-R learning at all three level of 
response representation, I used fMRI to assess RS in distinct occipital/temporal and 
inferior PFC regions.  This design also included the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
manipulations introduced in Chapter 4 as a means of assessing whether bindings form 
between responses and “abstract” stimulus representations.  RS was seen in bilateral 
occipital/temporal regions as well as distinct clusters in inferior PFC.  Although RS in 
occipital/temporal regions was robust to switches in response between presentations, 
RS in inferior PFC was sensitive to such switches.  The RS seen in occipital/temporal 
regions was only present in the Picture-Picture condition (i.e., was only present when 
there was complete visual overlap between presentations), and thus plausibly reflects 
the facilitation of perceptual processes.  In inferior PFC I saw a significant decrease in 
RS for Incongruent compared to Congruent trials.  Indeed, I even saw evidence for 
significant repetition enhancement (RE) for Incongruent trials in inferior PFC 
suggesting possible interference.  These S-R effects were shown in both the Picture-
Picture and Word-Picture condition, confirming that S-R bindings can form between 
responses and “abstract” stimulus representations. 
 These results were considered in relation to S-R theories of repetition priming 
and RS, as well as theories of inferior PFC function and cognitive control.  Although 
the data presented certain specific problems for some theories, they were broadly 
consistent with hierarchical views of PFC function.  It was suggested that activity in 
inferior PFC may reflect the resolution of competition between particular task-
relevant response representations at varying levels of abstraction along a posterior-to-
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anterior axis.  Although revealing, the present fMRI results suffer from the lack of 
temporal resolution inherent in this methodology – a product of the sluggish nature of 
the BOLD response.  It was suggested that the temporal resolution of EEG would help 
to circumvent these issues, ensuring any repetition effects were occurring prior to 
response onset.  In the next Chapter I therefore present the results of an EEG 
experiment using the same design as the present chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
S-R learning, repetition and event-related potentials: an EEG study 
 
In chapter 5 I presented an fMRI study designed to assess repetition-related decreases 
– repetition suppression (RS) – within occipital/temporal and prefrontal regions.  I 
saw a dissociation between occipital/temporal regions, in which RS was robust to 
switches in response between presentations, and inferior prefrontal regions, in which 
RS was sensitive to such switches.  Critically, the RS effect in occipital/temporal 
regions was specific to the Picture-Picture condition, and was therefore suggested to 
be a marker of perceptual facilitation owing to the repetition of the same visual 
stimulus at Study and Test.  Thus I plausibly have evidence for two distinct RS 
effects: (1) perceptual facilitation within occipital/temporal regions and (2) S-R 
learning within inferior prefrontal regions.  Interestingly, this latter prefrontal RS 
effect was seen in both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition, suggesting 
that stimuli within S-R bindings can form at a representational level that abstracts 
away from the specific visual format of a stimulus. 
One issue with these data however, which I discussed in the former chapter, 
concerns the temporal sequence of such effects.  Although it is plausible that the 
“perceptual” effect seen within occipital/temporal regions occurs earlier than the “S-R 
learning” effect seen within inferior prefrontal regions, the sluggish nature of the 
BOLD response does not allow for the temporal separation of such effects.  For 
example, the RS in occipital/temporal regions could reflect reduced attention to a 
stimulus after a response has been made. Indeed, it is possible that the RS effect seen 
in the fMRI study of Chapter 5 was a result of neural decreases subsequent to object 
identification/classification and therefore may not play a causal role in behavioural 
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priming.  EEG does not suffer from these issues, having a temporal resolution in the 
order of milliseconds.  This improved resolution not only allows the temporal 
separation of effects within an epoch, but also allows one to separate processes that 
are “locked” to either stimulus- or response-onset.  For example, it is likely that the 
“perceptual” effect seen in the fMRI data occurs at a consistent time after stimulus-
onset, whereas the “S-R learning” effect may vary in time in relation to stimulus-
onset, but occur at a consistent time prior to response-onset.  Such response-locked 
analyses are also appropriate as they control for RT differences (i.e., priming) across 
conditions that may affect stimulus-locked analyses.  For example, an event-related 
potential (ERP) component relating to response preparation and/or execution would 
occur earlier for trials with shorter RTs.  As such, ERP “repetition” effects in 
stimulus-locked analyses may reflect the earlier onset of such response processes, 
rather than a change in magnitude of the same ERP component.   
In the present chapter I present the results of an EEG experiment using the 
same design used in the fMRI study of Chapter 5.  Specifically, I asked (1) can I see 
differential “perceptual” and “S-R learning” effects as in the fMRI data, (2) are these 
effects temporally dissociated (either in terms of latency relative to stimulus onset, or 
in terms of being stimulus-locked versus response-locked) and (3) are the topographic 
distributions of these effects qualitatively different (i.e., suggesting that their 
underlying neural generators are distinct)?   
Previous EEG research has shown repetition-related changes to ERPs in visual 
object classification experiments similar to the present paradigm (e.g., Guillaume et 
al., 2009; Henson et al., 2004; Schendan & Kutas, 2003).  For example, Henson et al. 
(2004) produced evidence for ERP long-lag repetition effects between 200-300ms and 
400-600ms post-stimulus onset (albeit using shorter lags than the present paradigm).  
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This latter time-window in particular was characterised by increased positivity 
(relative to a mastoid reference) for repeated stimuli that was maximal over central 
electrodes.  Repetition-related changes in induced responses have also been shown, 
with repetition resulting in a decrease in power in the gamma frequency band (i.e., 
>20Hz) between 200 and 400ms (e.g., Gruber & Muller, 2002, 2006).  The authors 
suggested that these changes in induced gamma were a potential correlate of the same 
neural mechanism that produces the BOLD RS effect, as measured by fMRI.  Finally, 
a recent MEG study has suggested that stimulus repetition can lead to changes in 
synchrony between frontal and temporal sources (Ghuman, Bar, Dobbins & Schnyer, 
2008).  These authors saw an increase in phase synchrony in the beta frequency band 
(i.e., 10-30Hz) between frontal and temporal sources occurring between 200 and 
250ms, as well as a decrease in neural activity within these sources between 300 and 
400ms.  
Although these studies have presented evidence for changes in ERPs, induced 
gamma responses and phase synchrony following repetition of visual object stimuli, 
such effects have been primarily attributed to the facilitation of particular perceptual 
and/or conceptual component processes.  Indeed, some of these studies failed to 
suitably control for S-R contributions, and as such any effects seen may have been 
driven by the repetition of particular S-R bindings (e.g., Ghuman et al., 2008).  Using 
the present experimental design, I was able to assess directly whether the repetition-
related (ERP) changes seen in previous studies were a result of the facilitation of 
specific component processes, in which case they should be robust to changes in 
response between presentations, or were a result of the retrieval and repetition of an S-
R binding, in which case they should be sensitive to changes in response between 
presentations. 
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6.1 Experiment 11 
 
6.1.1 Method 
 
Apart from the following exceptions, Experiment 11 was identical to Experiment 10 
in Chapter 5. 
6.1.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (8 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  
The mean age across participants was 23.5 years (σ = 4.0).  By self-report, all 
participants were right-handed. 
6.1.1.2 Procedure 
The trial sequence was as follows.  A central fixation cross was presented for 500ms, 
followed by a stimulus for 1000ms, followed by another fixation cross for 500ms.  At 
the end of each trial a circle was presented centrally for a varied time between 750ms 
and 1250ms, with a mean of 1000ms.  Participants were instructed to keep blinks to a 
minimum, however if a blink was necessary to wait till the presentation of the central 
circle (i.e., the end of the trial).  The mean time per trial was 3000ms. 
6.1.1.3 EEG acquisition 
EEG was recorded in a magnetically shielded room from 70 electrodes placed within 
an elastic cap (EASYCAP GmbH, Herrching-Breitbrunn, Germany) according to the 
extended 10-10 system, using a nose electrode as the recording reference and also 
bipolar electrodes to measure the vertical and horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG).  
All data were sampled at 1kHz with a band-pass filter from 0.03-330Hz.  Although 
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simultaneous magnetoencephalographic data was recorded with a VectorView system 
(Elekta-Neuromag, Helsinki, Finland), these data are not reported in the present 
chapter. 
6.1.1.4 ERP analysis 
Analyses were conducted using SPM5 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) as well as 
using custom-made scripts within MATLAB (The Mathworks Inc., MA, USA).  The 
continuous EEG data from each Test session were downsampled to 100Hz and band-
pass filtered between 1 and 40Hz in both forward and backward directions using a 5th-
order Butterworth digital filter.  These data were epoched in two ways: (1) from -
100ms to 800ms relative to stimulus onset (and baseline-corrected from -100ms to 
0ms), and (2) from -300 to 200ms relative to response onset (and baseline-corrected 
from -300ms to -200ms). Epochs in which the signal from any channel, including 
EOG, exceeded 150μV were removed (median number of trials = 8; range = 0-84).  
Channels were removed if the proportion of rejected trials within a channel exceeded 
20% of the total number of trials (median number of channels removed = 1; range = 
0-3).  The data were then averaged across trials within each condition, and re-
referenced to the average across all remaining channels. For purposes of later 
statistics, 57 EEG channels remained that were not bad in any subject.   
6.1.1.5 Space x Time SPM analysis 
Given I had few a priori predictions regarding when (within an epoch) and where 
(over sensors) repetition effects would be present, particularly for the response 
congruency manipulation, I adopted a mass univariate approach in which F-tests were 
performed at every point in a 3D image of channel space and time.  The 2D channel 
space was created by a spherical projection of the standardised Easycap channel 
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locations onto a plane, followed by a linear interpolation to a 32x32 pixel grid.  The 
time dimension consisted of the 91 (stimulus-locked analysis) or 51 (response-locked 
analysis) 10ms samples in each epoch.  In line with the analyses of Experiments 9 and 
10, four specific contrasts were tested: (1) Picture-Picture repetition effects (Picture-
Picture minus Novel), (2) Word-Picture repetition effects (Word-Picture minus 
Novel), (3) Picture-Picture repetition effects that interact with response congruency 
((Picture-Picture Congruent – Novel Congruent) – (Picture-Picture Incongruent – 
Novel Incongruent)) and (4) Word-Picture repetition effects that interact with 
response congruency ((Word-Picture Congruent – Novel Congruent) – (Word-Picture 
Incongruent – Novel Incongruent)).  Each contrast was performed within a general 
linear model (GLM) using a pooled error over the 6 conditions, with nonsphericity 
across conditions estimated using Restricted Maximal Likelihood.  The resulting 
statistical parametric maps (SPMs) were corrected for multiple comparisons using 
Random Field Theory.  Effects were first height thresholded at p<.001 uncorrected 
and are reported if they survived subsequent correction at either the voxel or cluster 
level with alpha set at .05.  
6.1.1.6 Time window analysis 
I next identified specific time-windows of interest based on the above SPM analyses.  
For the stimulus-locked analysis I identified two time-windows: (1) between 400-
500ms and (2) between 500-600ms. For the response-locked analyses I identified one 
time-window, between -200 and -100ms (i.e., from 200-100ms prior to response 
onset).  For each time-window I performed ANOVAs on the mean amplitude, 
compared to the mean pre-stimulus baseline, with the factors of Stimulus-type and 
Congruency as well as a further factor of Channel. 
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6.1.2 Results 
6.1.2.1 Behavioural results 
 
After excluding 6% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown in 
Table 6.1.  Analyses of errors revealed a significant increase in errors for repeated 
than novel items (in the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions) for Incongruent 
trials only (see Appendix A-11).  Thus the retrieval of an incongruent S-R binding 
resulted in participants producing more errors, irrespective of whether the item was 
previously seen as a picture or a word. 
 
Table 6.1.  Mean percentage errors, error priming, reaction times (RTs), RT priming and proportional 
priming (Prop. Priming) (plus standard deviations) across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-
Picture, Novel) and Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) for Experiment 11. 
 
  A further 12% of repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to 
incorrect responses given at Study.  Table 6.1 displays mean RTs, while Figure 6.1 
shows priming (Novel-Repeated) of RTs across all conditions.  Inspection of Figure 
6.1 shows the only positive priming effect was seen in the Picture-Picture Congruent 
condition, though there was a trend in the Word-Picture Congruent condition.  
Interestingly, the Word-Picture Incongruent condition shows a significant slowing of 
RTs relative to novel items (i.e., negative priming), with a trend in the Picture-Picture 
Stimulus-type / Picture-Picture Word-Picture Novel 
Congruency Con Incon Con Incon Con Incon 
       
% Errors 5.4 (3.8) 17.6 (7.2) 5.4 (3.7) 14.1 (6.2) 6.3 (5.7) 9.8 (7.8) 
Error Priming 1.0 (6.0) -7.8 (9.8) 1.0 (4.3) -4.3 (8.7)   
       
RTs 678 (65) 811 (90) 734 (82) 826 (97) 749 (81) 802 (101) 
RT Priming 70 (41) -8 (36) 15 (42) -24 (37)   
RT Prop. Priming .09 (.05) -.01 (.04) .02 (.05) -.03 (.04)   
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Incongruent condition.  A 3x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency) ANOVA revealed a 
significant Stimulus-type x Congruency interaction, F(2.0, 33.3) = 16.75, p<.001 (as 
well as main effects of Stimulus-type, F(1.9, 31.5) = 23.04, p<.001, and Congruency, 
F(1, 17) = 146.74, p<.001). 
As in Experiments 9 and 10, I broke this Stimulus-type x Congruency 
interaction down into two separate 2x2 (Repetition x Congruency) ANOVAs 
comparing (1) the Picture-Picture condition with the Novel condition and (2) the 
Word-Picture condition with the Novel condition.  This allowed me to assess priming 
for each Stimulus-type separately across Congruency.    The Picture-Picture analysis 
revealed a significant Repetition x Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 34.08, p<.001.  
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, this interaction reflected reliable positive priming in the 
Congruent Picture-Picture condition, coupled with a trend for negative priming in the 
Incongruent Picture-Picture condition.  
The Word-Picture analysis also revealed a significant Repetition x 
Congruency interaction, F(1, 17) = 6.94, p<.05.  As can be seen in Figure 6.1, this 
interaction reflected a trend for positive priming in the Congruent Word-Picture 
condition, coupled with significant negative priming in the Incongruent Word-Picture 
condition.  These results therefore mirror those of Experiments 9 and 10, in that I saw 
a decrease in priming for Incongruent than Congruent trials in both the Picture-Picture 
and Word-Picture analyses.  A t-test comparing the difference in priming between 
Congruent and Incongruent trials across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
conditions revealed that this congruency effect was greater in the Picture-Picture 
condition, t(17) = 3.19, p<.01.  Thus the retrieval of S-R bindings led to a greater 
difference in priming between Congruent and Incongruent trials in the Picture-Picture 
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than Word-Picture condition.  These results mirror those of Experiment 9, suggesting 
that S-R bindings can form at two distinct levels of stimulus representation. 
 
Figure 6.1.  Mean repetition priming (Novel-Repeated) across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture and 
Word-Picture) and Congruency (Congruent and Incongruent) in Experiment 11.  Error bars represent 
95% two-tailed confidence intervals of priming effect.  *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05. 
 
 
6.1.2.2 Analysis across Experiments 9-11 
 
Note that the behavioural results of Experiments 9, 10 and 11 do not appear entirely 
consistent.  I saw a difference in the magnitude of the Repetition x Congruency effect 
between the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions in Experiment 9 and the 
present experiment.  On the other hand, Experiment 10 failed to reveal any difference 
in the magnitude of this effect.  In other words, the S-R learning effect in Experiment 
10 was equivalent across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions.  To address 
this inconsistency, I entered the results of Experiments 9, 10 and 11 into a 2x3 
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(Picture-Picture S-R effect, Word-Picture S-R effect x Experiment) mixed ANOVA 
(collapsing the results of Experiment 9 across Prime-level).  If a consistent difference 
is present between the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture S-R effect, I should see a 
significant main effect of this factor that does not interact with experiment.  This 
analysis revealed a main effect of Picture-Picture vs. Word-Picture S-R effect, F(1, 
49) = 8.82, p<.01, that did not significantly interact with the between-subjects 
Experiment factor, F(2, 49) = 2.26, p=.15.  Thus, across Experiments 9, 10 and 11, the 
S-R effect (i.e., greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent trials) in the Picture-
Picture condition was greater than in the Word-Picture condition.  This analysis 
therefore supports the conclusion drawn in Chapter 4, that S-R bindings can form at 
multiple levels of stimulus representations. 
 
6.1.2.3 EEG results 
 
For the subsequent EEG results, I adopted the same approach used in the behavioural 
analyses (as introduced in Experiments 9 and 10).  For each Stimulus-type (i.e., 
Picture-Picture and Word-Picture), I searched for effects of Repetition, collapsed 
across Congruency, followed by a search for Repetition x Congruency effects.  Thus, 
each Stimulus-type is compared separately to the same Novel baseline condition.  
This approach of analysing the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions 
separately was supported by the above inter-experimental analysis, suggesting that S-
R effects in the Picture-Picture condition are greater than in the Word-Picture 
condition. 
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Figure 6.2.  Unthresholded space-time Statistical Parametric Map (SPM) F-tests for (A) the main effect 
of Repetition in the Picture-Picture stimulus-locked analysis, with the crosshair located on the parietal 
maximum at 500ms, (B) the main effect of Repetition in the Word-Picture stimulus-locked analysis, 
with the crosshair located on the centroparietal maximum at 540ms, (C) the Repetition x Congruency 
interaction in the Picture-Picture stimulus-locked analysis, with the crosshair located on the parietal 
maximum at 550ms and (D) the Repetition x Congruency interaction in the Picture-Picture response-
locked analysis, with the crosshair located on the left posterior maximum at 150ms prior to response 
onset.  The three images in each panel represent the orthogonal planes (y-t, x-t, x-y) through the 3D 
image at the location of the crosshair.  Colour-maps show F-values from (A) 0-70 and (B-D) 0-20. 
 
 
 
6.1.2.3.1 Space x Time SPMs 
6.1.2.3.1.1 Stimulus-locked analyses 
 
I first looked for a significant Picture-Picture repetition effect (Picture-Picture minus 
Novel, collapsed across Congruency) in the EEG data.  This revealed a significant 
effect extending from approximately 400-600ms, with two clusters over frontal and 
parietal electrodes respectively (Figure 6.2-A). These clusters are likely to be 
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reflections of the same effect, but simply of opposite polarity relative to the average 
reference (see ahead to Figure 6.3).  The Word-Picture condition revealed a repetition 
effect over similar centroparietal electrodes, onsetting somewhat later, and extending 
from approximately 520-560ms (Figure 6.2-B).  I next looked for a significant 
interaction between repetition, in both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition, 
and Congruency.  The only effect to survive correction was for the Picture-Picture 
condition, extending from 540-560ms over parietal electrodes (Figure 6.2-C).  The 
stimulus-locked analyses therefore revealed three effects: (1) a Picture-Picture 
repetition effect onsetting around 400ms, (2) a Word-Picture repetition effect 
onsetting around 520ms and (3) a Picture-Picture Repetition x Congruency effect 
onsetting around 540ms.   
 
6.1.2.3.1.2 Response-locked analyses 
 
I next performed the same four contrasts on the response-locked epochs.  Note that 
this analysis is only concerned with the 200ms prior to response onset (i.e., from -200 
to 0ms).  This analysis controls for differences between RTs across conditions (e.g., 
relating to priming), revealing possible effects that are time-locked to response-onset 
as opposed to stimulus-onset.  Firstly, the EEG data revealed a significant deflection 
in the Picture-Picture relative to Novel condition over left posterior sensors extending 
from -160 to -105ms.  This effect however looked to be driven primarily by the 
Picture-Picture Congruent condition, as shown by a significant interaction between 
Picture-Picture repetition and Congruency over similar sensors extending from -170 
to -110ms (Figure 6.2-D).  The Word-Picture analysis failed to reveal any significant 
effects that survived correction for multiple comparisons.  The response-locked 
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analyses therefore revealed a significant Repetition x Congruency interaction in the 
Picture-Picture analysis, onsetting approximately 170ms prior to the key press. 
 
6.1.2.3.2 Time-window analyses 
 
Whereas the mass univariate SPM analysis is appropriate for localising effects in 
space and time, the multiple comparisons problem means that it may not be as 
sensitive to effects that are widely distributed over space and time. Therefore I 
performed additional analyses that averaged over time, within windows informed by 
the SPM results (that are corrected for multiple comparisons over time). In these time-
window analyses, channels were also included as a factor in an ANOVA (rather than 
tested separately). Note that main effects of channel in these ANOVAs are not of 
interest; nor are main effects of condition (because their referencing to the average 
channel means that the mean over channels for each condition and time-point is zero); 
the main interest is in interactions between conditions and channels.  
 
6.1.2.3.2.1 Stimulus-locked analyses 
 
The space x time SPM analyses revealed several effects between 400 and 600ms: (1) 
a Picture-Picture repetition effect onsetting around 400ms, (2) a Word-Picture 
repetition effect onsetting around 520ms and (3) a Picture-Picture repetition x 
Congruency interaction onsetting around 540ms.  In light of these possible latency 
differences, I extracted two time-windows for further analyses: (1) between 400-
500ms and (2) between 500-600ms.  Averaging across samples within these time-
windows, I conducted 2 x 2 x 57 (Repetition x Congruency x Channel) ANOVAs 
(with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for nonsphericity), where 57 relates to the total 
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number of remaining EEG channels (see Methods).  Separate ANOVAs were 
conducted for both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition (against the Novel 
condition) for each sensor type.   
 
 
Figure 6.3.  Picture-Picture stimulus-locked repetition effect.  (A) Scalp topography of the global 
repetition effect from 400-500ms with peak channel (POZ) circled; (B) Amplitude difference between 
Repeated and Novel trials across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-Picture) and Congruency 
(Congruent, Incongruent) for peak channel; (C) ERPs for Picture-Picture Repeated vs. Novel across 
Congruency for peak channel with 400-500ms time-window shaded in gray; (D) ERPs for Word-
Picture Repeated vs. Novel across Congruency for peak channel with 400-500ms time-window shaded 
in gray.  Error bars in (B) represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed); *** p<.001. 
 
Firstly, in the 400-500ms time-window, the Picture-Picture analysis revealed a 
significant Repetition x Channel interaction, F(3.8, 64.8) = 24.34, p<.001, with no 
other interaction with Channel approaching significance, F’s<2.0, p’s>.11.  The 
Word-Picture analysis in this time-window failed to show a reliable Repetition x 
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Channel interaction, F(3.2, 55.1) = 2.21, p=.09.  Indeed, when comparing the 
repetition effects across Stimulus-type in a 2 x 57 (Picture-Picture repetition effects 
vs. Word-Picture repetition effects x Channel) ANOVA, a significant main effect of 
P-P vs. W-P repetition effect was present, F(1, 17) = 33.77, p<.001.  Therefore the 
magnitude of the repetition effect in the Picture-Picture condition was greater than in 
the Word-Picture condition. Inspection of Figure 6.3 reveals this effect reflects a 
positivity over parietal electrodes, in line with the SPM analysis that defined this 
time-window.  The peak channel (POZ) shows a positive deflection for Picture-
Picture vs. Novel trials irrespective of Congruency, an effect that is not present in the 
Word-Picture condition.  Thus, this repetition effect is specific to the repetition of the 
same visual stimulus between presentations and is robust to switches in response 
between presentations. 
 
In the 500-600ms time-window the Picture-Picture analysis revealed a 
significant Repetition x Congruency x Channel interaction, F(3.6, 61.2) = 3.71, p<.05 
(as well as Repetition x Channel, F(3.8, 65.0) = 14.10, p<.001, and Congruency x 
Channel, F(3.4, 58.0) = 5.55, p<.001, interactions).  The Word-Picture analysis 
revealed a significant Repetition x Channel interaction, F(2.9, 48.5) = 5.08, p<.01, in 
this same time-window.  Thus, repetition effects were present in the 500-600ms time-
window for both the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture condition.  Inspection of 
Figure 6.4 reveals the Word-Picture repetition effect reflects a positivity over central 
electrodes.  The peak channel (CPZ) shows a positive deflection for Picture-Picture 
and Word-Picture vs. Novel trials.  Although the Word-Picture repetition effect is not 
modulated by Congruency, the Picture-Picture condition shows a greater repetition 
effect for Congruent than Incongruent trials.  The 500-600ms time-window may 
therefore be showing two separate effects: (1) a Word-Picture repetition effect and (2) 
Chapter 6: S-R learning, repetition and event-related potentials: an EEG study 
 
 154
a Picture-Picture repetition x congruency effect.  Regardless of whether these effects 
have differing topographies, the 500-600ms time-window suggests that ERP 
repetition effects can be seen when switching from a word to a picture between 
presentations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4.  Word-Picture stimulus-locked repetition effect.  (A) Scalp topography of the global 
repetition effect from 500-600ms with peak channel (CPZ) circled; (B) Amplitude difference between 
Repeated and Novel trials across Stimulus-type (Picture-Picture, Word-Picture) and Congruency 
(Congruent, Incongruent) for peak channel; (C) ERPs for Picture-Picture Repeated vs. Novel across 
Congruency for peak channel with 500-600ms time-window shaded in gray; (D) ERPs for Word-Picture 
Repeated vs. Novel across Congruency for peak channel with 500-600ms time-window shaded in gray.  
Error bars in (B) represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed); *** p<.001; ** p<.01. 
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The stimulus-locked analyses therefore revealed three possibly distinct effects: 
(1) a Picture-Picture repetition effect in the earlier 400-500ms time-window (that did 
not interact with Congruency), (2) a Word-Picture repetition effect in the later 500-
600ms time-window (that did not interact with Congruency) and (3) a Picture-Picture 
repetition x congruency interaction in the later 500-600ms time-window.  The issue of 
whether these effects have qualitatively distinct topographies, and thus have plausibly 
differing underlying neural generators, is addressed later. 
 
6.1.2.3.2.2 Response-locked analyses 
 
The space x time SPM analyses revealed a significant Picture-Picture repetition x 
Congruency effect between 200-100ms prior to response onset.  Taking this time-
window, I conducted the same ANOVAs as in the stimulus-locked analyses for the 
Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions separately.  Firstly, the Picture-Picture 
analysis revealed a significant Repetition x Congruency x Channel interaction, F(3.2, 
54.4) = 3.95, p<.05 (as well as significant Repetition x Channel, F(3.5, 58.6) = 2.71, 
p<.05, and Congruency x Channel, F(4.2, 71.6) = 6.02, p<.001, interactions).  
Although the Word-Picture condition revealed a significant Congruency x Channel 
interaction, F(3.8, 63.7) = 4.05, p<.01, the Repetition x Congruency x Channel 
interaction failed to reached significance, F(4.2, 70.9) = .84, p=.51.  Inspection of 
Figure 6.5 reveals the Picture-Picture Repetition x Congruency effect reflects a 
posterior negativity (and frontal positivity) that is maximal over left posterior 
channels (PO7). The pattern on this channel seems to reflect a negative repetition 
effect for Picture-Picture Incongruent trials that is not present for Congruent trials.  
Interestingly, this negative repetition effect for Incongruent trials was also present in 
the Word-Picture condition, despite failing to reveal a significant Repetition x 
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Congruency x Channel interaction in the Word-Picture analysis.  Thus, analysis of the 
peak sensor (as defined by the Picture-Picture repetition x congruency interaction) 
suggests that this congruency effect can also be seen (albeit reduced) in the Word-
Picture condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5.  Picture-Picture Repetition x Congruency response-locked effect.  (A) Scalp topography of 
the global repetition x Congruency effect from 200-100ms prior to response-onset with peak channel 
(PO7) circled; (B) Amplitude difference between Repeated and Novel trials across Stimulus-type 
(Picture-Picture, Word-Picture) and Congruency (Congruent, Incongruent) for peak channel; (C) ERPs 
for Picture-Picture Repeated vs. Novel across Congruency for peak channel with 200-100ms time-
window shaded in gray; (D) ERPs for Word-Picture Repeated vs. Novel across Congruency for peak 
channel with 200-100ms time-window shaded in gray.  Time-point zero = response-onset.  Error bars in 
(B) represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed); ** p<.01; * p<.05. 
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6.1.2.3.3 EOG analyses 
 
Finally, analyses were conducted on the vertical and hortizontal EOG channels to rule 
out eye-movements as a cause for the above ERP effects.  Separate 2 x 2 (Repetition x 
Congruency) ANOVAs were conducted separately for the Picture-Picture and Word-
Picture conditions for VEOG and HEOG in each time-window.  The only effect to 
reach significance in these analysis was a main effect of Congruency in the 400-
500ms time-window for the VEOG Picture-Picture analysis, F(1, 17) = 10.64, p<.01.  
Given no effect of Congruency was present in this time-window in the ERP analyses, 
this is unlikely to have affected the present results.  No further main effects or 
interactions were seen across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture analyses in VEOG 
and HEOG across the three main time-windows of interest, F’s<4.2, p’s>.06.  Thus, 
eye-movement artefacts are unlikely to have contributed to the above ERP effects. 
 
6.1.2.3.4 Effect x Channel analyses 
 
The ANOVA analyses revealed several interesting effects.  In the stimulus-locked 
analyses I saw: (1) a Picture-Picture repetition effect in the 400-500ms time-window, 
(2) a Word-Picture repetition effect in the 500-600ms time-window and (3) a Picture-
Picture repetition x Congruency interaction in the 500-600ms time-window.  I also 
saw a Picture-Picture repetition x Congruency interaction in the response-locked time-
window from 200-100ms prior to response onset.  To see whether there was evidence 
for different underlying generators in the brain, I tested for differences in scalp 
topographies using separate ANOVAs comparing 2 “effects” x 57 channels, after 
normalizing amplitude differences across effects to the mean min-max range over 
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sites and participants (McCarthy & Wood, 1985;  note that this scaling does not suffer 
the problems of RMS scaling that are discussed by Urbach & Kutas, 2002).  I used the 
response-locked rather than stimulus locked congruency x condition interaction, given 
that it was more reliable and less contaminated by motor differences relating to 
different RTs (see Introduction). 
I therefore conducted three separate ANOVAs comparing: (1) the Picture-
Picture repetition effect in the 400-500ms time-window from the stimulus-locked 
analysis with the Word-Picture repetition effect in the 500-600ms time-window for 
the stimulus-locked analysis, (2) the same Picture-Picture repetition effect with the 
Picture-Picture repetition x Congruency effect in the -200 to -100ms time-window 
from the response-locked analysis and (3) the same Word-Picture repetition effect 
with the response-locked Picture-Picture repetition x Congruency effect1.  Significant 
Effect x Channel interactions were seen for the Picture-Picture vs. Word-Picture 
repetition effect analysis, F(4.1, 69.5) = 8.26, p<.001, the Picture-Picture repetition 
effect vs. Picture-Picture repetition x Congruency effect analysis, F(4.0, 68.7) = 
22.46, p<.001, and the Word-Picture repetition effect x Picture-Picture repetition x 
Congruency effect analysis, F(3.6, 60.5) = 7.21, p<.001.  As can be seen from Figures 
6.2-6.4, the Picture-Picture 400-500ms repetition effect was maximal over parietal 
and frontal electrodes, the Word-Picture 500-600ms repetition effect was maximal 
over central and frontal electrodes and the Picture-Picture -200 to -100 repetition x 
congruency effect was maximal over left posterior and right frontal electrodes.  These 
                                                          
1 Analyses with the Picture-Picture repetition x Congruency effect in the 500-600ms time-window for 
the stimulus-locked analysis revealed similar dissociations with the stimulus-locked Picture-Picture and 
Word-Picture repetition effect.  All three effects were also topographically distinct if a standard 400-
600ms time-window for the stimulus-locked analysis was used (i.e., using the same time-window for 
all three effects).  Finally, the 400-500ms stimulus-locked Picture-Picture repetition effect, F(3.4, 57.6) 
= 4.81, p<.01, and 500-600ms stimulus-locked Word-Picture repetition effect, F(3.4, 58.3) = 5.13, 
p<.01, showed distinct topographies from the -200 to -100ms response-locked Picture-Picture 
Incongruent repetition effect (i.e., when comparing across repetition effects as opposed to comparing a 
repetition effect with a repetition x congruency interaction). 
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analyses revealed that these topographies are qualitatively distinct, suggesting (though 
not conclusively; Urbach & Kutas, 2002) that the above ERP effects have distinct 
underlying neural generators (in line with the fMRI results from Chapter 5). 
 
6.2 General Discussion 
 
The EEG data revealed several temporally and spatially distinct effects.  Specifically, 
I saw (1) a Picture-Picture repetition effect onsetting around 400ms, (2) a Word-
Picture repetition effect onsetting around 520ms and (3) a Picture-Picture repetition x 
Congruency effect onsetting around 540ms in the stimulus-locked analysis and 
onsetting around -170ms in the response-locked analysis.  As well as demonstrating 
possibly distinct temporal profiles, the three effects were shown to have significantly 
distinct topographies suggesting that each effect has distinct neural generators.  Thus, 
the EEG data confirmed the results of the fMRI data in Chapter 5.  Although S-R 
contributions were present, effects plausibly relating to the facilitation of component 
processes were also present.  Moreover, these effects were present prior to response-
onset and are not therefore attributable to post-decision processes such as a reduction 
in attention to a visual stimulus after a decision has been made (see Discussion – 
Chapter 5). 
 
6.2.1 Stimulus-locked effects 
 
The repetition effects seen in the stimulus-locked analyses between 400-600ms over 
centroparietal and frontal electrodes have been seen in previous studies (e.g., 
Guillaume et al., 2009; Henson et al., 2004; Schendan & Kutas, 2003).  Although the 
repetition effects in these studies may not have been contaminated by S-R 
contributions, they did not directly manipulate response congruency between 
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presentations.  In the present experiment, the Picture-Picture repetition effect between 
400-500ms and the Word-Picture repetition effect between 500-600ms were not 
significantly modulated by response congruency.  Thus, these effects are not readily 
attributable to the retrieval of S-R bindings.   
It is noteworthy that the fMRI experiment presented in Chapter 5 failed to find 
a Word-Picture repetition effect.  This is at odds with the present experiment that 
found a significant Word-Picture repetition effect in the stimulus-locked analyses.  
Although I found no evidence for a RS effect when switching from words to pictures 
in the fMRI experiment, previous research has suggested that RS effects in prefrontal 
and occipital/temporal regions can be seen when switching between object exemplars 
(Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2002) or even between 
words and pictures (Horner & Henson, submitted).  Thus, the failure to find a 
significant Word-Picture repetition effect in the fMRI data of Chapter 5 may simply 
have been a Type II error.  Another possibility is that these previous fMRI studies 
failed to suitably control of S-R learning contributions, however it is unclear how this 
argument relates to the RS previously seen in occipital/temporal regions given such 
effects have been shown to be robust to switches in response/task between 
presentations (Experiment 10 in Chapter 5; Horner & Henson, 2008; Race et al., 
2009). 
 
6.2.1.1 Facilitation of component processes? 
 
One possibility is that these stimulus-locked repetition effects reflect the facilitation of 
particular component processes that are engaged at both Study and Test.  As the 400-
500ms effect was present only in the Picture-Picture analysis, this effect would seem 
to be specific to the repetition of the same visual stimulus.  As such, this effect is 
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likely to reflect the facilitation of specific perceptual (e.g., object recognition) 
processes.  The 500-600ms effect was present when stimuli at Test were previously 
seen as words.  Thus, this effect would seem to occur regardless of visual similarity 
between presentations and plausibly reflects the facilitation of conceptual processes 
relating to the retrieval of task-relevant semantic and/or phonological/lexical 
information.  Note that the different topographies of the Picture-Picture and Word-
Picture repetition effects suggests that they do not simply reflect facilitation of the 
same component process (e.g., access to conceptual information) that simply occurs 
earlier when Pictures are repeated at Test. Such an explanation would fit with the 
notion that component processes are engaged in a serial feed-forward manner, with 
the engagement of perceptual processes involved in stimulus identification occurring 
prior to the engagement of conceptual processes involved in the extraction of task-
relevant semantic information. 
One issue with this proposal is the latency of the current repetition effects.  
The present experiment failed to provide evidence for repetition effects occurring 
within 400ms of stimulus-onset.  In particular, no effects were seen for the so-called 
N170 component, a posterior negativity that is typically seen between 150 and 200ms 
post stimulus-onset.  While the present results accord with the long-lag results of 
Henson et al. (2004), repetition has recently been shown to modulate these earlier 
components even within a long-lag Study-Test paradigm (Guillaume et al., 2009).  It 
is this early pre-200ms effect that has been proposed as a marker of perceptual 
processes involved in both object (Guillaume et al., 2009) and face (e.g., Bentin, 
Allison, Puce, Perez & McCarthy, 1996; Eimer & Holmes, 2007) identification.  
Given these data, it is unclear why I should see “perceptual” repetition effects 
relatively late in the epoch.  One possibility is that these late effects are the result of 
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feedback from cortical regions further along the processing stream.  This conception 
accords with recent evidence suggesting that repetition effects in occipital/temporal 
ventral visual regions result from feedback projections from regions in the prefrontal 
cortex (Ghuman et al., 2008).  Indeed, when inferior prefrontal regions were targeted 
using TMS during the Study phase of a visual object priming experiment, repetition 
effects (i.e., RS as measured by fMRI) at Test were reduced in both prefrontal and 
occipital/temporal regions (Wig, Grafton, Demos & Kelley, 2005).  Thus, repetition 
effects plausibly relating to the facilitation of particular perceptual and/or conceptual 
processes would seem to result from feed-back from frontal to occipital/temporal 
regions.  Although the present sensor-level analysis cannot confirm the cortical 
regions that underlie the present repetition effects, the relatively longer latencies of 
such effects fit with this conception. 
 
6.2.1.2 Explicit memory retrieval? 
 
Although the above account is plausible, it does not explain why no perceptual and/or 
conceptual effects were seen in the RT priming data.  Here the data were fully 
explicable in terms of the retrieval of S-R bindings, with no effects that were 
unequivocally a result of CP facilitation.  The present stimulus-locked repetition 
effects may therefore be incidental to behavioural priming, possibly reflecting the 
conscious recollection of a previous stimulus encounter.  In other words, these effects 
may not be driving the RT differences seen between conditions.  With this in mind, it 
is noteworthy that repetition effects have been shown at similar latencies and 
electrodes in the context of direct “explicit” memory tasks (see Rugg & Curran, 2007 
for a review).  Furthermore, regions associated with explicit memory retrieval (e.g., 
precuneus) showed repetition-related increases during the Test phase of fMRI studies 
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similar to the present experiment (e.g., Horner & Henson, 2008).  Given participants 
were often aware of stimulus repetition throughout the experiment, such conscious 
recollection was indeed likely.   
This proposal however does not readily explain the two distinct repetition 
effects seen in the stimulus-locked analyses – for the Picture-Picture condition 
between 400-500ms and the Word-Picture condition between 500-600ms.  If such 
effects were simply a result of incidental memory retrieval it is unclear why two 
temporally and spatially distinct effects should be present.  One could of course 
propose that the earlier effect reflected incidental retrieval of information relating to 
the perceptual characteristics of the stimulus, whereas the later effect reflected 
retrieval of semantic information.  If one were to pursue such an argument however it 
is unclear why this account is a more parsimonious explanation than the component 
process view.  One way to address this issue would be to source localise the stimulus-
locked repetition effects.  If such localisation were to fit with the results from the 
fMRI experiment in Chapter 5, for instance localising these effects within 
occipital/temporal regions, this could be taken as evidence against the proposed 
incidental explicit retrieval account. 
 
6.2.2 Response-locked effect 
 
In the response-locked analyses I saw a significant interaction between repetition and 
congruency in the Picture-Picture condition.  This effect was characterised by a 
posterior negativity (and a frontal positivity) for Repeated Incongruent trials occurring 
between 200-100ms prior to response-onset and was maximal over left posterior 
sensors.  Importantly, this response-locked effect cannot be attributable to RT 
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differences between conditions (i.e., priming), a statement that cannot be made in 
relation to the stimulus-locked repetition x congruency effect. 
Interestingly, the peak sensor identified in the Picture-Picture analysis showed 
a similar (albeit reduced) negative deflection for Incongruent trials in the Word-
Picture condition (although I note this effect was not significant in the main SPM and 
ANOVA analyses).  This suggests that the S-R effect in this response-locked analysis 
was not specific to the repetition of the same visual stimulus between presentations, a 
finding that fits with the behavioural results of the present experiment.  Thus, this 
effect is most readily attributable to the retrieval of a previously encoded S-R binding.  
Interestingly, this effect was primarily driven by Repeated Incongruent trials.  This is 
at odds with the behavioural and fMRI data that principally showed differences 
between Repeated Congruent vs. Novel trials.  Differences were seen between 
Repeated Incongruent vs. Novel trials in the Word-Picture condition however, 
suggesting that retrieval of an incongruent response can lead to interference.  The 
present response-locked ERP effect is therefore likely to reflect such interference, 
given it was specific to Repeated Incongruent trials.  It remains to be seen whether the 
present response-locked effect localises to the prefrontal regions highlighted in the 
fMRI study in Chapter 5. 
 
6.2.3 Chapter Summary 
 
The present chapter assessed both S-R and CP contributions to repetition-related 
changes in ERPs.  I have presented the results of an EEG experiment that utilised the 
same design as the fMRI experiment in Chapter 5.  Importantly, the use of EEG 
allowed me to identify repetition effects that occurred prior to response-onset.  This 
was not possible in the fMRI experiment given the sluggish nature of the BOLD 
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response.  I indentified three separate ERP effects: (1) a Picture-Picture repetition 
effect between 400-500ms over centroparietal electrodes in the stimulus-locked 
analyses that did not vary as a function of response congruency, (2) a Word-Picture 
repetition effect between 500-600ms over central electrodes in the stimulus-locked 
analyses that did not vary as a function of response congruency and (3) a Picture-
Picture repetition x congruency interaction between -200 to -100ms in the response-
locked analyses.  Importantly, all three effects were shown to have distinct 
topographies, suggesting that they were produced by differing underlying neural 
generators.  These effects were suggested as possible markers of (1) perceptual 
facilitation, (2) conceptual facilitation and (3) retrieval of S-R bindings respectively 
(although alternative explanations were discussed).  Thus, the EEG data presented 
evidence for both S-R and CP contributions to repetition-related ERP changes.  In 
summary, Chapters 5 and 6 have presented evidence for S-R and CP contributions to 
repetition-related changes in neural activity that are temporally and spatially distinct.  
Future research will need to address whether the present ERP effects are a correlate of 
the same neural mechanisms that underpin the RS effects seen in Chapter 5.  In the 
final experimental chapter I turn my attention back to behavioural repetition priming 
and address the final question posed in Chapter 1: is attention necessary for both the 
encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings? 
 166 
Chapter 7 
Is attention necessary for the both the encoding and retrieval of S-R 
bindings? 
 
The role of attention has been studied extensively in relation to repetition priming 
(e.g., Allport, Tipper & Chmiel, 1985; Chiappe & MacLeod, 1995; Fox, 1995; 
Joordens, Betancourt & Spalek, 2006; Lavie & Fox, 2000; MacDonald & Joordens, 
2000; MacDonald, Joordens & Seergobin, 1999; Mackintosh, Mathews & Holden, 
2002; May, Kane & Hasher, 1995; Simone, Ahrens, Foerde & Spinetta, 2006; Tipper 
& Driver, 1988).  The phenomenon of negative priming (Tipper, 1985), in particular, 
has received much attention and has been the cause of much debate (see Fox, 1995; 
May et al., 1995; Tipper, 2001 for reviews).  Here the repetition of a previously 
unattended stimulus can lead to the slowing of RTs compared to an experimentally 
novel stimulus.  The negative priming effect is often thought to reflect the inhibition 
of unattended stimulus representations (Tipper, 1985).  Such inhibition is thought to 
produce carry-over effects from initial to subsequent presentations, resulting in a 
slowing of RTs.  Alternatively, unattended stimuli are tagged with a “do-not-respond” 
code that interferes with response generation on subsequent presentation (Neill, 
1997).   
Again however, a third type of explanation for negative priming has appealed 
to S-R learning (Frings et al., 2007; Rothermund et al., 2005).  According to such 
accounts, the response given to an attended stimulus becomes bound to the critical 
unattended stimulus.  In other words, a response becomes bound to any co-occurring 
stimulus, regardless of attention.  When the unattended stimulus is repeated (and 
attended) negative priming can manifest if the response previously bound to the 
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stimulus is incongruent to the newly generated response.  Note that this makes a clear 
prediction in relation to other theories of negative priming – I should only see a 
slowing of RTs if the response between initial and subsequent presentation is 
incongruent.  Both the inhibition and “tagging” theory of negative priming do not 
predict such specificity (i.e., negative priming should occur regardless of response 
congruency).  In favour of such an account, Rothermund et al. (2005) presented 
adjectives and nouns in either red or green font as primes and participants were 
required to respond to the colour of the word presented (and ignore the meaning of the 
word).  At probe, participants categorised repeated or novel words as either an 
adjective or noun.  Critically, the colour of the prime words was manipulated such 
that repeated words received a congruent or incongruent response between 
presentations.  Although significant positive priming was seen when a stimulus and 
response was repeated, significant negative priming (i.e., a slowing of RTs) was seen 
when a stimulus was repeated but the response was reversed.  The authors attributed 
such negative priming to the retrieval of an S-R binding between the unattended 
stimulus (the word meaning) and the previously generated response. 
These immediate “prime-probe” repetition studies complement the results of 
Hommel (2005), who presented evidence to suggest that Event Files can form in the 
absence of attention, even when a particular stimulus is task-irrelevant.  Here 
participants were required to prepare a right or left key-press response at the 
beginning of each trial, cued by a right or left facing arrow.  This response was 
enacted when a visual stimulus, such as an “X” in the upper half of the screen (S1), 
was presented.  Following a brief delay the same stimulus was repeated (S2) and 
participants were required to respond with a right or left key-press according to the 
stimulus location (e.g., upper or lower half of the screen).  Typically, responses are 
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slower when a stimulus is repeated and a response is reversed between presentations 
(Hommel, 1998).  Importantly, such interference effects were seen despite the 
response at S1 being cued by an auditory tone.  In other words, although a visual 
stimulus is still present at S1, it is no longer task-relevant.  These results again suggest 
that responses can become bound to task-irrelevant unattended stimuli. 
 Although negative priming effects have been recently shown across lags 
similar to the experiments in the present thesis (Grison et al., 2005), the issue of 
whether such effects are due to the binding of a response to an unattended stimulus 
have not presently been explored.  Given these results, I sought evidence for S-R 
effects for unattended stimuli in a long-lag paradigm using semantic classification of 
visual objects.  Given the large S-R effects seen in Experiments 1-11, such a paradigm 
would seem ideal for studying attentional effects on S-R learning.  Using a long-lag 
paradigm is also informative for negative priming in general, as such effects are 
usually examined using immediate repetition (though see Grison et al., 2005).  In the 
present chapter I therefore assessed whether bindings can form between responses (to 
task-relevant attended stimuli) and co-occurring though unattended (task-irrelevant) 
stimuli.  Furthermore, I asked whether previously encoded S-R bindings are 
automatically retrieved when a repeated stimulus is unattended (and task-irrelevant).  
In other words, I tested whether spatial attention is necessary for the encoding and/or 
retrieval of S-R bindings. 
 The designs of Experiments 12-15 are presented in Figure 7.1.  In Experiment 
12, I presented two spatially non-overlapping stimuli at Study and directed 
participants’ attention to a stimulus using an attentional pre-cue.  At Test, a single 
stimulus was presented that was either previously attended, previously unattended or 
novel.  By pairing stimuli at Study with either the same or a different size-
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classification (i.e., bigger/smaller than a shoebox), previously unattended stimuli 
either received a congruent or incongruent response to that made at Study.  In 
Experiment 13, I presented two spatially non-overlapping stimuli at Study and Test in 
order to increase possible stimulus competition at Test, again manipulating response 
congruency for previously unattended stimuli.  In Experiment 14, I presented three 
non-overlapping stimuli at Study and Test.  At Study, participants attended to the two 
flanker stimuli whilst ignoring (though fixating upon) the centrally presented 
stimulus.  At Test, the centrally presented stimulus was attended and was either 
repeated or novel.  The flanker stimuli at Test were all novel.  Here RTs for repeated 
(previously unattended) centrally presented stimuli that received a congruent or 
incongruent response were compared to novel baseline.  None of these studies found 
convincing evidence for the binding of a response to an unattended task-irrelevant 
stimulus.  
  Finally, in Experiment 15 I used a similar three stimulus presentation to 
Experiment 14 at Study and Test.  At Test, I repeated previously attended flankers and 
presented novel central stimuli.  The question was whether the presentation of 
previously attended flankers would result in the automatic retrieval of a previously 
encoded S-R binding and affect processing of the novel attended stimulus.  No 
evidence was found to suggest that previously encoded S-R bindings could be 
retrieved in the absence of attention.  First I focus on whether attention is necessary 
for the encoding of S-R bindings. 
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Figure 7.1. Experimental design of Experiments 12-15.  Experiment 12 presented two stimuli at Study, 
with an attentional precue directing participants’ attention towards the attended stimulus.  At Test, one 
stimulus (Attended, Unattended Congruent, Unattended Incongruent or Novel) was presented centrally.  
Experiment 13 presented two stimuli at Study and Test.  Attended stimuli at Test were previously 
Attended, Unattended Congruent, Unattended Incongruent or Novel.  The Unattended stimulus at Test 
was always novel.  Experiment 14 presented three stimuli at Study and Test.  At Study participants 
attended to the two flanker stimuli whereas at Test participants attended to the central stimulus.  
Attended Test stimuli were previously Unattended Congruent, Unattended Incongruent or Novel.  
Flankers at Test were always novel.  Experiment 15 used the same three stimulus design at Study and 
Test however repeated flankers (i.e., previously attended) rather than the central (i.e., previously 
unattended) stimulus.  Previously seen flankers were either Congruent or Incongruent with the novel 
central attended stimulus.  Note that this figure represents a simplified design of each experiment, as 
each condition had equal numbers of bigger/smaller stimuli. 
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7.1 Experiment 12 
 
Experiment 12 was designed to assess whether responses become bound to all stimuli 
that are present at initial presentation, or whether they only become bound to the task-
relevant attended stimulus.  In order to achieve this I presented two objects 
simultaneously during Study trials, one to the right and one to the left of fixation, with 
attention being cued to one or the other stimulus using an attentional pre-cue.  Given 
participants performed the “bigger-than-shoebox” task on the attended stimulus, I 
could vary the congruency of response between that given to the attended stimulus 
and that which would have been given to the unattended stimulus.  For example, if the 
attended stimulus was “bigger”, then the unattended stimulus could either be “bigger” 
(Congruent) or “smaller” (Incongruent).  I then repeated both attended and unattended 
stimuli at Test in isolation (i.e., one stimulus was presented centrally on each trial) 
using the same “bigger-than-shoebox” task.  This design allowed me to assess priming 
for previously attended stimuli (Attended), previously unattended stimuli that 
received a congruent response between Study and Test (Unattended – Congruent) and 
previously unattended stimuli that received an incongruent response between Study 
and Test (Unattended –  Incongruent).  This design is presented in Figure 7.1.  I was 
particularly interested in whether a difference in priming would be seen between the 
two unattended conditions, given they were unattended and not task-relevant at Study. 
 
7.1.1 Method 
7.1.1.1 Participants 
18 participants (6 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 24.4 years (σ = 6.0).  5 participants reported as 
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being left-handed, the remaining 13 were all right-handed.  One participant was 
excluded from subsequent analyses due to a high error rate (>80%), resulting in a total 
of 17 participants in the main analyses. 
7.1.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were 144 coloured images of simple objects (a subset of the main stimulus set 
used throughout).  50% of the items were classified as “bigger than a shoebox”, the 
other 50% being “smaller than a shoebox”.  Each image was randomly assigned to 
one of 9 groups, so that each group contained equal numbers of each stimulus 
classification.  This resulted in a total of 16 images per group.  6 groups were used for 
the conditions of interest (3x2 – Study-context – Attended, Unattended-Congruent, 
Unattended Incongruent – by Repetition – Repeated, Novel); the remaining 3 groups 
were used as “filler” items at Study. 
7.1.1.3 Procedure 
The Study block consisted of 48 separate trials, with two items presented 
simultaneously per trial.  For each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 600ms, 
followed by the outline of a red square presented either to the right or left of fixation 
(3o from centre) that served as an attentional pre-cue.  200ms after the presentation of 
the attentional cue two differing objects were presented, one to the right and one to 
the left of fixation (3o from centre), one of which was within the still present red 
square.  Subjects were told to respond to the item in the red square, and ignore the 
other object.  Objects were present until a response was given, up to a maximum of 
2000ms, after which the screen was entirely blank.  A total of 2500ms elapsed 
between the presentation of the objects and the start of the next trial, irrespective of 
reaction time.  The Test block consisted of 96 separate trials, which were identical to 
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the single image centre presentation trials used in previous experiments.  Participants 
carried out the same “bigger than a shoebox?” task used in all previous studies during 
both the Study and Test block.  The same outlier criteria as used in all previous 
experiments were used.  Study trials that received an incorrect response were 
additionally discarded. 
 
7.1.2 Results and Discussion 
 
After excluding 5.6% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown 
in Table 7.1.  Analyses of errors are reported in Appendix A-12.  A further 2.1% of 
Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
Study.  The raw RT data, as shown in Table 7.1, were entered into a 3x2 (Study-
context – Attended, Unattended-Congruent, Unattended Incongruent – by Repetition – 
Repeated, Novel) repeated-measures ANOVA, revealing a significant Study-context x 
Repetition interaction, F(1.6, 25.2) = 7.70, p<.01 (as well as a main effect of Study-
context, F(1.9, 29.7) = 21.48, p<.001).  RT priming effects for unattended stimuli are 
shown in Figure 7.2-A.  Paired t-tests on the priming data from each Study-context 
condition revealed significantly greater priming for the Attended than both the 
Unattended-Congruent, t(16) = 2.98, p<.01, and Unattended-Incongruent, t(16) = 
4.05, p<.01, conditions.  Despite a significant effect of priming in the Unattended-
Congruent, t(16) = 2.1, p<.05, but not the Unattended-Incongruent, t(16) = .14, p=.89, 
condition, no significant difference was present between these two conditions, t(16) = 
1.26, p=.23.  Thus, although I was able to produce a significant positive priming 
effect for unattended (congruent) stimuli, I could find no evidence for S-R effects for 
stimuli that were unattended at Study.  In particular, I saw no evidence for negative 
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priming due to an incongruent response being bound to an unattended stimulus at 
Study. 
 
Table 7.1.  Mean RTs, RT priming, proportional priming, percentage errors and error priming (plus 
standard deviations) across Study-context (Attended, Unattended-Congruent, Unattended-Incongruent) 
and Prime-level (Low-primed, High-primed) for Experiments 12-13.  LP = Low-primed; HP = High-
primed; Prop. Priming = Proportional Priming.  High-primed items were not included in Experiment 
12, therefore results are only shown for “Low-primed” for this Experiment.  Note that Experiment 13 
had a single Novel condition against which to compare repeated stimuli (shown above the RT and 
error scores for Experiment 13). 
 
Attended Unattended-Congruent Unattended-Incongruent Conditions: 
LP HP LP HP LP HP 
       
RTs       
  Experiment 12:  
     Repeated 715 (80) 781 (113) 835 (120) 
     Novel 807 (107) 810 (108) 832 (127) 
     Priming 92 (63) 29 (57) -3 (88) 
     Prop. Priming .11 (.07) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 
.04 (.07) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 
-.01 (.11) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 
  Experiment 13: Novel condition = 786 (147) 
     RTs 723 (118) 693 (99) 806 (156) 811 (141) 784 (116) 797 (148) 
     Priming 63 (69) 93 (82) -19 (74) -25 (70) 2 (62) -11 (74) 
     Prop. Priming .07 (.08) .11 (.09) -.03 (.10) -.04 (.09) -.01 (.07) -.02 (.08) 
       
Errors       
  Experiment 12:  
     Repeated 21.7 (9.7) 28.3 (11.9) 33.5 (12.3) 
     Novel 14.0 (7.2) 13.2 (8.5) 16.9 (9.3) 
     Error Priming -7.7 (10.3) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 -15.1 (10.8) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 -16.5 (13.1) 
HP condition 
not included in 
Experiment 12 
  Experiment 13: Novel condition = 15.8 (7.7) 
     Errors 20.8 (8.5) 27.3 (11.2) 30.8 (9.2) 26.3 (8.9) 31.3 (12.8) 37.0 (11.9) 
     Error Priming -5.0 (12.8) -11.5 (11.4) -15.0 (10.1) -10.5 (9.9) -15.5 (13.7) -21.3 (14.4) 
       
 
 
7.2 Experiment 13 
 
One possible reason for a lack of negative priming for unattended stimuli in 
Experiment 12 was the presentation of Test stimuli in isolation.  Previous negative 
priming research has suggested that such effects only manifest when at least two items 
are presented at Test (Allport et al., 1985), producing competition amongst 
simultaneously presented stimuli that places greater demand on selective attention 
processes.  The single stimulus presentation in the Test phase of Experiment 12 may 
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therefore have not induced sufficient competition for negative priming to manifest.  
Although it is unclear a priori how greater demand on such stimulus selection 
processes would increase any possible S-R effects, I nonetheless deemed it necessary 
to include this manipulation in Experiment 13.  Trials at both Study and Test in 
Experiment 13 therefore consisted of two simultaneously presented stimuli, with an 
attentional pre-cue alerting the participant to the location of the to-be-attended 
stimulus.  This design is presented in Figure 7.1.  I also included the Prime-level 
manipulation introduced in Chapter 2, given I saw larger S-R effects for High-primed 
stimuli in Chapters 3 and 4.  As in Experiment 12, I was particularly interested in any 
differences between unattended stimuli that received either a congruent or an 
incongruent response between Study and Test. 
 
Figure 7.2.  Repetition priming (ms) for Unattended-Congruent and Unattended-Incongruent 
conditions for (A) Experiment 12, (B) Experiment 13 collapsed across Prime-level, (C) Experiment 14 
collapsed across Test-context and (D) Experiment 15 collapsed across Study-Context 
Congruent/Incongruent.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (two-tailed). 
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7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 Participants 
20 participants (4 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 24.4 years (σ = 4.0).  2 participants reported as 
being left-handed, the remaining 18 were all right-handed. 
7.2.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were 400 coloured images of simple objects.  50% of the items were classified 
as “bigger than a shoebox”, the other 50% being “smaller than a shoebox”.  Each 
image was randomly assigned to one of 20 groups, so that each group contained equal 
numbers of each stimulus classification, resulting in a total of 20 images per group.  7 
groups were used for the conditions of interest (3x2 – Study-context – Attended, 
Unattended-Congruent, Unattended-Incongruent – by Prime-level – High-primed, 
Low-primed – plus a further Novel condition); the remaining 13 groups were used as 
“filler” items at both Study and Test.  Image groups were assigned to each of these 20 
groups, and were counterbalanced across participants. 
7.2.1.3 Procedure 
Experiment 13 consisted of two Study-Test blocks.  Each Study block consisted of 
120 trials, with 30 stimuli – 10 for each of the three primed Study-context conditions 
(Attended, Unattended-Congruent, Unattended-Incongruent) – presented once (Low-
primed) and 30 stimuli presented three times (High-Primed).  High-primed items at 
Study were paired with the same “filler” stimulus for each presentation.  At Test, 
these 60 stimuli were repeated along with 10 Novel stimuli, resulting in a total of 70 
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trials.  All primed and novel stimuli were presented with “filler” stimuli at Test that 
were experimentally novel.  The trial sequence at both Study and Test was identical to 
the Study phase trials in Experiment 12.  Participants carried out the “bigger-than-
shoebox” task to the attended stimulus at both Study and Test.  As in all previous 
behavioural experiments, High-primed items were excluded if an incorrect response 
was made at any Study phase presentation; all other exclusion criteria remained the 
same as previous experiments. 
 
7.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
After excluding 6% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown in 
Table 7.1.  Analyses of errors are reported in Appendix A-13.  A further 4% of 
Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
Study.  Given I did not include a Repetition factor in the present experiment (i.e., 
Repetition was not an orthogonal manipulation), I conducted an ANOVA on the RT 
priming scores (as shown in Table 7.1).  This 3 x 2 (Study-context x Prime-level) 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Study-context, F(1.9, 35.6) = 
28.50, p<.001 (as well as a trend towards a Study-context x Prime-level interaction, 
F(1.9, 37.2) = 3.08, p=.06).  Paired t-tests comparing the priming scores across Study-
context revealed significantly greater priming for the Attended than both the 
Unattended-Congruent, t(19) = 6.70, p<.001, and the Unattended-Incongruent, t(19) = 
6.78, p<.001, condition.  No significant difference was seen between the two 
Unattended conditions, t(19) = 1.18, p=.25, nor was priming reliable in either 
condition (t’s<1.6, p’s>1.2) (see Figure 7.2-B).  Experiment 13 therefore replicated 
the results of Experiment 12 in so far as I could find no evidence for S-R learning 
effects for stimuli that were unattended at Study.  Again, I saw no evidence for 
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negative priming owing to an incongruent response being bound to an unattended 
stimulus at Study. 
 
7.3 Experiment 14 
 
In Experiment 12 and 13 I presented two non-overlapping stimuli at Study.  
Participants were pre-cued to attend to one stimulus whilst ignoring the other.  One 
possible reason for my failure to find an S-R learning effect for unattended stimuli 
may have been this attentional manipulation.  In short, such a manipulation may have 
been entirely effective in focussing attention therefore leaving little processing 
capacity for the unattended stimulus.  In Experiment 14 I therefore presented three 
different stimuli at Study, one centrally with a left and right flanker.  The participants’ 
task was to fixate centrally whilst attending to both flanker stimuli.  As such, the 
central stimulus was unattended (and task-irrelevant) but remained in fixation at all 
times during the trial.  This manipulation was also used as it has previously been 
shown to produce long-lag negative priming effects, although not in relation to S-R 
learning (Grison et al., 2005). 
At Study, participants were asked “are the flanker stimuli both bigger than a 
shoebox?”.  They were required to answer “yes” if both stimuli were bigger and “no” 
if both were smaller.  To ensure participants categorised both flanker stimuli, catch 
trials were included where one stimulus was bigger than a shoebox and one was 
smaller than a shoebox.  At Test, the stimuli that were presented centrally and not 
attended at Study were re-presented centrally, together with experimentally novel 
flankers.  Participants’ task was to attend to the central stimulus and perform the 
“bigger-than-shoebox” task whilst ignoring the flankers.  This design is presented in 
Figure 7.1.  In order to control for possible flanker effects at Test, both congruent and 
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incongruent Study stimuli were presented with both congruent and incongruent 
flankers (Test-context). As in Experiments 12 and 13, the unattended stimuli at Study 
either received a congruent or incongruent response between Study and Test. 
 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Participants 
13 participants (10 male) give informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 25.1 years (σ = 3.4).  One participant reported as 
being left-handed, the remaining 12 were all right-handed. 
7.3.1.2 Materials 
Stimuli were 364 coloured images of simple objects (50% bigger and 50% smaller 
than a shoebox).  Each image was randomly assigned to one of 26 groups, so that each 
group contained equal numbers of each stimulus classification, resulting in a total of 
14 images per group.  6 groups were used for the conditions of interest (3x2 – Study-
context – Congruent, Incongruent, Novel – by Test-context – Congruent, 
Incongruent).  8 groups were used as flankers for the Congruent and Incongruent trials 
at Study and the remaining 12 were used as flankers for the 6 conditions of interest at 
Test.  Image groups were assigned to each of these 26 groups and were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
7.3.1.3 Procedure 
Experiment 14 consisted of a single Study-Test block.  The Study block consisted of 
62 trials.  6 of these trials were catch trials, where one flanker was bigger and the 
other smaller than a shoebox.  Of the remaining 56 trials, 28 corresponded to the 
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Study-context Congruent and 28 to the Incongruent condition.  Each set of 28 was 
further split into the two possible categorisation permutations (i.e., for the Congruent 
condition “Bigger-Bigger-Bigger” and “Smaller-Smaller-Smaller”; for the 
Incongruent condition “Bigger-Smaller-Bigger” and “Smaller-Bigger-Smaller”).  All 
stimuli were presented once at Study and participants were asked “are the flankers 
both bigger than a shoebox?”.  They were instructed to press the right button for “yes” 
the left button for “no” and the space bar for catch trials.  Each Study trial consisted of 
a centrally presented fixation cross for 500ms followed by the presentation of three 
stimuli, one centrally and one to the left and right of fixation, each subtending 
approximately 3o of visual angle.  These stimuli remained on screen until 200ms 
following response up to a maximum of 3000ms, after which a blank screen was 
presented for 500ms. 
At Test, these 56 primed unattended stimuli were presented along with 28 
Novel stimuli.  All primed and novel stimuli were presented with flanker stimuli at 
Test that were experimentally novel.  For Study-context Congruent, Incongruent and 
Novel stimuli, half were flanked with congruent stimuli and half were flanked with 
incongruent stimuli at Test (Test-context).  Participants performed the “bigger-than-
shoebox” task on the centrally presented stimulus whilst ignoring the flankers.  Each 
Test trial consisted of a 500ms centrally presented fixation cross, after which three 
stimuli were presented for 2000ms, followed by a 500ms blank screen. 
 
7.3.2 Results and Discussion 
 
After excluding 5% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown in 
Table 7.2.  Analyses of errors are reported in Appendix A-14.  A further 16% of 
Repeated trials were excluded from RT analysis due to incorrect responses given at 
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Study.  These RT data were subjected to a 3x2 (Study-context x Test-context) 
repeated-measures ANOVA that failed to reveal any significant main effects or 
interactions, F’s<.94, p’s>.35.  Furthermore, no significant RT priming was seen for 
Study-context Congruent or Incongruent trials, t(13)’s<1.41, p’s>.18, with no 
significant difference between these two effects, t(13) = .37, p=.72 (collapsed across 
Test-context) (see Figure 7.2-C).  In line with Experiments 12 and 13, Experiment 14 
found no evidence of S-R effects for stimuli that were unattended at Study.  I also saw 
no evidence for negative priming due to an incongruent response being bound to an 
unattended stimulus at Study.  Note that these possible unattended S-R effects were 
not present despite participants fixating on the unattended stimulus at Study in the 
present experiment.  Given the manipulations used at both Study and Test over 
Experiments 12-14 it is unlikely that responses made to attended stimuli become 
bound to task-irrelevant distracter stimuli at Study, at least within the present long-lag 
semantic classification paradigm. 
 
7.4 Experiment 15 
 
In Experiments 12-14 I focussed on the role of attention at encoding (i.e., in the Study 
phase).  Although S-R bindings would seem to require full attention in order to form, 
it is possible that their retrieval can occur without attention.  Experiment 15 used the 
same three stimulus presentation paradigm as in Experiment 14, attending to the 
flanker stimuli at Study and the central stimulus at Test.  In Experiment 15 however, I 
presented an experimentally novel central stimulus at Test, whilst repeating the 
previously attended flanker stimuli in the same locations.  As such, any priming 
effects will have resulted from the repetition of, now unattended, flanker stimuli.  
Importantly, the response previously made to the flanker stimuli was congruent or 
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incongruent with that made to the experimentally novel centrally presented Test 
stimulus.  This design in presented in Figure 7.1.  As such, I could assess whether the 
repetition of flanker stimuli that were previously attended but now unattended and 
task-irrelevant could affect the categorisation of a novel centrally presented stimulus. 
 
Table 7.2.  Mean RTs, RT priming, proportional priming, percentage errors and error priming (plus 
standard deviations) across Study-context (Congruent, Incongruent, Novel) and Test-context 
(Congruent, Incongruent) for Experiment 14-15.  Prop. Priming = Proportional Priming. 
 
Study-context: Congruent Incongruent Novel 
Test-context Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
       
RTs       
  Experiment 14:  
     RTs 956 (196) 922 (134) 962 (212) 938 (163) 972 (203) 975 (210) 
     Priming 16 (110) 53 (137) 10 (109) 37 (96)   
     Prop. Priming .01 (.11) .03 (.15) .01 (.11) .03 (.09)   
  Experiment 15:  
     RTs 869 (133) 857 (108) 829 (118) 865 (151) 854 (118) 852 (121) 
     Priming -15 (66) -5 (94) 25 (50) -13 (102)   
     Prop. Priming -.02 (.08) -.01 (.12) .03 (.06) -.02 (.12)   
       
Errors       
  Experiment 14:  
     Errors 14.8 (12.2) 11.5 (13.8) 14.3 (14.9) 14.3 (14.0) 12.1 (10.7) 12.6 (12.4) 
     Error Priming -2.7 (8.5) 1.1 (12.7) -2.2 (13.5) -1.6 (11.7)   
  Experiment 15:  
     Errors 10.6 (5.9) 13.5 (8.0) 12.5 (11.4) 13.9 (8.1) 9.6 (6.0) 13.0 (10.4) 
     Error Priming -1.0 (9.1) -0.5 (13.4) -2.9 (14.1) -1.0 (13.5)   
       
 
7.4.1 Method 
7.4.1.1 Participants 
13 participants (3 male) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment.  The 
mean age across participants was 26.9 years (σ = 4.5).  One participant reported as 
being left-handed, the remaining 12 were all right-handed. 
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7.4.1.2 Materials 
352 stimuli from the full stimulus set were split into 22 groups, resulting in 16 images 
per group.  12 groups were used for the flanker stimuli for the conditions of interest 
(3x2 – Study-context – Congruent, Incongruent, Novel – by Test-Context – 
Congruent, Incongruent).  Note that although I included Congruent and Incongruent 
Study-context conditions, this should not affect priming at Test given that the central 
stimulus at Test was always novel (i.e., the Congruent/Incongruent Study-context 
conditions could be collapsed into a single condition of Repetition). 6 groups were 
used as central stimuli during the Test phase and the remaining 4 groups were used as 
central stimuli during the Study phase. 
7.4.1.3 Procedure 
Experiment 15 consisted of a single Study-Test block.  The Study block consisted of 
70 trials.  6 of these were catch trials, where one flanker was bigger and the other 
smaller than a shoebox.  Of the remaining 64 trials, 32 corresponded to the Study-
context Congruent and 32 to the Study-context Incongruent condition.  At Test, these 
64 primed attended flanker stimuli were repeated along with 32 experimentally novel 
flankers.  All primed and novel flankers were presented with novel central stimuli at 
Test.  For the Test-context Congruent condition, the flanker stimuli were paired with a 
congruent central stimulus whilst for the Test-context Incongruent condition the 
flanker stimuli were paired with an incongruent central stimulus.  The Study and Test 
tasks were identical to Experiment 14.  I was critically interested in whether the Test-
context Congruent and Test-context Incongruent conditions varied as a function of 
whether they were repeated (Study-context Congruent/Incongruent) or novel (Study-
context Novel). 
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7.4.2 Results and Discussion 
 
After excluding 6% of trials with outlying RTs, the percentages of errors are shown in 
Table 7.2.  Analyses of errors are reported in Appendix A-15.  A further 12% of 
Repeated trials were excluded from RT analyses due to incorrect responses given at 
Study.  These RT data were subjected to a 3x2 (Study-context x Test-context) 
repeated-measures ANOVA that failed to reveal any significant main effects or 
interactions, F’s<1.26, p’s>.30.  Furthermore, no significant RT priming was seen for 
Test-context Congruent or Incongruent trials, t(13)’s<.40, p’s>.70, with no significant 
difference between these two effects, t(13) = .50, p=.62 (collapsed across Study-
context Congruent/Incongruent) (see Figure 7.2-D).  Therefore I found no evidence to 
suggest that unattended stimuli can cue the retrieval of S-R bindings when those 
stimuli were previously attended.  Alternatively, such S-R bindings may be retrieved 
but due to the task-irrelevance of the flankers at Test they do not affect the 
categorisation of an experimentally novel stimulus.  Regardless, Experiment 15 failed 
to provide evidence of S-R learning effects for unattended stimuli, in line with the 
results of Experiments 12-14. 
 
7.5 General Discussion 
 
Experiments 12-15 were designed to assess whether attention is necessary for S-R 
effects to manifest.  In Experiments 12-14 I focussed on the role of attention at Study, 
and found no evidence to suggest that responses made to an attended stimulus can 
become bound to a co-occurring task-irrelevant unattended stimulus (at least when 
stimuli are non-overlapping).  Whereas in Experiment 12 I tested for possible S-R 
bindings by presenting previously unattended stimuli in isolation at Test, in 
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Experiment 13 I presented previously unattended stimuli with another distracter 
stimulus.  This dual presentation at Test has been shown previously to produce robust 
negative priming effects (at least in immediate repetition paradigms), possibly due to 
a greater demand on selective attention processes (Allport et al., 1985).  Regardless, 
this manipulation failed to provide evidence for either S-R effects for unattended 
stimuli or negative priming, at least over the Study-Test lags used in the present 
thesis. 
In Experiments 12-13, participants were required to fixate centrally while 
stimuli were presented to the right and left of fixation, as such neither the attended or 
unattended stimulus was ever fixated.  In Experiment 14 I therefore presented three 
stimuli simultaneously, one in the middle of fixation, and one each to the left and the 
right of fixation.  Although participants were required to fixate centrally, they 
attended to the two flanker stimuli.  As such, the central stimulus was fixated but 
unattended at Study.  Despite this manipulation I again failed to provide evidence of 
S-R effects for unattended stimuli.  Finally, in Experiment 15 I switched focus from 
the encoding to the retrieval of S-R bindings.  Repeating previously attended flankers 
at Test, I again failed to provide evidence of S-R effects for unattended stimuli.  This 
lack of S-R effect across Experiments 12-15 is striking given the dominance of such 
effects across Experiments 1-11.  Taken together, Experiments 12-15 suggest that 
attention is needed to both encode and retrieve S-R bindings, at least within the 
present long-lag semantic classification paradigm.  
These results are at odds with those of Hommel (2005) and Rothermund et al. 
(2005).  These authors found robust negative priming in immediate repetition 
paradigms when previously unattended stimuli were repeated and participants were 
required to make an incongruent response between presentations.  One possibility is 
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that although attention may not be necessary for the formation of an S-R binding, such 
binding may be temporary.  Attention therefore may be necessary for the encoding of 
such bindings into a more stable long-term memory.  Another possibility however is 
that the attentional manipulations used in the present thesis may have been more 
effective in focussing attention compared to previous studies.  In Rothermund et al. 
(2005), participants were required to attend to the colour of a word and ignore the 
meaning of the word.  Here then, attention was directed towards a particular stimulus 
characteristic rather than a separate stimulus.  Given words are often thought to be 
read automatically, even when they interfere with current task demands (e.g., Stroop, 
1935), such an attentional manipulation is unlikely to have been as effective as the 
current classification task to an entirely separate stimulus.  In Hommel (2005), 
participants were required to enact a prepared response to an auditory tone whilst 
ignoring a visual “X” on the computer screen.  Again, such a task would seem to 
require less attentional resources compared to the present classification task.  The 
present results are not able to disentangle these two possibilities, therefore lag and 
attention remain important issues for future research. 
The present results are however consistent with related work using an 
immediate masked priming paradigm, in which not only spatial (e.g., Lachter et al., 
2004) and temporal (e.g., Naccache et al., 2002) attention, but also awareness of a 
stimulus, seems necessary for the encoding of S-R bindings (even though awareness 
does not seem necessary for the expression of those bindings; Eckstein & Henson, 
submitted).  Note however that this does not suggest that S-R bindings are not 
automatically encoded and retrieved (i.e., are not under conscious control).  Such 
encoding and retrieval may be automatic but require full attention in order to occur.  I 
return to this point in Chapter 8. 
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7.5.1 Chapter Summary 
 
In Chapter 7, I have investigated the role of attention in the encoding and retrieval of 
S-R bindings.  I particular, I wanted to assess whether negative priming is caused by 
the retrieval of an S-R binding to a previously unattended stimulus.  In Experiment 12 
I presented two spatially non-overlapping stimuli at Study, and directed attention 
towards the attended stimulus with an attentional pre-cue.  At Test, a single stimulus 
was presented that was either attended at Study, unattended at Study or Novel.  
Critically, the responses made at Test to previously unattended stimuli were either 
congruent or incongruent to those at Study.  Although robust priming was seen for 
previously attended stimuli, no effect of response congruency was seen for previously 
unattended stimuli.  In Experiment 13 I presented two non-overlapping stimuli at Test 
to increase demands on attentional selection processes.  Again, no effects of response 
congruency were seen for previously unattended stimuli.  In Experiment 14 I 
presented three stimuli, one centrally with two flankers.  Whereas participants fixated 
on the central stimulus, attention was directed to the flankers at Study.  At Test, 
participants attended to the central stimulus that was either repeated (previously 
unattended) or novel.  As in Experiments 12 & 13, no effects of response congruency 
were seen for previously unattended stimuli.  Finally, in Experiment 15 I focussed on 
whether previously encoded S-R bindings are retrieved at Test without attention.  
Here I presented novel central stimuli and repeated previously attended flankers.  The 
presentation of previously attended flankers did not affect RTs to novel central 
stimuli.  Thus, Experiment 15 suggests that attention is necessary for the retrieval of 
S-R bindings. 
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Taken together, the results of Chapter 7 suggest that attention is necessary for 
the encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings in long-lag classification paradigms.  This 
therefore answers Question 5 posed in Chapter 1.  In the next (and final) chapter, I 
summarise the results of Chapters 2-7 before answering the five questions posed in 
Chapter 1.  Following this, I focus on how existing S-R and CP theories of priming 
fail to accommodate all the results presented in this thesis.  Finally, I outline a 
tentative framework for repetition priming designed to incorporate known S-R and CP 
contributions to repetition priming. 
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Chapter 8 
The Multiple-Route Multiple-Stage framework 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to characterise the role of stimulus-response (S-
R) learning contributions to long-lag repetition priming using classification tasks.  In 
particular, the thesis aimed to assess both component process (CP) and S-R learning 
contributions to priming and relate such effects to repetition-related neural changes 
(e.g., repetition suppression – RS).  In the service of this aim, a combination of 
behavioural and neuroimaging (fMRI and EEG) techniques were employed.  The 
main results are discussed below, followed by an assessment of current theories of 
repetition priming.  As such theories are not capable of explaining all the data in the 
present thesis, a novel framework is presented that incorporates known CP and S-R 
contributions to priming. 
 
8.1 Summary of Results 
8.1.1 Chapter 2 
 
In Chapter 2 I introduced a design that incorporated the Start/Switch manipulation of 
Dobbins et al. (2004) within a Study-Test design, either repeating or reversing the task 
question between Study and Test (e.g., the Same and Reverse condition).  Three 
experiments revealed significant S-R learning effects across these conditions, with 
greater priming for the Same than the Reverse condition.  These results confirmed that 
S-R effects could be seen when using somewhat ad-hoc classification tasks (e.g., 
“bigger than a shoebox?”; Experiments 1 & 3) as well as tasks thought to tap more 
fundamental distinctions within semantic memory (e.g., “is the object man-made?”; 
Experiment 2).  Such effects were also seen when varying either the Study task 
(Experiment 1-2) or Test task (Experiment 3).  Despite the decrease in priming seen in 
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the Reverse condition, significant priming was still present.  Although the residual 
priming in the Reverse task could be taken as evidence for facilitation of component 
processes (e.g., perceptual/semantic facilitation), it could also be attributed to S-R 
learning through the repetition of a Classification response (e.g., bigger/smaller – see 
summary of Chapter 4). 
A further manipulation was added to Experiments 1-3 in Chapter 2, whereby 
the Study and Test task were unrelated (e.g., “bigger than a shoebox” at study and “is 
the object man-made?” at test).  In this Orthogonal condition, the Action (e.g., 
right/left finger-press) and Decision (e.g., yes/no) responses made at Test were, on 
average, orthogonal to those made at Study.  Classification responses made at Test 
were unrelated to those made at Study (e.g., “bigger” to “man-made”).  This condition 
was introduced to assess the relative facilitation/interference owing to response 
repetition/reversal in the Same and Reverse condition respectively.  Interestingly, 
Experiments 1-3 failed to reveal any significant priming in the Orthogonal condition.  
In other words, once I created a condition that balanced possible 
facilitation/interference effects due to response repetition/reversal, I saw no evidence 
of priming.  These results suggest that little, if any, priming in the present paradigm is 
a consequence of facilitation of component processes.  The Orthogonal condition also 
allowed a separation of Congruent and Incongruent responses (at the level of Action 
and Decision).  Analyses of these split data consistently revealed greater priming for 
Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, a further marker of S-R learning.  As such, S-R 
learning effects were still present despite the fact that responses made at Study were, 
on average, orthogonal to those made at Test.   
In summary, Chapter 2 revealed two possible markers of S-R learning: (1) 
greater priming in the Same than Reverse condition and (2) greater priming for 
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Congruent than Incongruent stimuli in the Orthogonal condition.  Indeed, little if any 
priming could be attributed unequivocally to the facilitation of component processes.  
The dominance of S-R learning was particularly apparent in the Orthogonal condition 
of Experiments 1-3:  when responses at Study were orthogonal to those at Test, no 
significant priming was present.   
 
8.1.2 Chapter 3 
 
Given the dominance of S-R contributions in Chapter 2, several manipulations were 
used in an attempt to reveal significant CP contributions in Chapter 3.  In Experiment 
4, I introduced a Test task in the Orthogonal condition thought to require access to the 
same size-information needed in the “bigger than shoebox” tasks (i.e., “is the object 
taller than it is wide?”), in an attempt to boost the contribution from facilitation of 
conceptual component processes.  In Experiment 5, based on previous studies, I 
presented visual word stimuli rather than pictures of objects to plausibly increase 
mental imagery processes at Study and Test as well as increase the possibility of 
facilitation of phonological processes.  Finally, in Experiment 6 I degraded picture 
stimuli at Test to increase the contributions of possible perceptual processes (i.e., 
object identification processes). 
 Despite these manipulations, no priming effects were seen that could not be 
attributed to the retrieval of S-R bindings.  Specifically, although I saw significant 
priming in the Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 5 and 6, this was carried by 
Congruent stimuli.  In other words, priming in the Orthogonal condition was only 
present when responses (Actions and Decisions) were repeated between Study and 
Test.  No positive priming effects were seen for Incongruent stimuli in any of the 
Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 1-6. 
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 Experiments 4 and 6 also revealed a further signature of S-R learning: greater 
priming for High-primed stimuli in the Same condition.  These results suggest that 
repeating a stimulus and response pairing at Study increases priming when the same 
S-R pairing is repeated at Test.  As no difference in priming was seen between High- 
and Low-primed stimuli in the Reverse condition, this effect could not have resulted 
from the facilitation of component processes alone.  One possibility is that the 
increase in priming for High-primed stimuli in the Same condition was a result of CP 
facilitation, however this effect was counteracted by response interference in the 
Reverse condition.  Indeed, this explanation would explain why reduced priming in 
the High-primed condition of the Reverse condition was not seen, as facilitation of 
component processes cancelled out the effects of retrieval of an incongruent S-R 
binding (see section 8.3.4.1).  A more parsimonious answer however, is that the 
increase in priming for High-primed stimuli in the Same condition was due to greater 
facilitation owing to the retrieval of an S-R binding, facilitation that would not have 
occurred in the Reverse condition as the response was not repeated between Study and 
Test.  Regardless, this is the first evidence in the current thesis that supports the idea 
that multiple S-R repetitions (i.e., trials) can result in greater facilitation when the 
response is repeated at Test. Given I did not see a decrease in priming for High- than 
Low-primed stimuli in the Reverse condition, Chapter 3 failed to provide unequivocal 
evidence for interference effects due to the reversal of response between Study and 
Test. 
 In summary, Chapter 3 replicated and extended the results of Chapter 2.  Three 
possible markers of S-R learning were revealed: (1) greater priming in the Same than 
Reverse condition, (2) greater priming for High-primed stimuli in the Same condition 
coupled with no difference between High- and Low-primed stimuli in the Reverse 
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condition and (3) greater priming for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli in the 
Orthogonal condition.  Again, I failed to reveal any priming effects that were 
unequivocally a result of facilitation of component processes.  The results of Chapters 
2 and 3 therefore suggest that S-R contributions dominate in long-lag classification 
paradigms. 
 
8.1.3 Chapter 4 
 
The results of Chapters 2-3 were explicable solely in terms of S-R learning, provided 
responses are encoded at multiple levels of representation.  In order to explain the 
significant residual priming in the Reverse condition, responses must be coded at the 
abstract level of a task-dependent Classification (e.g., bigger/smaller).  In the 
Orthogonal condition however, Classifications made at Study would be irrelevant to 
those at Test (e.g., bigger/smaller at Study to man-made/natural at Test).  The 
response-congruency effects seen in the Orthogonal condition are possible only if 
responses are coded at the level of Actions (e.g., right/left finger-press) or Decision 
(e.g., yes/no).  In Chapter 4 I provided direct evidence for the existence of at least 
three distinct levels of response representation.  Experiment 7 provided evidence for 
responses coded at the levels of Action and Decision, whereas Experiment 8 provided 
evidence for responses coded at the levels of Decision and Classification.  Indeed, 
once I controlled for S-R learning at all three levels of representation in Experiment 8, 
no positive priming was seen.  These results again underline the dominance and 
complexity of S-R learning contributions in the present paradigm. 
 Experiment 9 in Chapter 4 focussed on the level of stimulus representation 
within S-R bindings.  Using the referent change manipulation introduced in 
Experiment 8 (e.g., “Bigger than X?” to “Bigger than Y?”) to ensure response 
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switches at all three levels of response representation, Experiment 9 tested whether S-
R learning effects could be seen when switching from a visual object name at Study 
(e.g., the word “lion”) to a picture of the same object at Test (e.g., a picture of a lion).  
This manipulation provided evidence for S-R learning that abstracts away from the 
specific visual format of the stimulus presented at Study.  Experiment 9 also provided 
preliminary evidence for S-R learning at two distinct levels of stimulus representation; 
one tied to the specific visual format of a stimulus and one that abstracts away from 
the visual format.  This was evident from the greater S-R effect seen when picture 
stimuli were presented at both Study and Test (i.e., when there was complete visual 
similarity between Study and Test presentations), compared to when stimuli were 
presented as words at Study and pictures at Test.  The greater S-R learning effect in 
the picture-to-picture manipulation can be attributed to the retrieval of S-R bindings at 
two levels of stimulus representation compared to only one level in the word-to-
picture manipulation.   
 Finally, Experiments 8 and 9 were the first to provide evidence for 
interference effects owing to response reversal.  In Experiment 8, I saw significantly 
reduced priming for High- than Low-primed Incongruent stimuli.  This result suggests 
that increasing the number of S-R repetitions (i.e., trials) at Study results in greater 
interference when the response is reversed at Test.  In Experiment 9, I saw significant 
negative priming (i.e., a slowing of RTs compared to novel baseline) for Incongruent 
stimuli (in the Word-Picture condition).  As such, the retrieval of an incongruent S-R 
binding slowed RTs compared to experimentally novel stimuli.  The results of 
Chapters 3 and 4 therefore provide evidence for both facilitation owing to response 
repetition (Experiments 4 and 6) and interference owing to response reversal 
(Experiments 8 amd 9).  In summary, Chapter 4 provides evidence for S-R bindings at 
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multiple levels of both stimulus and response representation, as well as evidence for 
interference effects due to the reversal of response between Study and Test 
presentations. 
 
8.1.4 Chapter 5 
 
In Chapter 5 I turned my attention to the repetition-related changes in neural activity 
(e.g., repetition suppression – RS) that are often thought to relate to behavioural 
priming effects.  Experiment 10 used the referent change manipulation introduced in 
Experiments 8 and 9 to manipulate S-R learning at all three levels of response 
representation.  The picture-to-picture and word-to-picture stimulus manipulation 
introduced in Experiment 9 was also used to test simultaneously the level of stimulus 
representation in S-R bindings.  This optimised design therefore appropriately 
controlled for S-R learning at all levels of stimulus and response representation.  
Using fMRI, Experiment 10 was thus able to assess the sensitivity of RS effects to 
repetitions/reversals in response, as well as to changes in stimulus format, between 
Study and Test.   
RS was seen in bilateral occipital and temporal ventral visual regions as well 
as distinct clusters in the inferior prefrontal gyrus.  The RS effect in inferior prefrontal 
regions was shown to be sensitive to reversals in response between Study and Test, 
showing greater RS for repeated compared to reversed responses.  This response-
congruency effect was present in both the picture-to-picture and word-to-picture 
manipulation demonstrating that S-R learning effects in inferior prefrontal regions are 
present despite switching from words at Study to pictures at Test.  Interestingly, 
response reversals between presentations resulted in greater activation compared to 
novel stimuli (i.e., repetition enhancement).  This suggests that inferior PFC regions 
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may be involved in the resolution of interference resulting from the retrieval of an 
incongruent S-R binding, increasing activity compared to the novel baseline.  These 
data therefore mirror the behavioural results of Experiments 9 and 10; S-R learning 
can abstract away from the specific visual format of the stimulus presented at Study, 
and reversals of response between presentations can result in interference. 
The RS effect in occipital/temporal ventral visual regions was shown to be 
robust to reversals in response between presentations, demonstrating significant RS 
regardless of whether a response was repeated or reversed.  This effect, however, was 
shown to be sensitive to the word-to-picture stimulus manipulation.  Whereas I saw 
robust RS when the same stimulus was presented between Study and Test (the 
picture-to-picture manipulation), no RS was seen when the stimulus format changed 
between Study and Test (the word-to-picture manipulation).  As such, the RS in 
occipital/temporal regions is plausibly a marker of perceptual facilitation in that it is 
specific to repetition of the same visual stimulus and occurs regardless of response 
repetitions/reversals.  Thus, whereas Chapters 2-4 failed to provide evidence for 
significant CP contributions to behavioural priming, Experiment 10 demonstrated 
significant CP contributions to RS.  I return to this disconnect between the 
behavioural priming and neuroimaging results later in this chapter. 
In summary, Chapter 5 provided evidence for significant S-R and CP 
contributions to RS.  S-R effects were seen in inferior prefrontal regions in both the 
picture-to-picture and word-to-picture conditions and were shown to both decrease 
and increase activation relative to the presentation of novel stimuli.  Thus the retrieval 
of S-R bindings can facilitate and interfere with processing in such regions.  CP 
contributions to RS were seen in occipital/temporal ventral visual regions.  This effect 
was robust to response repetitions/reversals and was specific to repetition of the same 
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visual stimulus between Study and Test and thus is plausibly a result of facilitation of 
perceptual processes involved in stimulus identification. 
 
8.1.5 Chapter 6 
 
In Chapter 6 I used the same experimental design as Experiment 10 in Chapter 5.  
Here I used EEG to assess the temporal profile of S-R and CP contributions to 
repetition-related neural changes.  Comparing response-locked event-related 
potentials (ERPs) across conditions, a significant deflection was seen over left 
posterior and right frontal electrodes onsetting 170ms prior to response-onset.  This 
deflection was specific to reversals in response between Study and Test, and was 
shown in both the picture-to-picture and word-to-picture conditions (at least in the 
peak-sensor analysis).  Thus the retrieval of S-R bindings resulted in a deflection that 
was time-locked to response onset and was shown despite switching from words at 
Study to pictures at Test. 
Comparing stimulus-locked ERPs across conditions, two distinct effects were 
seen: (1) a significant deflection over parietal and frontal electrodes onsetting 400ms 
post stimulus-onset for repeated compared to novel items that was specific to 
repetition of the same visual stimulus (i.e., the picture-to-picture condition) and (2) a 
significant deflection over central and frontal electrodes onsetting 520ms post 
stimulus-onset for repeated compared to novel items that occurred regardless of 
changes in visual format between presentations (i.e., the word-to-picture 
manipulation).  Neither of these effects were significantly modulated by 
repetition/reversals in response between presentations.  Thus Experiment 11 revealed 
two effects that are plausibly related to the facilitation of component processes.  The 
first was shown to be specific to repetition of the same visual stimulus between 
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presentations and therefore possibly reflects the facilitation of perceptual processes.  
The second was present despite switching from words at Study to pictures at Test, 
abstracting away from the specific visual format at Study, and therefore possibly 
reflects the facilitation of conceptual processes.  Importantly, all three effects seen in 
the EEG data were shown to be topographically distinct, suggesting that each effect 
has a different neural generator. 
In summary, Experiment 11 in Chapter 6 presents ERP evidence for S-R and 
CP contributions to repetition-related changes in neural activity.  S-R effects were 
shown to be time-locked to response-onset and were present in both the picture-to-
picture and word-to-picture conditions, mirroring the behavioural data seen in 
Experiments 9-11.  CP effects were shown to be time-locked to stimulus-onset and 
plausibly relate to both the facilitation of perceptual and conceptual processes.  These 
effects were shown to be both temporally and topographically distinct, suggesting 
they are produced by different neural generators at different times. 
 
8.1.6 Chapter 7 
 
In Chapter 7 I switched my focus to the role of attention in both the encoding and 
retrieval of S-R bindings.  In Experiment 12 and 13 two non-overlapping stimuli were 
presented at Study.  Participants attended to one stimulus whilst ignoring the second.  
Experiment 12 repeated both attended and unattended stimuli at Test.  Importantly, 
unattended stimuli at Study required either the same response at Test or a reversal of 
response.  This response-congruency manipulation failed to reveal any difference in 
priming.  In other words, when an unattended stimulus was repeated and attended at 
Test, priming was not modulated by its response history.  This same result was seen in 
Experiment 13 when two stimuli were presented at Test as well (and the repeated 
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stimulus was attended).  Thus, this lack of S-R learning effect was not a result of a 
lack of competition between stimuli in Experiment 12 when only one stimulus was 
presented at Test. 
 In Experiment 14, three stimuli were presented at both Study and Test.  
Participants were required to attend to the two flanker stimuli at Study and the central 
stimulus at Test.  Importantly, participants were required to fixate on the centrally 
presented stimulus at Study despite attending to the flanker stimuli.  Thus the central 
stimulus was fixated but was unattended.  Again, the response history of unattended 
stimuli was manipulated such that they received either the same or the opposite 
response at Test to that made at Study.  As in Experiments 12 and 13, response history 
had no effect on priming for unattended stimuli.  Indeed, no priming was seen for 
unattended stimuli.  Experiments 12-14 therefore suggest that attention is necessary 
for the encoding of S-R bindings. 
 Experiment 15 was concerned with the retrieval of previously encoded S-R 
bindings.  Using the same concurrent presentation of three stimuli as in Experiment 
14, previously attended flankers were repeated but unattended at Test.  Participants 
were required to attend to novel centrally presented stimuli whilst ignoring the 
previously presented and attended flankers.  Importantly, the correct response to the 
centrally presented novel stimulus was either congruent or incongruent with that 
which was given to the previously attended flankers.  Experiment 15 failed to provide 
any evidence for the idea that previously encoded S-R bindings are retrieved 
regardless of attention; priming for novel stimuli was unaffected by the presentation 
of previously attended flanker stimuli. 
 In summary, Experiments 12-15 focussed on the role of attention in both the 
encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings in long-lag classification paradigms.  
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Experiments 12-14 suggested that attention is necessary for the encoding of S-R 
bindings.  Experiment 15 suggested that attention is also necessary for the retrieval of 
previously encoded S-R bindings.  As such, Chapter 7 underlines the importance of 
attention in both the encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings in long-lag classification 
paradigms. 
  
8.2 Addressing the questions outlined in Chapter 1 
8.2.1 Question 1: How dominant are S-R learning contributions 
within long-lag classification paradigms? 
 
The present thesis demonstrates that S-R learning plays a dominant role in long-lag 
repetition priming of speeded semantic classification tasks.  The basic finding of 
greater priming for congruent than incongruent responses is not readily explicable by 
CP accounts.  This is because CP theories predict priming can only result from the 
facilitation of processes that are stimulus specific.  Although response-selection 
processes may have show facilitation, they would need to be bound to a specific 
(repeated) stimulus in order to contribute to priming (i.e., to generate an RT difference 
between Novel and Repeated stimuli).  The dominance of S-R contributions was such 
that there was little evidence remaining for any other contributions to priming, 
contrary to the common assumption that priming reflects the facilitation of one or 
more component processes (e.g., faster object identification or semantic retrieval).  In 
other words, I did not see significant positive priming when responses were reversed 
between presentations. This questions prior interpretations of priming in speeded 
classification tasks, in both healthy participants (e.g., Bowers & Turner, 2003; Bruce 
et al., 2000; Light, Prull & Kennison, 2000; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; 
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Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000; Vriezen et al., 1995), and in amnesic patients (Schnyer et 
al., 2006).   
It is important to note that the present thesis cannot claim that all examples of 
priming reflect S-R learning, i.e., that there is never a role for the facilitation of 
perceptual or conceptual processing.  Indeed, given the evidence for interference 
effects due to previously learnt S-R associations (Experiment 8-11), it is plausible that 
significant perceptual and/or conceptual contributions may have been masked in the 
present series of experiments (i.e., for Incongruent trials in the Orthogonal condition).  
Furthermore, the robust priming of accuracy or response times found in identification 
paradigms (rather than classification paradigms), such as picture-fragment or word-
fragment completion tasks, would appear difficult to explain in terms of S-R learning.  
In these “data-driven” tasks (Jacoby, 1983a; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Roediger 
et al., 1989a), a degraded version of a stimulus is often difficult to identify unless an 
intact version has been seen previously, offering little opportunity for a prior response 
to be retrieved until the stimulus is identified through priming (e.g., the "Dalmatian 
dog" example in Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Roediger et al., 1989a).  I return to 
the issue of integrating such component process contributions with S-R learning 
below. 
 
8.2.2 Question 2: At what level are both stimuli and responses 
represented within S-R bindings? 
 
S-R learning can occur at multiple levels of stimulus and response representation.  In 
relation to responses, the present thesis found evidence for S-R learning at three 
distinct levels of representation from the Action (left/right finger press) to the 
Decision (yes/no) to the task-dependent Classification (bigger/smaller).  Indeed, it 
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was only once S-R learning was considered at all three levels of representation that 
the dominance of such learning was revealed.  Evidence for S-R learning was also 
found at multiple levels of stimulus representation, one tied to the specific visual 
format of the stimulus and one that abstracts across differing visual formats (i.e., from 
visual words to object pictures). 
 
8.2.3 Question 3: Does the retrieval of S-R bindings result in 
facilitation when a response is repeated or interference when a 
response is reversed? 
 
The present thesis revealed both facilitation and interference due to the retrieval of S-
R learning.  In Chapter 3 I saw greater priming for High- than Low-primed stimuli 
that was specific to the repetition of both stimulus and response (i.e., in the Same 
condition).  This suggests that retrieval of an S-R binding facilitates later response 
selection if the response is repeated.  In Chapters 4-6 I saw a slowing of RTs 
compared to novel stimuli (i.e., negative priming) when a response was reversed 
between presentations. Importantly, this interference only became apparent once S-R 
learning was reversed at all three levels of response representation. 
 
8.2.4 Question 4: Are repetition-related changes in neural activity, 
as measured by fMRI and EEG, related to S-R learning or 
component process contributions to behavioural priming. 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented evidence for both S-R and CP contributions to repetition-
related neural changes.  In Chapter 5 I saw significant RS in occipital/temporal and 
inferior prefrontal regions.  Whereas the RS effect in occipital/temporal regions was 
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attributed to the facilitation of perceptual processes, the RS effect in inferior 
prefrontal regions was attributed to S-R learning.  In Chapter 6 I saw significant 
repetition effects in the stimulus-locked and response-locked analyses.  Whereas the 
two effects seen in the stimulus-locked analysis were attributed to the repetition of 
perceptual and/or conceptual processes, the effect seen in the response-locked ERP 
analysis was attributed to S-R learning. 
 One issue with the neuroimaging results is why robust CP contributions were 
present despite the dominance of S-R learning seen in the behavioural data.  One 
possibility is that the binary semantic classification tasks performed on clear images 
of everyday objects load more heavily on S-R learning processes.  In other words, 
perceptual/conceptual components may contribute only a small portion of the total RT 
variance in such tasks.  This explanation fits with previous studies that have failed to 
demonstrate a correlation between RS effects in occipital/temporal regions and 
behavioural priming (a relationship that has been seen in inferior prefrontal regions) 
(e.g., Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008; Orfanidou, Marslen-Wilson & 
Davis, 2006).  An alternative explanation is that neural repetition effects reflect 
processing largely irrelevant to the behavioural measure of priming in paradigms like 
the present one.  For example, the RS seen in occipital/temporal regions in Chapter 5 
may reflect processing arising subsequent to the behavioural response, such as 
reductions in attention to the object once a decision has been made (Eger et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, the repetition-related effects seen in the stimulus-locked analysis of 
Chapter 6 may reflect incidental conscious recollection of the stimulus, a process that 
may not contribute to RTs in a speeded classification task.  This possibility fits with 
previous EEG data demonstrating significant repetition-related effects over similar 
Chapter 8: the Multiple-Route Multiple-Stage framework 
 
 204
electrodes and time-points using direct memory tests (e.g., old/new judgements; Rugg 
& Curran, 2007).  
 
8.2.5 Question 5: Is attention necessary for both the encoding and 
retrieval of S-R bindings? 
 
The results of Chapter 7 suggest that attention is necessary for both the encoding and 
retrieval of S-R bindings.  Although these results are at odds with previous research 
suggesting that S-R bindings can form between a response and an unattended task-
irrelevant stimulus in immediate repetition paradigms (Rothermund et al., 2005), this 
is the first time such effects have been assessed using object picture stimuli in long-
lag speeded classification paradigms.  One explanation for this discrepancy is that the 
attentional manipulations used in the present thesis were more effective at focussing 
attention than previous studies.  Indeed, previous research has focussed on directing 
attention towards stimulus attributes (e.g., colour vs. meaning) rather than separate 
stimuli, or has used simple intermixed letter stimuli (e.g., Rothermund et al., 2005).  
Although plausible, negative priming effects have been shown using non-overlapping 
picture stimuli in short- (Allport et al., 1985) and long-lag (Grison et al., 2005) 
paradigms.  These studies did not focus on S-R effects however.  Therefore although 
more common contributions to negative priming, such as inhibition of stimulus 
representations (Tipper, 1985, 2001), may be less susceptible to such attentional 
manipulations, a greater amount of attention may be needed to encode and retrieve S-
R bindings. 
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8.3 Multiple-Routes and Multiple-Stages: the MR-MS framework 
 
The present thesis has presented evidence for S-R learning contributions to 
behavioural repetition priming at multiple levels of stimulus and response 
representation.  The retrieval of such S-R bindings can facilitate and interfere with 
processing dependent upon whether the response is repeated or reversed between 
presentations.  Although S-R contributions in general are consistent with Instance 
Theory and the Event-File theory of Logan and Hommel respectively, certain aspects 
of the data in the present thesis were not readily explicable by either theory.   
 
 
Figure 8.1.  Multiple-route multiple-stage (MR-MS) framework.  The framework includes a 
component process and S-R retrieval route to response generation.  The component process route 
includes multiple stages from perceptual to semantic to task-dependent response representations.  The 
response retrieval route allows for S-R binding at multiple levels of stimulus and response 
representation.  The two routes interact in the response representation stage of the component process 
route.  This interaction can result in facilitation or interference dependent on the congruency of 
response generated by the two routes.  Solid lines represent pre-existing (though modifiable) 
connections between stimulus representations.  Dotted lines represent temporary connections between 
representations specific to the current task set.  Red lines represent connections that are capable of 
showing facilitation (e.g., strengthening). 
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In the case of Instance Theory, it is unclear why one should see response 
congruency effects in situations where previous responses are not predictive of the 
correct response at Test.  This was seen in the Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 
1-6, where stimuli that received a congruent response showed greater priming than 
those that received an incongruent response.  In a situation in which the task at Test is 
unrelated to that at Study, Instance Theory predicts that the system reverts to the 
algorithmic route, effectively ignoring any retrieved S-R bindings.  The present results 
suggest this does not occur, and that retrieval of S-R bindings occurs automatically 
and affects processing, regardless of its predictive power.  A further result that is not 
readily explained by Instance Theory is the evidence for interference effects due to 
reversals of response between presentations.  If the system does simply revert to the 
algorithmic route when a retrieved response is not appropriate to the current situation 
then no nett priming should be seen.  To reiterate, Instance Theory predicts that 
negative priming cannot occur as the response retrieval and algorithmic route are 
thought to be independent.  Such interference requires interactions between the 
algorithmic and S-R retrieval route and as such would reflect a major departure from 
the original Instance Theory. 
The Event-File theory would seem a more appropriate theory for explaining 
the interference effects seen following reversals in response in the present thesis.  This 
theory would also seem to readily explain the congruency effects seen in the 
Orthogonal conditions of Experiments 1-6, in that previous S-R bindings are 
automatically retrieved and affect processing dependent on the overlap between the 
present conditions and the retrieved S-R binding.  It is unclear, however, how the 
theory predicts positive priming, given its focus on interference effect arising from 
prior experience.  In particular, it does not specify a mechanism (such as the race in 
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Instance Theory) by which multiple records can further speed RTs (e.g., for High-
primed stimuli in the Same condition of Experiments 4 & 6) (see the General 
Discussions of Chapters 2 and 3 for more in-depth analysis of these issues). 
The results of the present thesis are therefore difficult to explain with either 
Instance Theory or the Event-File Theory.  Furthermore, the clear evidence for S-R 
learning is inconsistent with a purely modification theory such as a component 
process account of priming.  Although the present thesis failed to reveal priming 
effects that were unequivocally a result of facilitation of component processes, studies 
using identification tasks have provided such evidence (e.g., Roediger, 1990; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Roediger et al., 1989a; Schott et al., 2005).  Therefore 
a theory of priming is needed that allows for a formal integration of these two 
independent contributions to behavioural priming.  The present thesis outlines a 
tentative framework that explains priming effects in terms of an interaction between a 
component process (i.e., the algorithmic route) and S-R retrieval route.  This 
framework provides for a natural explanation for both the facilitation and interference 
effects following retrieval of S-R bindings, a result that present S-R learning theories 
struggle to explain.  Moreover, this framework allows for the integration of S-R and 
CP theories of priming.  I call this the “multiple-route and multiple-stage” (MR-MS) 
framework (Figure 8.1). 
Key assumptions in this framework are that: (1) there are multiple routes to 
generating the final response: a component process and S-R retrieval route (analogous 
to Instance Theory); (2) unlike Instance Theory, multiple stages within the component 
process route can potentially be facilitated by prior performance of those stages; (3) 
the outputs of the component process and S-R retrieval routes can interact, such that 
the congruency of response generated by each route can modulate (e.g., 
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facilitate/interfere with) RTs, (4) multiple S-R bindings can be stored from a single 
stimulus-response pairing (trial), each encoding a differing level of stimulus and 
response and (5) in line with the task-switching literature, task-demands entail the 
formation of temporary, task-specific, response representations and mappings 
between such representations. This framework is also novel in attempting a tentative 
mapping of these stages/routes onto the brain. 
 
8.3.1 S-R retrieval route 
 
The response retrieval route in the MR-MS framework builds on the Instance Theory 
of Logan.  S-R bindings are automatically encoded during all co-occurrences of a 
stimulus and response (when that stimulus is attended and consciously perceived) and 
automatically retrieved at all subsequent encounters (when that stimulus is attended, 
though not necessarily consciously perceived). These bindings are assumed to be 
established from a single trial (within a certain experimental context) and to be 
temporary (in comparison to permanent, though modifiable, associations between pre-
existing stimulus representations).  These "bindings" could be associative, in that they 
increase or decrease in strength with repeated stimulus-response pairings, or they 
could be episodic, with new associations being formed on each such pairing.  Note 
however that an episodic account would lend itself more readily to explaining other 
factors that affect priming, such as the binding of incidentally co-occuring stimuli 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986), incidentally co-occurring responses (generated by other 
stimuli on a particular trial, as in negative priming paradigms; Rothermund et al., 
2005), incidentally co-occuring stimulus attributes (Rubin & Koch, 2006), or of 
representations of the task itself (Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak & Hommel, 2007). 
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These S-R bindings are indicated by the dash-dotted lines in Figure 8.1, as 
distinct from the solid lines that represent pre-existing connections (i.e., previously 
established from long-term semantic learning). However, the S-R retrieval route 
differs from Instance Theory in two key ways: (1) any level of stimulus or response 
representation that is behaviourally relevant at initial encounter will be encoded in a 
separate S-R binding, and (2) the multiple possible levels of stimuli and responses are 
simultaneously cued by re-presentation of a stimulus, and interact with the component 
process route.  Such interaction (at specific levels of response representation) could 
plausibly facilitate and/or interfere with processing, which would be dependent upon 
the congruency of response generated by each route (see later).  
Given that S-R contributions to behavioural priming have been shown to be 
disrupted in amnesics with damage to medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions (Schnyer 
et al., 2006) and macaque monkeys with lesions to the hippocampus have shown 
impairments in learning stimulus-response (but not stimulus-stimulus) pairings (Wise 
& Murray, 1999), I propose that these S-R bindings are coded in MTL regions.  Note 
though that I make no claim about whether such bindings are retrieved consciously or 
relate to explicit “episodic” memory (Tulving, 1972). 
 
8.3.2 Component process route 
 
The component process route of the MR-MS framework consists of several levels of 
stimulus representation, both perceptual and semantic.  There may of course be more 
levels than shown in Figure 8.1, but these are the minimum needed for the present 
data.  The connections between nodes in these layers, shown by solid lines, are pre-
existing but modifiable (consistent with component process theories of priming).  
However, there are a further set of nodes that represent different levels of response 
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representation, which are assumed to be established dynamically as a function of the 
current task.  These are shown by dashed lines in Figure 8.1. 
 
8.3.2.1 Pre-existing stimulus representations 
 
The connections between pre-existing stimulus representations are assumed to be 
strengthened by prior processing of a stimulus, contributing to the overall measure of 
priming.  Such strengthening may be part of normal learning in this system (Bowers et 
al., 2002; Marsolek et al., 2006; Stark & McClelland, 2000).  These connections are 
similar to Bower’s (1996) Type I associations.  Importantly, these connections pass 
through unique representations of each object, which is what makes priming specific 
to a given object.  In other words, strengthening of the connection between a visual 
input and the “octopus” concept does not affect the processing of other objects that 
are linked by different connections.  Such strengthening is necessary to explain 
priming in identification tasks, such as word-stem completion (e.g., Schott et al., 
2005), where no obvious S-R pairing is repeated between presentations.  The 
inclusion of unique representations for each object also allows for S-R learning at an 
abstract level of stimulus representation. 
 Having said this, the framework is not incompatible with distributed 
representations of the perceptual input, such that similar inputs (e.g., two similar 
picture of an octopus) would benefit from prior strengthening of (some of) the 
connections between the input nodes and the unique object nodes.  This would allow 
some generalisation of priming across different exemplars of an object.  Indeed, the 
framework even allows for some priming, albeit reduced, from pictures to words (and 
vice versa) within the same task, by virtue of strengthening of connections between 
the object nodes and semantic features.  Although we have not provided evidence for 
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such picture to word priming in the present paper (that is not explained instead by S-R 
learning), previous research has shown significant priming from pictures to words 
(Bruce et al., 2000; Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000; Vriezen et al., 1995) and from spoken to 
written words (Light et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; Vaidya et al., 
1997) when using tasks that require access to similar semantic information (though 
these studies may also be explicable in terms of S-R learning).  
Thus priming can arise from multiple stages within this "modificationist" 
system. In general, the degree of priming should be related to the degree of overlap in 
the pathways traversed through this system, which will depend on both the stimulus 
and the task (Henson, 2003), but keeping in mind that this priming is specific to an 
object, so cannot reflect a generalised transfer of appropriate processing.  Previous 
fMRI (Henson et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Race et 
al., 2009; Simons et al., 2003) and neuropsychological (Bondi & Kaszniak, 1991; 
Keane et al., 1995) studies, as well as the fMRI results from Chapter 5 in the present 
thesis, would suggest that these abstract visual and semantic representations exist 
within the occipital and temporal lobes. 
 
8.3.2.2 Task-dependent response representations 
 
Given the task-specific nature of certain response representations (i.e., Decisions and 
Classifications), such representations are assumed to be temporary; likely limited to 
the current task or experimental context.  For example, representations of a particular 
Classification (e.g., bigger) or Decision (e.g., yes) would be rapidly constructed at the 
beginning of an experiment (based on instructions and/or the first few trials).  Such 
representations might relate to the particular “task-set” (Monsell, 1996).  They can 
also be rapidly dismantled under conditions that demand differing representations 
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(e.g., when switching from a “bigger/smaller” to “man-made/natural” task).  Such 
adaptive coding of responses has parallels with the idea of “task-set reconfiguration”, 
whereby task-switches require “the re-tuning of input-output mapping between 
processing modules” (Monsell, 1996).  Here however, the proposal is that such re-
configuration is specific to task-dependent response representations (and possibly 
task-dependent semantic information), rather than the entire processing stream.  
Previous research has implicated the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in such adaptive (task-
relevant) coding (Duncan, 2001). 
 
8.3.3 Interaction between the multiple routes 
 
As shown in Figure 8.1, the output of the perceptual and semantic processing of the 
stimulus and the retrieval of S-R associations converge on the task-specific response 
representations.  Indeed, these interactions between algorithmic and S-R retrieval 
routes can occur at multiple levels of response representation.  The framework 
assumes that the final behaviour (action) is reached by a process of accumulation of 
information at each of these levels, until some criterion is reached (e.g. Laming, 1968; 
Ratcliff, 1978; Usher & McClelland, 2001).  While the framework does not specify 
the nature of the decision in detail, it seems likely that competition between 
conflicting responses is involved (indicated by the inhibitory connections in Figure 
8.1). This competition would seem necessary to explain why interference can occur 
when incongruent responses are retrieved from the component process and S-R 
retrieval routes.  For example, in circumstances where the responses (e.g., 
Classification) are congruent, consistent information from both routes will accelerate 
the build up of evidence for a given final action.  For S-R pairings that have 
previously occurred multiple times (e.g., High-primed items), the stronger 
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modificationist connections and stronger/greater number of S-R associations will 
increase this effect.  Conversely, in circumstances where the responses from the two 
routes are incongruent, the accumulation of evidence in competing response 
representations will act to slow RTs. 
Given that this interaction between the multiple routes must occur at the 
response level, and that we assume these temporary response representations are 
stored in PFC, then the above response competition must occur within PFC. This is 
consistent with previous fMRI data (Dobbins et al., 2004; Horner & Henson, 2008; 
Race et al., 2009; Wig et al., 2009), as well as the fMRI data from Chapter 5 that 
showed significant RS following response repetition but repetition enhancement (i.e., 
greater activation) when responses were reversed between presentations.  Thus these 
data show both facilitation and interference from the retrieval of S-R bindings, 
depending on the congruency of response generated by the component process and S-
R retrieval route. 
 
8.3.4 Application of the MR-MS framework to the present data 
8.3.4.1 Same and Reverse conditions 
 
It is useful to consider how the MR-MS framework explains the present pattern of 
results.  In Chapters 2-3 I saw significant priming in the Same condition.  This is 
presumed to result from both (1) strengthening of connections between pre-existing 
representations at one or more stages in the component process route (connections 1 
and 2 in Figure 8.1) and (2) congruency between the response generated by the 
component process and S-R retrieval route, at all levels of response representation 
(Action, Decision, Classification; indicated by associations 3-5 in Figure 8.1).  The 
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significant decrease in priming in the Reverse condition in Chapters 2-3 is then 
attributed to an incongruency at the level of both Action and Decision response 
representations (numbered 4-5).  However, the framework also predicts that the 
congruency of response at the level of Classification (numbered 3), coupled with any 
strengthening of connections between pre-existing stimulus representations (i.e., 
connections 1 & 2), will facilitate primed items in the Reverse condition.  Such 
facilitation must outweigh the predicted interference effects at the level of Action and 
Decision to result in significant (although decreased) priming. 
 Increasing the number of stimulus repetitions in the Same and Reverse 
conditions (i.e., High-primed items) will both (1) strengthen further the connections 
between pre-existing stimulus representations and (2) increase the number of S-R 
bindings.  The strengthening of connections between stimulus representations, 
coupled with the increased number of S-R bindings at all levels of both stimulus and 
response representation, will increase priming in the Same condition (relative to Low-
primed items).  In the Reverse condition the strengthening of connections between 
stimulus representations will result in increased priming.  Furthermore, the increased 
number of S-R bindings at the level of Classification will increase priming (due to 
repetition of Classification responses regardless of the task direction).  The increased 
number of S-R bindings at Action and Decision levels will produce greater 
interference than for Low-primed items however.  If this increase in interference 
equals the facilitation resulting from strengthening of connections between stimulus 
representations (and repetition of Classification responses), no difference in priming 
for Low- and High-primed stimuli in the Reverse condition would be seen. 
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8.3.4.2 Orthogonal condition 
 
The response-congruency effects seen in the Orthogonal condition of Chapters 2-3 are 
explained in the following manner.  Firstly, the differing task demands will result in 
the formation of new task-dependent Classification response representations.  For 
example, if the task was switched from “bigger-than-shoebox?” to “man-made?”, the 
“Bigger” and “Smaller” Classifications used at Study would be replaced by “Man-
made” and “Natural” Classifications at Test (numbered 6).  Such new Classifications 
may plausibly connect to different semantic representations depending upon the 
overlap in semantic processing between Study and Test tasks.  For example, whereas 
the “taller than wide?” task might access similar size-semantics to the “bigger than 
shoebox?” tasks, the “man-made?” task might require access to different semantic 
information.  Such tasks all require response representations at the level of Action and 
Decision however, explaining the congruency effects seen in the Orthogonal condition 
of Chapters 2-3.  For congruent stimuli, congruency of response at the level of Action 
and Decision results in facilitation.  For incongruent stimuli, incongruent responses at 
the level of Action and Decision result in interference.  Given Classification responses 
at Study and Test are unrelated, the retrieval of a Classification response should not 
facilitate or interfere with processing at Test. 
 The critical issue in the Orthogonal condition is why no significant CP 
contributions were seen.  The MR-MS framework explains this result in the following 
manner.  Firstly, the retrieval of S-R bindings at Test both facilitated and interfered 
with processing depending on the congruency of response between the component 
process and S-R retrieval route.  Secondly, repetition resulted in the strengthening of 
connections between pre-existing stimulus representations in the component process 
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route.  This strengthening of connections will have resulted in facilitation regardless 
of the congruency of response between the two routes.  For congruent stimuli, 
facilitation will occur due to both facilitation of component processes and retrieval of 
a congruent response, resulting in overall positive priming.  For incongruent stimuli, 
the facilitation caused by repetition of component processes will be counteracted by 
the interference from retrieval of an incongruent response, resulting in no nett 
priming.   
Although the framework readily predicts this pattern of results, it is perhaps 
not the most parsimonious of explanations.  For example, no nett priming for 
incongruent stimuli could simply be due to a lack of CP facilitation coupled with 
effective ignoring of previously retrieved responses.  Note however, that the 
framework makes two specific predictions.  Firstly, in circumstances where no 
strengthening of connections in the component process route occurs, incongruent 
stimuli should show negative priming (due to interference at the level of Action and 
Decision representations).  This prediction could be tested by switching both stimulus 
type and task between Study and Test.  For example, switching between word and 
picture stimuli should prevent facilitation from the strengthening of connections 
between perceptual and stimulus representations (numbered 1), whereas switching 
between tasks that require access to different semantic information should prevent 
facilitation owing to the strengthening of connections between stimulus and semantic 
representations (numbered 2).  The framework predicts that S-R bindings will still be 
retrieved from activation of the same stimulus (but not perceptual) representation, 
thus resulting in S-R effects.  In this situation the framework predicts that incongruent 
stimuli should show slower RTs than novel stimuli (i.e., negative priming). 
Chapter 8: the Multiple-Route Multiple-Stage framework 
 
 217
Secondly, in circumstances where S-R learning does not occur, positive (and 
equal) priming should be present for both congruent and incongruent stimuli.  This 
would be due to the strengthening of connections between perceptual and stimulus 
representations and/or between stimulus and semantic representations.  Given the 
evidence that amnesic patients with damage to the MTL do not show typical S-R 
effects, this prediction could be tested using such a population.  If amnesic patients 
are impaired in the encoding and retrieval of S-R bindings, they should show 
significant positive priming in the Orthogonal condition regardless of response 
congruency.  If evidence were produced to support these two predictions it would 
confirm that the lack of priming seen for incongruent stimuli in the Orthogonal 
condition was a result of counteracting facilitation and interference effects.  
 
8.3.4.3 Repetition-related changes in neural activity 
 
In Chapters 5-6 I saw evidence for both S-R and CP contributions to repetition-related 
neural changes (e.g., repetition suppression).  Using fMRI I saw significant RS in 
occipital/temporal ventral visual regions that is most readily explained by facilitation 
of component processes.  The framework explains such reductions in neural activity 
by the strengthening of connections between pre-existing stimulus representations.  
Such strengthening could act to speed-up processing time in these regions, resulting in 
a more rapid curtailing of activity within such regions. Because the BOLD signal 
integrates over several seconds of neural activity, such curtailment of neural activity 
would cause a decrease in the BOLD response (although other neural mechanisms for 
RS exist; Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Chapter 5 also provided evidence for RS in 
inferior prefrontal regions that was sensitive to response repetitions/reversals.  The 
framework predicts that the component process and response retrieval route interact in 
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prefrontal regions.  This interaction should result in neural decreases when the 
response generated by the two routes is congruent.  This is because the congruent 
information arriving at each response representation will result in the more rapid 
accumulation of information needed to effect a decision.  When the response 
generated by the two routes is incongruent, neural increases should be seen (compared 
to experimentally novel stimuli).  This is because the incongruent information arriving 
at each response representation results in competition between the two competing 
representations, producing greater activity within these regions. The present fMRI 
results showed repetition suppression following response repetition and repetition 
enhancement (i.e., greater activity compared to novel stimuli) following response 
reversal, in line with the predictions of the MR-MS framework. 
 Finally, the framework predicts that repetition effects resulting from the 
strengthening of connections between pre-existing stimulus representations should 
occur prior to effects due to the congruency of response between the two routes.  This 
is because the stimulus representations are upstream of the task-dependent 
representations where such S-R effects are predicted to manifest.  The EEG data 
presented in Chapter 6 suggests that this is the case.  Whereas the repetition effects 
that were thought to be related to facilitation of component processes occurred 400-
600ms post stimulus-onset, the effects thought to be related to S-R learning occurred -
200 to -100ms prior to response-onset.  Given response onset typically occurred 
800ms post stimulus-onset, these data suggest that the component process effects seen 
in the EEG data occurred prior to the S-R effects.  Furthermore, although the 
component process effects were time-locked to stimulus-onset, the S-R effects were 
time-locked to response-onset.  These data suggest that component process effects 
reflect the facilitation of processes that are closely tied to the presentation of a 
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particular stimulus.  S-R effects however are more closely tied to response preparation 
(i.e., are locked to response-onset) suggesting they occur further downstream. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
The present thesis presented evidence for the contribution of S-R effects to 
behavioural priming and repetition-related changes in neural activity.  Such S-R 
effects were found to dominate behavioural repetition priming in long-lag semantic 
classification paradigms, with little if any evidence for facilitation of component 
processes.  This dominance questions the commonly held assumption that priming 
reflects the facilitation of one or more component processes, casting doubt on research 
that utilises priming (e.g., Franks et al., 2000; Thompson-Schill & Gabrieli, 1999; 
Vriezen et al., 1995; Wig et al., 2005; Xiong et al., 2003) and repetition-related neural 
changes (e.g., Ghuman et al., 2008; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2003; Wig et 
al., 2005) as a means to study underlying mental and neural representations. 
 S-R learning was found to occur at multiple levels of stimulus and response.  
The retrieval of such S-R bindings was found to facilitate processing when the 
retrieved response was congruent with the response required on repetition of a 
stimulus, and interfere with processing when the retrieved response was incongruent.  
These S-R effects were found only after stimuli were attended at both initial and 
subsequent presentation, suggesting that attention is necessary for both the encoding 
and retrieval of S-R bindings. 
 fMRI and EEG data found evidence for both S-R and CP contributions to the 
repetition-related changes in neural activity associated with behavioural priming.  
Whereas CP contributions were found in occipital/temporal ventral visual regions, as 
shown using fMRI, and were locked to stimulus-onset, as shown using EEG, S-R 
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contributions were found in inferior prefrontal regions (fMRI) and were locked to 
response-onset (EEG).  Both the fMRI and EEG data suggest that such CP and S-R 
contributions to repetition-related neural changes are spatially distinct, with differing 
underlying neural generators. 
Given current theories of priming are not able to encompass all the results 
presented in the present thesis, a novel framework of priming was introduced.  The 
multiple-route multiple-stage (MR-MS) framework includes two routes to response 
selection, a component process and S-R retrieval route.  It is the interaction of these 
two routes within prefrontal regions that is capable of explaining the facilitation and 
interference effects following response repetition/reversal respectively in the present 
data.  This dual route framework is also able to incorporate much of the literature on 
priming that has demonstrated both CP and S-R contributions to priming.  
Furthermore, this framework incorporates results from fMRI and EEG experiments on 
priming, embedding CP and S-R effects within specific brain regions.  Overall, this 
framework is designed to encompass a wide range of cognitive neuroscientific 
research, highlighting the importance of S-R learning effects within stimulus 
repetition (i.e., priming) experiments. 
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Appendices 
 
Analyses of error rates and proportional measures of priming are reported below. 
 
Chapter 2 
A-1 Experiment 1 
 
The error data were entered into a 3x2x2 (Task x Repetition x Prime-level) ANOVA 
that revealed a significant effect of Task, F(1.9, 21.2) = 59.74, p<.001, reflecting 
greater accuracy for the “man-made” Orthogonal task compared to the “bigger than 
shoebox” task in both the Same, t(11) = 8.66, p<.001, and Reverse, t(11) = 10.78, 
p<.001, conditions (Same vs. Reverse, t(11) = .50, p=.63).  No main effect of 
Repetition was present, F(1, 11) = .01, p=.93, although the Repetition x Prime-level 
interaction was close to significance, F(1.7, 18.8) = 3.53, p=.06.  Despite this trend for 
a significant interaction, no repetition effects were seen for any of the three Tasks 
individually (t’s < 1.96, p’s>.08) when collapsing across Prime-level. 
 The mean RT data for Novel stimuli alone were entered into a 3x2 (Task x 
Prime-level) ANOVA revealing a main effect of Task, F(1.7, 18.4) = 10.12, p<.01.  
Further tests revealed longer RTs for the Same and Reverse compared to the 
Orthogonal condition, t’s>3.61, p’s<.01, presumably because participants found the 
“man-made” task easier than the “bigger-than-shoebox” task.  To control for these 
baseline RT differences, a proportional priming measure ((Novel-Repeated)/Novel) 
was used in a 3x2 (Task x Prime-level) ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of Task, 
F(1.6, 17.2) = 10.42, p<.001, replicating the Task-by-Repetition interaction for the 
subtractive measure of priming reported in Chapter 2.  Proportional priming was 
greater in the Same relative to Reverse, t(11) = 3.64, p<.01, and Orthogonal, t(11) = 
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4.61, p<.01, conditions (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(11) = 1.42, p=.18).  Proportional 
priming was significant in both the Same, t(12) = 8.60, p<.001, and Reverse, t(12) = 
2.82, p<.05, conditions, but not the Orthogonal condition, t(12) = .72, p=.49. 
 
A-2 Experiment 2 
 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA on errors revealed a significant main effect of Task, F(1.5, 25.8) = 
92.69, p<.001, reflecting greater accuracy in the Orthogonal compared to both the 
Same, t(17) = 11.67, p<.001, and Reverse, t(17) = 9.56, p<.001, conditions (Same vs. 
Reverse, t(17) = .66, p=.52).  No main effect of Repetition was present, F(1, 17) = 
.53, p=.48, nor did this factor interact significantly with any other (F’s<2.33, p’s>.13). 
ANOVA on the mean RT data for Novel items in Experiment 2 showed a 
main effect of Task, F(1.4, 24.5) = 24.44, p<.001.  Further tests revealed shorter RTs 
for the Same and Reverse compared to the Orthogonal condition, t’s>4.70, p’s<.001.  
Therefore, a 3x2 (Task x Prime-level) ANOVA was performed on the proportional 
priming scores. This showed a significant main effect of Task, F(1.7, 29.3) = 9.74, 
p<.001, replicating the Task-by-Repetition interaction for the subtractive measure of 
priming reported in Chapter 2. Proportional priming was greater in the Same relative 
to the Reverse, t(17) = 4.18, p<.01, and Orthogonal, t(17) = 4.28, p<.01, conditions 
(Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 0.56, p=.58).  Proportional priming was significant in 
the Same condition, t(17) = 5.98, p<.001, but not the Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 
.60, p=.56, though failed to reach significance in the Reverse condition, t(17) = 1.10, 
p=.29, unlike when using the subtractive measure. 
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A-3 Experiment 3 
 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA on errors revealed a trend towards a Task x Repetition interaction, 
F(1.6, 17.5) = 3.42, p=.07, reflecting greater accuracy for repeated stimuli in the 
Same, t(11) = 2.78, p<.05, but not the Reverse or Orthogonal conditions (t(11)’s<1.0).  
Therefore repeating a response between Study and Test led to greater accuracy than 
when a response was reversed.  These results reinforce the effect of priming, in that 
repetition of stimuli in the Same task both increased priming and reduced errors in 
relation to the Reverse task.  No further main effects or interaction approached 
significance, F’s<1.7, p’s>.21.  In particular, no main effect of Task was seen as the 
task at Test remained constant in Experiment 3 (but the Study task varied). 
 ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in Experiment 3 failed to reveal any 
main effects or interactions, F’s<2.4, p’s>.12.  Nonetheless, A 3x2 ANOVA on the 
proportional priming data was performed, revealing a main effect of Task, F(1.7, 
18.6) = 6.40, p<.01, replicating the Task x Repetition interaction for the subtractive 
measure of priming seen in Chapter 2.  Post-hoc tests revealed significantly greater 
priming in the Same than Reverse, t(11) = 2.76, p<.05, and Orthogonal, t(11) = 3.18, 
p<.01, condition (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(11) = 1.35, p=.20).  Furthermore, 
significant priming was seen in the Same, t(11) = 5.69, p<.001, and Reverse, t(11) = 
2.52, p<.05, condition but not Orthogonal condition, t(11) = .95, p=.37. 
 
Chapter 3 
A-4 Experiment 4 
 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Task, F(1.3, 22.7) = 23.66, 
p<.001, reflecting greater accuracy in the Same than Reverse condition, t(17) = 4.42, 
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p<.001, and the Reverse than Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 3.72, p<.01 (Same vs. 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 5.92, p<.001).  The greater accuracy in the Same compared to 
Reverse condition may reflect the greater amount of experience participants had with 
the “bigger than shoebox” compared to the “smaller than shoebox” task (given the 
task at Study was always “bigger than shoebox”).  No main effect of Repetition was 
present, F(1, 17) = 1.13, p=.30, nor did this factor interact with any other (F’s<.81, 
p’s>.44). 
ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in Experiment 4 revealed a main effect 
of Task, F(1.6, 27.8) = 39.62, p<.002.  Further tests revealed shorter RTs for the Same 
than the Reverse condition, t(17) = 3.59, p<.01, and the Reverse than Orthogonal 
condition, t(17) = 6.08, p<.001 (Same vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 7.29, p<.001).   
Although the longer RTs in the Orthogonal condition were expected, given the 
difficulty of the “taller-than-wide” task, it is unclear why the Reverse condition 
produced longer RTs than the Same condition.  In any case, a 3x2 ANOVA on the 
proportional priming data revealed a significant main effect of Task, F(1.5, 25.3) = 
23.55, p<.001 (the Task x Prime-level interaction also approached significance, F(1.9, 
32.3) = 2.66, p=.09), replicating the Task-by-Repetition interaction for the subtractive 
measure of priming seen in Chapter 3. Priming was greater in the Same compared to 
the Reverse, t(17) = 6.74, p<.001, and Orthogonal, t(17) = 5.44, p<.001, conditions 
(Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 1.78, p=.09). Proportional priming was significant in 
the Same condition, t(17) = 8.79, p<.001, and a trend in the Reverse condition, t(17) = 
1.69, p=.12, but not in the Orthogonal condition, t(17) = .37, p=.72. 
 
A-5 Experiment 5 
 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Task, F(1.5, 26.1) = 19.58, 
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p<.001, reflecting greater accuracy in the Same than Reverse condition, t(17) = 3.05, 
p<.01, and the Reverse than Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 3.10, p<.01 (Same vs. 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 6.67, p<.001).  No main effect of Repetition was present, F(1, 17) 
= .05, p=.83, however a significant Task x Repetition interaction was seen, F(1.7, 
28.3) = 3.53, p<.05.  Post-hoc tests revealed significantly greater errors for Repeated 
stimuli in the Reverse condition compared to the Same condition, t(17) = 3.17, p<.01.  
Indeed, there was a significant effect of Repetition in the Reverse condition, t(17) = 
2.75, p<.05, that was not present in the Same, t(17) = 1.42, p=.17, or Orthogonal, 
t(17) = .92, p=.37, conditions.  These results reinforce the effect of priming, in that 
repetition of stimuli in the Reverse task both reduced priming and increased errors 
compared to the Same task. 
ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in Experiment 5 revealed a main effect 
of Task, F(1.8, 30.2) = 63.27, p<.001.  Further tests revealed shorter RTs for the Same 
than the Reverse condition, t(17) = 2.40, p<.05, and the Reverse than the Orthogonal 
condition, t(17) = 7.37, p<.001 (Same vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 11.08, p<.001).  A 3x2 
(Task x Prime-level) ANOVA on the proportional priming data revealed a significant 
main effect of Task, F(1.8, 29.8) = 21.65, p<.001 replicating the Task-by-Repetition 
interaction for the subtractive measure of priming reported in the main paper. Priming 
was greater in the Same compared to the Reverse, t(17) = 5.32, p<.001, and 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 7.11, p<.001, conditions (Reverse vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 0.03, 
p=.98). Proportional priming was significant in the Same condition, t(17) = 10.03, 
p<.001, a trend in the Reverse condition, t(17) = 1.52, p=.16, and significant in the 
Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 2.24, p<.05. 
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A-6 Experiment 6 
 
A 3x2x2 ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of Task, F(1.5, 24.9) = 15.73, 
p<.001, reflecting greater accuracy in the Same, t(17) = 4.77, p<.001, and Reverse, 
t(17) = 3.82, p<.001, condition compared to the Orthogonal condition (Same vs. 
Reverse, t(17) = .78, p=.48).  No main effect of Repetition was present, F(1, 17) = 
.30, p=.59, nor did this factor significantly interact with any other (F’s<1.47, p’s>.24). 
ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in Experiment 6 revealed a main effect 
of Task, F(1.4, 23.3) = 31.11, p<.001.  Further tests revealed shorter RTs for the Same 
than the Reverse condition, t(17) = 5.59, p<.001, and the Reverse than the Orthogonal 
condition, t(17) = 3.71, p<.01 (Same vs. Orthogonal, t(17) = 7.33, p<.001).  A 3x2 
ANOVA on the proportional priming data revealed a significant main effect of Task,  
F(1.7, 28.4) = 27.90, p<.001 (the Task x Prime-level interaction also approached 
significance, F(1.6, 26.5) = 3.48, p=.06), replicating the Task-by-Repetition 
interaction for the subtractive measure of priming reported in the main paper. Further 
tests revealed significantly greater priming in the Same than Reverse condition, t(17) 
= 3.15, p<.01, and Reverse than Orthogonal condition, t(17) = 3.67, p<.01 (Same vs. 
Orthogonal, t(17) = 8.98, p<.001. Proportional priming was significant in the Same, 
t(17) = 16.45, p<.001, Reverse, t(17) = 11.03, p<.001, and Orthogonal, t(17) = 3.13, 
p<.05, conditions. 
 
Chapter 4 
A-7 Experiment 7 
 
A 3x2x2 (Task x Repetition x Prime-level) ANOVA on errors failed to reveal any 
significant main effects or interactions (Repetition, F(1, 17) = .11, p=.75). 
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A 3x2 (Task x Prime-level) ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in 
Experiment 7 did not reveal any reliable differences, F’s<2.28, p’s>.12. Nonetheless, 
analysis of proportional priming was performed for completeness. A 3x2 (Task x 
Prime-level) ANOVA on the proportional priming data revealed significant main 
effects of Task, F(1.5, 24.7) = 23.62, p<.001, and Prime-level, F(1, 17) = 8.20, p<.05.  
The main effect of Task replicates the Task-by-Repetition interaction for the 
subtractive measure of priming reported in the main paper.  The main effect of Prime-
level replicates the Prime-level-by-Repetition interaction for the subtractive measure 
of priming, showing greater priming for High- than Low-primed items irrespective of 
Task. Further tests revealed significantly greater priming in the Same-Action Same-
Decision than Different-Action Same-Decision condition, t(17) = 3.00, p<.01, and 
Different-Action Same-Decision than Different-Action Different-Decision condition, 
t(17) = 3.99, p<.01.  Proportional priming was significant in the Same-Action Same-
Decision, t(17) = 13.13, p<.001, Different-Action Same-Decision, t(17) = 10.14, 
p<.001, and Different-Action Different-Decision, t(17) = 2.43, p<.05, conditions. 
 
A-8 Experiment 8 
 
A 2x2x2x2 (Classification-congruency x Decision-congruency x Prime-level x 
Repetition) ANOVA on errors failed to reveal a main effect of Repetition, F(1, 23) = 
1.39, p=.25, however a Repetition x Prime-level interaction was present, F(1, 23) = 
5.00, p<.05, reflecting fewer errors for Low-primed repeated stimuli (compared to 
Novel), t(23) = 2.08, p<.05, that was not present for High-primed repeated stimuli, 
t(23) = .21, p=.84.  An Classification-congruency x Prime-level interaction was also 
present, F(1, 23) = 9.37, p<.001, reflecting greater errors for High- than Low-primed 
Classification-incongruent stimuli, t(23) = 2.37, p<.05, that was not present for 
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Classification-congruent stimuli, t(23) = 1.47, p=.19. 
A 2x2x2 (Classification-congruency x Decision-congruency x Prime-level) 
ANOVA on mean RTs for Novel items in Experiment 8 revealed a significant 
Classification-congruency x Decision-congruency x Prime-level interaction, F(1, 23) 
= 10.30, p<.01, plus a main effect of Classification-congruency, F(1, 23) = 37.00, 
p<.001.  A 2x2x2 (Classification-congruency x Decision-congruency x Prime-level) 
ANOVA on proportional priming showed a significant Decision-congruency x Prime-
level interaction, F(1, 23) = 6.80, p<.05 (Classification-congruency x Prime-level, 
F(1, 23) = 2.15, p=.16), plus main effects of Decision-congruency, F(1, 23) = 23.37, 
p<.001, and Prime-level, F(1, 23) = 6.25, p<.05 (the main effect of Classification-
congruency also approached significance, F(1, 23) = 3.94, p=.06).  Further analyses 
(as in the main text) revealed significantly greater priming for Low- than High-primed 
Incongruent trials for both Decision-, t(23) = 3.73, p<.01, and Classification-
congruency, t(23) = 2.68, p<.01, which was not present for Congruent trials, t’s<.95, 
p’s>.35.  Furthermore, priming was significantly greater for Congruent than 
Incongruent trials for both Decision-congruency, t(23) = 4.88, p<.001, and 
Classification-congruency, t(23) = 2.08, p<.05.  Therefore, effects of both 
Classification- and Decision-congruency were still present despite making allowances 
for baseline RT differences. 
 
A-9 Experiment 9 
 
A 2x2x2x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency x Prime-level x Repetition) ANOVA on 
errors revealed significant main effects of Prime-level, F(1, 15) = 6.41, p<.05, 
reflecting greater accuracy for High- than Low-primed stimuli, and Congruency, F(1, 
15) = 100.89, p<.001, reflecting greater accuracy for Congruent than Incongruent 
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stimuli.  No main effect of Repetition was seen, F(1, 15) = .54, p=.48, nor did this 
factor interact with any other, F’s<2.3, p’s>.15. 
 A 2x2x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency x Prime-level) ANOVA on mean RTs 
for Novel items in Experiment 9 revealed a significant main effect of Prime-level, 
F(1, 15) = 8.04, p<.05, reflecting faster RTs for Low- than High-primed stimuli (note 
that stimuli are arbitrarily split between these conditions, so this effect is likely to be a 
Type I error), and Congruency, F(1, 15) = 70.99, p<.001, reflecting slower RTs for 
Incongruent than Congruent stimuli.  A further Stimulus-type x Congruency 
interaction was seen, F(1, 15) = 5.78, p<.05, reflecting a greater Congruency effect in 
the Word-Picture than Picture-Picture condition.  Given these Novel RT differences, a 
2x2x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency x Prime-level) ANOVA on the proportional 
priming data was performed.  This revealed significant main effects of Stimulus-type, 
F(1, 15) = 5.07, p<.05, revealing greater priming for the Picture-Picture than Word-
Picture condition, and Congruency, F(1, 15) = 56.81, p<.001, revealing greater 
priming for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli.  These main effects however were 
superseded by a Stimulus-type x Congruency interaction, F(1, 15) = 4.68, p<.05, 
revealing a greater Congruency effect in the Picture-Picture than Word-Picture 
condition.  Thus, these data replicate the main findings of the subtractive priming 
analyses. 
 
Chapter 5 
A-10 Experiment 10 
 
A 3x2 (Stimulus-type – Picture-Picture, Word-Picture, Novel x Congruency) ANOVA 
on errors revealed a main effect of Congruency, F(1, 17) = 11.10, p<.01, reflecting 
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greater accuracy for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli.  No further main effects or 
interactions were present, F’s<.13, p’s>.83. 
 Given RTs were faster for Novel Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, t(17) = 
6.08, p<.001, the proportional priming data were entered into a 2x2 (Stimulus-type – 
Picture-Picture, Word-Picture x Congruency) ANOVA.  This revealed main effects of 
Stimulus-type, F(1, 17) = 71.02, showing greater priming for the Picture-Picture than 
Word-Picture condition, and Congruency, F(1, 17) = 23.92, p<.001, with no 
interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) = .39, p=.54.  Thus these results replicate 
the Repetition x Congruency effects seen in the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
subtractive priming analyses. 
 
Chapter 6 
A-11 Experiment 11 
 
A 3x2 (Stimulus-type x Congruency) ANOVA on errors revealed a main effect of 
Stimulus-type, F(1.5, 26.2) = 5.68, p<.05, reflecting greater accuracy for Novel than 
Picture-Picture stimuli, t(17) = 2.67, p<.05, but not Novel than Word-Picture stimuli, 
t(17) = 1.31, p=.21.  A main effect of Congruency was also revealed, F(1, 17) = 
24.60, p<.001, with greater accuracy for Congruent than Incongruent stimuli.  These 
effects however were superseded by a Stimulus-type x Congruency interaction, F(1.6, 
27.4) = 6.01, p<.01.  Post-hoc tests of error priming (Novel – Repeated) revealed a 
significantly greater accuracy for Novel than Incongruent stimuli in the Picture-
Picture, t(17) = 3.39, p<.01, and a similar trend in the Word-Picture condition, t(17) = 
2.04, p=.06.  No error priming was seen for Congruent stimuli, t(17)’s<.96, p’s>.35.  
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Thus, the retrieval of an Incongruent response resulted in decreased accuracy 
compared to Novel stimuli. 
 Given RTs were faster for Novel Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, t(17) = 
5.70, p<.001, the proportional priming data were entered into a 2x2 (Stimulus-type x 
Congruency) ANOVA.  This revealed main effects of Stimulus-type, F(1, 17) = 
52.73, p<.001, reflecting greater priming for the Picture-Picture than Word-Picture 
condition, and Congruency, F(1, 17) = 27.66, p<.001, reflecting greater priming for 
Congruent than Incongruent stimuli, as well as a Stimulus-type x Congruency 
interaction, F(1, 17) = 12.42, p<.01, reflecting a greater Congruency effect in the 
Picture-Picture than Word-Picture condition.  These analyses therefore replicate the 
Repetition x Congruency interactions seen in the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture 
subtractive priming analyses as well as the significant difference in Congruency effect 
seen across the Picture-Picture and Word-Picture conditions. 
 
Chapter 7 
A-12 Experiment 12 
 
A 3x2 (Study-context – Attended, Unattended-Congruent, Unattended-Incongruent x 
Repetition) ANOVA on errors revealed main effects of Repetition, F(1, 16) = 90.15, 
p<.001, reflecting greater errors for Repeated than Novel stimuli, and Study-context, 
F(2.0, 31.3) = 5.17, p<.05, reflecting greater errors for Unattended-Incongruent than 
Attended stimuli, t(16) = 3.21, p<.01, and a trend for greater error for Unattended-
Congruent than Attended stimuli, t(16) = 2.04, p=.06.  No Study-context x Repetition 
interaction was present, F(1.6, 25.6) = 2.57, p=.11. 
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 Despite an 3-way ANOVA comparing Novel RTs across Study-context failing 
to reveal a significant effect, F(1.3, 21.4) = 1.94, p=.18, the proportional priming data 
were entered in a 3-way (Attended, Unattended-Congruent, Unattended-Incongruent) 
ANOVA.  This revealed a significant effect of Study-Context, F(1.9, 29.9) = 9.54, 
p<.01, showing greater priming in the Attended than both the Unattended-Congruent, 
t(16) = 3.05, p<.01, and Unattended-Incongruent, t(16) = 4.35, p<.01, condition.  
Although priming was significant in the Unattended-Congruent, t(16) = 2.09, p<.05, 
but not the Unattended-Incongruent, t(16) = .37, p=.71, condition no significant 
difference was seen between these conditions, t(16) = 1.48, p=.16.  These results 
therefore replicate the main subtractive priming analyses in that no effect of 
congruency was seen for previously unattended stimuli. 
 
A-13 Experiment 13 
 
A 3x2 (Study-context x Prime-level) ANOVA on error priming revealed a main effect 
of Prime-level, F(1, 19) = 8.36, p<.01, reflecting greater error priming (Repeated > 
Novel) for High- than Low-primed stimuli, and Study-context, F(1.7, 32.5) = 15.81, 
p<.001, reflecting greater error priming for Unattended-Congruent than Attended 
stimuli, t(19) = 2.99, p<.01, and a borderline effect for greater error priming for 
Unattended-Incongruent than Unattended-Congruent stimuli, t(19) = 2.18, p=.06.  No 
Study-context x Prime-level interaction was present, F(2.0, 37.7) = .15, p=.86. 
 Despite the fact than Novel stimuli were not included as a factorial 
manipulation in the present experiment (i.e., there was a single Novel condition), the 
proportional priming data were entered into a 3x2 (Study-context x Prime-level) 
ANOVA revealing a significant effect of Study-context.  Post-hoc tests revealed 
significantly greater priming for Attended than Unattended-Congruent, t(19) = 5.96, 
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p<.001, and Unattended-Incongruent, t(19) = 7.91, p<.001, stimuli.  No significant 
difference was seen between the two Unattended conditions, t(19) = 1.26, p=.22, nor 
did these conditions demonstrate significant priming, t(19)’s<1.9, p’s>.08.  Therefore, 
as in the subtractive priming analyses, no significant effect of congruency was seen 
for unattended stimuli. 
 
A-14 Experiment 14 
 
A 3x2 (Study-context x Test-context) ANOVA on errors failed to reveal any 
significant effects or interactions, F’s<.48, p’s>.51.  Although no difference in RTs 
was seen between the two Novel conditions, t(12) = .12, p=.91, the proportional data 
were entered into a 2x2 (Study-context x Test-context) ANOVA.  This analysis failed 
to reveal any main effects or interactions, F’s<.31, p’s>.59. 
 
A-15 Experiment 15 
 
A 3x2 (Study-context x Test-context) ANOVA on errors failed to reveal any 
significant effects or interaction, F<1.9, p’s>.19.  Although no difference in RTs was 
seen between the two Novel conditions, t(12) = .07, p=.94, the proportional data were 
entered into a 2x2 (Study-context x Test-context) ANOVA.  This analysis failed to 
reveal any main effect or interactions, F’s<1.3, p’s>.30. 
